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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the overall impact of financial liberalisation on Nepal’s 
financial system and economy. The study is specifically directed towards analysing the 
rationale of executing a financial liberalisation policy; preparing an account of the 
evolution, process and sequencing of the financial liberalisation; and evaluating the 
impact of the various liberalisation measures on financial and economic developments of 
Nepal with cointegration and causality tests.  
The study makes significant contributions in the area of the impact evaluation of 
financial liberalisation. Most of the previous studies focus on the economic growth aspect 
of financial liberalisation in detail, but attach less importance to the redistribution of 
income and stability of the financial systems. To bridge this gap, an aggregated 
framework for impact evaluation, which includes all of the three dimensions, is 
implemented in this study. The framework implemented in this study is useful not only 
for the impact evaluation of financial liberalisation policy, but also for other public 
policies. 
A summary index of the financial liberalisation comprising eight policy 
instruments is employed in this study. As some of these instruments have not been 
immediately fully employed, the index is designed to take into account their gradual 
implementation. The instruments are interest rate deregulation, removal of entry barriers, 
reduction in reserve requirement, easing in credit controls, implementation of prudential 
rules, stock market reform, privatisation of state-owned banks and external account 
liberalisation. A sequential procedure has been applied to test for unit roots on time series 
data. This procedure helps to determine the optimal test method for each time series 
under consideration and reduces the risk of model misspecification and biased results.  
The empirical test results obtained using the Nepalese quarterly data from 1970-
2003 suggest that financial liberalisation in Nepal has had a mixed impact on the 
financial system and the national economy. The number of per capita bank branches is 
found to be positively associated with the widening of the financial sector, which in turn 
affects financial development positively. The real deposit interest rate affects the volume 
of time deposits (savings) positively, but the increase in gross domestic product does not 
 xiii
affect time deposits. The volume of time deposits affects the volume of bank loans 
positively, but the lending rate does not have a significant impact on the volume of bank 
loans. Collectively, the financial liberalisation measures are positively associated with 
per capita income as well as with industrial development. 
The population density per bank branch is found to be positively associated with 
the volume of bank credit to the poor, while the overall measures of financial 
liberalisation are negatively associated with such credit. The results also suggest that 
financial liberalisation is positively associated with the credit-deposit ratio of the 
commercial banks. However, the higher credit-deposit ratio is not only associated with 
higher return, but also with higher risk. Therefore, it can be argued that financial 
liberalisation has brought instability in the Nepalese financial sector.  
The overall finding of this study is that financial liberalisation is positively 
associated with growth, but negatively associated with income equality and financial 
stability. However, the study does not find any causal relationship between financial 
development and economic growth in Nepal. Hence, the financial liberalisation in Nepal 
has not facilitated a financial development to the extend that contributed significantly to 
the economic development of the country. 
 1
  
 
 
Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Orientation 
The developing countries until the 1970s focused on state-initiated development 
and mainly emphasized infrastructure development. They believed that basic 
infrastructures would open the door for economic growth and development. Following 
this approach, resources were directed towards the building of roads, power, 
communication, and so on. The concept was that if a well functioning infrastructure was 
in place, the private sector also would be attracted to investing in new projects. This in 
turn would help industrial development in the country, and ultimately, a higher 
economic growth would be achieved.  
Despite the planned efforts of the governments, developing countries could not 
achieve economic growth to a satisfactory level. The private sector participation could 
not be increased, mainly due to the resource scarcity. Whatever resources were available 
in the market also could not be used efficiently, because of the under-developed and 
highly controlled financial systems in these countries. Acknowledging this situation, the 
emphasis of developing countries has shifted from infrastructure development to 
financial sector development. 
However, the highly controlled state of the financial system in developing 
countries pulled the private sector back from playing an active role in the economy. The 
government controlled the interest rates and credit ceilings, owned banks and financial 
institutions, and framed regulations with a view to making it easy for the government to 
acquire the financial resources at a cheap rate. Since the nominal interest rate was 
controlled and the real interest rate mostly remained negative, savings could not be 
encouraged. As a result, investment could not increase to the desired level. This 
ultimately slowed the economic growth.  
As early as 1973, McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) have identified this 
problem of financial repression in developing countries and have argued for a 
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liberalisation of the financial system. The World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund, since mid 1980s, started to prescribe financial liberalisation as a basic framework 
for member developing countries to foster their economic growth (Nepal Rastra Bank 
2001a; The World Bank Group 2005). With this, the era of financial liberalisation 
started in the developing countries with the technical and financial assistance of the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The initial liberalisation measures 
taken by some developing countries in early 1980s showed very impressive results. This 
type of result became the motivating factor for other developing countries to liberalise 
their financial sector. But the financial liberalisation did not only bring prosperities for 
the developing countries; it became a cause of financial fragility too. The Asian 
financial crisis of 1997 emerged out of the backdrop of financial liberalisation. 
Nevertheless, financial liberalisation still remains an ongoing process in developing 
countries.  
 
1.2 Objectives of Financial Liberalisation in Nepal 
The Nepalese financial system, until the mid 1980s, was comprised of less than 
a dozen banks and financial institutions including the central bank. As in other 
developing countries, financial repression in Nepal existed in the form of control of 
interest rates, ceilings on bank credit, directed credit policies, high reserve requirements 
and entry barriers for new banks and financial institutions. As a result, the banking and 
financial services could not reach a wider population, and bank loans could not be 
extended in sufficient amount due to the prevailing credit ceilings. Hence, the financial 
system could not cater to the demand of the areas other than the favoured ones. Due to 
the ‘repressed’1 and underdeveloped state of the financial system, wherever and 
whatever banking and financial services were available were primitive in nature and 
grossly inefficient. In this context, the main objective of financial liberalisation in Nepal 
was to ‘widen’ and ‘deepen’ the financial system and enhance efficiency through 
increased competition so that the financial system becomes able to aid in the economic 
growth of the country. The following sub-sections shed light on the main objectives of 
implementing financial liberalisation policy in Nepal. 
 
                                                 
1 Financial ‘repression’ is a state where the financial sector is highly regulated. 
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1.2.1 Financial Widening 
‘Financial widening’ refers to the increasing use of money in exchanging goods 
and services. There had been an increased use of money in Nepal following the 
establishment of Nepal Bank Limited (NBL) in 1937, Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB) in 
1956, and Rastriya Banijya Bank (RBB) in 1966. However, there was still scope for 
financial widening mainly because of the existence of vast non-monetised activities in 
rural areas in general, and the agricultural sector in particular (Khatiwada 1999).  
Although the state-owned commercial banks extended their branches in remote 
areas of the country, this was not sufficient. Not all the banking service needs of the 
businesses and the households were catered to by the existing banks, since they were 
directed to provide the banking services to the specified sectors and for the specified 
purposes only. Most of the rural population had to depend on village shop keepers and 
money lenders for their banking service needs. In this context, the financial 
liberalisation policy in Nepal was aimed at expanding banking services to the wider 
population, as well as to widen investment in different sectors and geographical areas. 
One of the key features of financial liberalisation is interest rate deregulation, 
which leads to a positive real deposit rate and thereby attracts more savings. In 
developing countries, there is a greater need of investment from the public as well as the 
private sector in order to achieve a higher economic growth. Higher investment is 
possible only with higher savings mobilisation. Therefore, the positive real deposit rate 
is instrumental in savings mobilisation, increased investment, and ultimately in higher 
economic growth. In the past, when interest rates were controlled, attempts by the NRB 
to keep the real deposit rates positive via frequent adjustments in the nominal interest 
rate, along with changes in inflation rate were not successful all the time. This was 
caused by delays in the implementation of policy changes (Khatiwada 1999). Therefore, 
financial liberalisation was aimed at maintaining the real deposit rate positive by 
removing ceilings on nominal interest rates. 
Private sector investment is regarded to be more efficient than public sector 
investment, because of the incentives associated with the returns on investment. As the 
owners of investment projects, private individuals get higher returns on their 
investment. In the case of public investment, the manager has relatively weaker 
incentives because he is not the owner, and hence gets only a fraction of the return on 
investment (Shleifer 1998, pp.137-138). Therefore, increased private sector investment 
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is supposed to accelerate economic growth. But due to the seigniorage collection by the 
government in the form of high reserve requirements, the private sector investment was 
crowded-out by government investment, thus adversely affecting economic growth. In 
this context, one of the specific objectives of the financial liberalisation in Nepal was to 
increase the availability of credit to the private sector so that the private sector 
investment is promoted and available financial resources are invested more efficiently. 
 In developing countries, where domestic resource mobilisation is at an 
inadequate level, foreign capital may be a crucial means to increase investment. When 
the financial system is highly regulated, foreign capital inflow cannot be expected 
because of the high restrictions on repatriation. Therefore, one of the reasons for 
adopting financial liberalisation policies in Nepal was to attract foreign capital. The 
removal of entry barriers in the banking sector of Nepal was specifically targeted at 
attracting foreign capital for the establishment of new banks. The establishment of new 
banks will not only increase competition in the banking sector but also will cater to the 
demands of a wider section of the population. 
 
1.2.2 Financial Deepening 
  Financial liberalisation was not only limited to financial widening but was also 
intended to deepen the financial sector. ‘Financial deepening’, which is measured as a 
ratio of financial assets or broader monetary aggregates to the gross domestic product 
(GDP), refers to the greater financial resource mobilisation in the formal financial 
sector, and the ease in liquidity constraints of banks and enlargement of funds available 
to finance projects (Fisher 1993). High financial deepening creates a favourable 
environment for increased resource deployment in the economy, which in turn can lead 
to an accelerated economic growth. In this context, enhanced financial deepening for 
accelerating economic growth was one of the objectives of financial liberalisation in 
Nepal (Khatiwada 1999). 
Economic activities in the country can be greatly facilitated by modern banking 
services. Financial deepening involves the introduction and intensive use of new 
financial products. In the past, government-owned commercial banks limited their 
services in offering only ‘traditional’ banking products. Thus, the businesses, 
households and the government were deprived of modern banking and financial service 
products. In this context, financial liberalisation was also aimed at modernizing the 
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banking system in order to avail modern banking and financial service products in the 
Nepalese financial markets. 
Financial intermediation cost becomes high when the administrative cost of 
banks is high. Administrative costs of two Nepalese government-owned banks remained 
high, resulting in a high intermediation cost. One of the main reasons of such high cost 
was the use of traditional management structure, technology, method and process by 
these banks. In this context, financial liberalisation in Nepal was also aimed at reducing 
the administrative costs of the banks.  
The interest rate spread, i.e., the gap between the interest rate charged by the 
bank on loans extended and the interest rate offered on the deposits collected, plays a 
vital role in deciding the volume of resources mobilized. A higher interest rate spread 
means that a higher interest rate is charged on loans and a lower interest rate is paid on 
the deposits. A persistent high interest rate spread inhibits financial development. When 
the interest rate spread is low, the depositors receive a higher interest on their resources 
and the borrowers get the resources at a lower interest rate. The interest rate spread of 
the commercial banks had remained quite high. Therefore, one of the specific objectives 
of financial liberalisation was to lower the interest rate spread of the banks.  
Banks and financial institutions perform the financial intermediary role by 
collecting financial resources from surplus units and availing that to the deficit units. 
When the deficit units receiving the resources through the bank do not pay back, the 
bank cannot return the funds to the depositors, or the surplus unit. Such an overdue 
loan, which is known as a non-performing asset (NPA) obstructs the financial 
intermediation process. The NPA of the two Nepalese state-owned commercial banks, 
NBL and RBB, stood at 16 per cent and 35 per cent of their total loan portfolios before 
1984, respectively; this indicated the bad health of these institutions. Therefore, 
financial liberalisation was also aimed at reducing the non-performing assets of these 
banks. 
 As mentioned earlier, Nepalese banks and financial institutions were offering 
traditional banking products in the traditional way and thus remained far from using 
such modern technology as computer hardware and software, and other electronic 
means and equipment. Therefore, one of the specific objectives of financial 
liberalisation was to create an environment of technology transfer, in order to facilitate 
the use of modern technology in the Nepalese banking system.   
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1.2.3 Competition and Efficiency  
Another objective of financial liberalisation was to increase competition and 
efficiency in the financial system. Due to the highly regulated environment and a secure 
market, there was no competition in the financial system and as a result, banks and 
financial institutions remained inefficient. To tackle this problem, financial 
liberalisation was aimed at nurturing competition and through this, promoting efficiency 
in the financial system.  
As is the case of financial systems of other developing countries, the Nepalese 
financial system was characterised by inefficient resource allocation. Regulated interest 
rate and credit ceilings, directed credit, and lack of competition were the main reasons 
behind such allocation. Deregulation of interest rate, removal of credit constraints, and 
introduction of competition helps mobilise the financial resources to high yielding 
sectors, which in turn leads to a higher economic growth. Therefore, one of the specific 
objectives of financial liberalisation was to improve the allocative efficiency of the 
available resources.   
Improved competition enhances operational efficiency by lowering financial 
intermediation costs, by improving service quality and promoting innovation. This 
stimulates savings and investment, and thus has a direct bearing on economic growth. In 
this context, financial liberalisation also was aimed at improving the operational 
efficiency in the financial sector. 
 The needs of the customers are ever changing. To fulfil such changing needs and 
to utilize newly developed technology, methods and processes, banks and financial 
institutions need to have dynamic efficiency within them. With such efficiency only 
these institutions can generate the host of new financial instruments required to cater to 
the changing needs of the consumers. Both the depositors and the borrowers can benefit 
from such development. Therefore, one of the expected outcomes of financial 
liberalisation in Nepal was enhancing the dynamic efficiency in the financial system. 
With a view to achieving the above-mentioned objectives, Nepal started 
financial liberalisation process in mid 1980s, and various measures have been employed 
under this process. The effectiveness of the policy in general and various policy 
measures in particular is unknown since a comprehensive impact study of the policy has 
not been conducted so far. In this context, this study aims at bridging this gap. 
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1.3 Objectives of the Study 
Different measures adopted in the process of financial liberalisation in Nepal 
have certainly brought some changes in different aspects of the financial system and the 
country’s national economy. In order to ascertain its effectiveness, it is necessary to 
conduct the impact evaluation of the policy. In this regard, this study intends to examine 
various aspects of financial liberalisation in Nepal.  
The main objectives of the study are as follows:  
 to examine the rationale of executing financial liberalisation policy in 
general, 
 to prepare an account of the evolution, process and sequencing of the 
financial liberalisation in Nepal, and 
 to evaluate the impact of the various liberalisation measures on financial 
system and economic growth of Nepal.  
 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
 This thesis is divided into 7 chapters. Chapter 1 is the introductory part of the 
thesis. Chapter 2 presents a comprehensive survey of the literature on financial 
liberalisation. This survey forms the theoretical basis for my study of the Nepalese case. 
In this chapter, the relationship between the financial system and economic growth is 
analysed; the theory of financial repression and financial liberalisation is discussed; the 
importance of the proper sequencing of liberalisation measures is highlighted; and 
issues related to welfare and financial fragility are examined. 
  Chapter 3 describes the liberalisation process in Nepal. In this chapter, an 
overview of the Nepalese economy is presented; the Nepalese financial system before 
liberalisation is discussed; and, the measures adopted under liberalisation process are 
analysed. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the methodology of this study. This chapter develops an 
aggregated framework for impact evaluation and outlines the hypotheses of the study. A 
financial liberalisation index is constructed to reflect the level of financial liberalisation 
in Nepal. Econometric models are specified in order to conduct the empirical tests on 
the impact of financial liberalisation on economic growth, distribution and financial 
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stability. The nature and sources of the data used in this study are also discussed in this 
chapter.  
Chapter 5 deals with the unit root test on the time series of the variables used for 
studying the impact of financial liberalisation in Nepal. Various methods of the unit root 
test are reviewed, and a sequential procedure based upon a general to specific approach 
is developed. The unit root test results obtained by employing the sequential procedure 
is presented and interpreted in this chapter.  
Chapter 6 contains the empirical results of the study. The cointegration and 
causality test statistics are presented and their results are summarised in this chapter. 
The long run relationships detected by the cointegration test assess the impact of 
financial liberalisation on various aspects of the Nepalese financial as well as economic 
systems. Similarly, the causality test results shed light on the direction of the causality 
between variables. 
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis. The major empirical findings of the study are 
highlighted and their policy implications are analysed in this chapter. This chapter also 
indicates the contribution of the study and suggests issues for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE 
  
This chapter presents the survey of the literature on financial liberalisation, 
which forms the theoretical basis of this study. In section 1, the role of the financial 
system in economic development is discussed. Section 2 sheds light on the concept of 
financial repression and outlines the issues associated with it. Section 3 reviews the 
theoretical background behind financial liberalisation and analyses the empirical 
findings of the previous research works. The importance of sequencing of financial 
liberalisation is illuminated in section 4. In section 5, various aspects of financial 
liberalisation and welfare are appraised. Section 6 examines the link between financial 
liberalisation and financial fragility. And finally, summary of the chapter and 
concluding remarks are presented in section 7. 
 
2.1 Role of Financial System in Economic Growth 
The financial system plays an important role in the process of economic 
development. Its primary task is to move scarce funds from those who save to those 
who borrow for consumption and investment. By making funds available for lending 
and borrowing, the financial system provides the means for economic growth.  
 The financial system determines both the cost and the quantity of credit. What 
happens in this system has a powerful impact upon the health of the entire economy. 
When credit becomes more costly and less available, total spending for goods and 
services falls; businesses cut back production and reduce their inventories. As a result, 
unemployment rises and economic growth slows down. In contrast, when the cost of 
credit declines and loanable funds become more readily available, total spending in the 
economy increases, more jobs are created, and economic growth accelerates.  
However, economists differ in their viewpoints regarding the role of finance in 
economic growth. In fact, the relationship between financial development and economic 
growth has remained an issue of debate. Subsequently, sub-section 2.1.1 highlights such 
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differing viewpoints possessed by economists in some detail, and sub-section 2.1.2 
discusses the relationship and causality between financial development and growth. 
Similarly, sub-section 2.1.3 presents an overview of the channels through which 
financial development is said to affect real economic growth.  
 
2.1.1 Different Viewpoints 
In the literature, three different views have emerged concerning the potential 
role of finance on economic growth. The first view considers finance as a critical 
element of growth. According to this view, services provided by the financial system 
are essential for growth. The second view regards finance as a relatively unimportant 
factor in growth. In this perspective, as the real sectors of the economy grow, the 
demand for various financial services rises and thus will be met by the financial sector. 
This view clearly suggests that financial development simply follows economic growth. 
The third view goes even further to claim that the financial development may 
potentially have negative impact on growth. The key studies related to each of these 
three views are discussed below. 
As early as 1911, Joseph Schumpeter claimed that the services provided by 
financial intermediaries form an element of economic development through channelling 
the society’s funds to the most innovative entrepreneurs (Schumpeter 1934, p.103). 
Hicks (1969, pp. 144-145) argues that financial development played a crucial role in 
igniting industrialization in England. The industrial revolution required funds for long-
term capital investment. Emergence of financial markets that traded a variety of 
securities encouraged savers to hold such assets, and these availed liquid funds for long-
term investment. “The industrial revolution may not have occurred without this liquidity 
transformation (Levine 1997, p.692).” These arguments highlight the role of the 
financial system in economic development. 
In contrast, some prominent economists view finance as a relatively unimportant 
factor in economic development. Robinson (1952) claims that financial development 
primarily follows economic growth. She asserts: “by and large, it seems to be the case 
that where enterprise leads finance follows (p.20).” Similarly, Lucas (1988, p.6) states, 
“the importance of financial matters is very badly over-stressed.” His model of 
economic growth encompasses physical capital, human capital and technological 
change as the only factors affecting economic growth.  
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Van Wijnbergen (1982, p.134; 1983, p.60) and Buffie (1984, p.312) highlight 
the role played by curb market in developing countries and suggest that in certain cases, 
financial development may have a negative impact on growth. According to this view, 
as the formal financial system develops, the funds move from a curb market to the 
formal financial market. But due to the reserve ratio requirement in formal markets, the 
entire fund switched from the curb market cannot be loaned. This reduces the aggregate 
domestic credit supply. The reduction in the supply of credit leads to a credit crunch, 
which can retard economic growth by lowering investment and slowing the production. 
This view strongly contradicts the common assertion that the financial development 
leads to efficient financial intermediation, and thereby increases the aggregate credit 
supply. Their views particularly overlook the risk factor, which might be crucial in 
determining the volume of credit supply.  
 
2.1.2 Relationship and Causality 
The pioneering empirical work by Goldsmith (1969) was successful in 
documenting the positive relationship between financial development and economic 
growth. Goldsmith used annual data for a period from 1880 to 1963 from 35 countries 
and employed a financial interrelations ratio1 to relate the process of financial 
development to modern economic growth. He asserts that financial superstructure 
accelerates economic growth and improves economic performance by facilitating the 
migration of funds to the place in the economic system where the funds will yield the 
highest social return (Goldsmith 1969, p.400).  
Development economists frequently express their scepticism about the 
relationship between finance and growth by ignoring the role of the financial system. 
Chandavarkar (1992) notes that none of the pioneers of development economics even 
listed finance as a factor in development.  This claim, however, has been challenged by 
Lewis (1955), one of the pioneers of development economics. He has postulated a 
relationship between financial development and economic growth. He observes that 
financial markets develop as a consequence of economic growth, which in turn feeds 
back as a stimulant to real growth. This view has been supported by Patrick (1966).  
                                                 
1  Goldsmith derived the financial interrelations ratio (FIR) by dividing the value of all financial 
instruments outstanding by the value of national wealth.  
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Patrick (1966) proposes a useful framework for the study of the causal 
relationships between finance and growth. He highlights the distinction between the 
‘supply-leading approach’ and the ‘demand-following approach’ in financial 
development. According to his views, ‘demand-following’ financial development 
appears as a consequence of the development of the real sector, whereas ‘supply-
leading’ financial development precedes demand for financial services, and can have an 
autonomously positive impact on growth. This hypothesis suggests the two-way 
causality that may exist between financial development and economic growth (Patrick 
1966, pp.174-177). 
Since the seminal work of Goldsmith (1969), economists have been showing 
their concern about the relation between financial development and economic growth. A 
growing body of empirical studies and cross-country comparisons revealed a strong 
positive link between the functioning of the financial system and long-run economic 
growth. McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) also documented a positive correlation 
between growth and indicators of financial development. However, these studies fail to 
explain the direction of causality between financial development and economic growth.  
A series of studies have been devoted to analyse the direction of causality 
between financial development and economic growth. Most contemporary studies put 
forward the idea that financial development has a strong causal influence on growth 
(Gupta 1984; King and Levine 1993a; Blommestein and Spencer 1996; Levine 1997; 
Rajan and Zingales 1998; Levine 1999; Beck, Levine et al. 2000; Xu 2000; Carlin and 
Mayer 2003; Fase and Abma 2003). This view suggests that the direction of causality 
runs from the financial to real development. Similarly, some studies have also claimed 
that there exists a bi-directional relationship between financial development and 
economic growth (Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990; Luintel and Khan 1999). Contrary 
to the above assertions, some studies do not find any strong causal relationship between 
financial development and economic growth (Demetriades and Hussein 1996; Ram 
1999).  
Gupta (1984) attempted to empirically examine whether financial development 
was the consequence of or the cause of economic growth. He conducted causality test 
for 14 developing countries using the data from the 1961-1980 period2, and employing 
                                                 
2  Time periods for some countries vary. 
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five different variables3 as proxies for financial development and industrial production 
as a proxy for real economic growth. He found that economic growth was the result of 
financial development. He also reports some evidence of causality from real to financial 
variables, with even lesser evidence for two-way (simultaneous) causality. This finding 
mainly suggests that the direction of causality ran from financial development to 
economic growth (Gupta 1984, p.41, 56).  
King and Levine (1993a) conducted an empirical study using data on 80 
countries over the 1960-1989 period. They employed four indicators of financial 
development: overall size of the formal financial system; bank deposits; credit allocated 
to the private enterprises; and, claims on the non-financial private sector. They found 
that higher levels of financial development are positively associated with faster rates of 
economic growth, physical capital accumulation, and economic efficiency 
improvements (King and Levine 1993a, p.719). 
Xu (2000) examines the effects of permanent financial development on domestic 
investment and output in 41 countries for the sample period of 1963-1993. He includes 
real GDP, real domestic investment, and an index of financial development in his 
multivariate Vector Auto-Regressive (VAR) framework. The result rejects the 
hypothesis that financial development simply follows economic growth and has very 
little effect on it. Instead, there is strong evidence that financial development is 
important to growth (Xu 2000, p.333-334, 343).  
Beck et al. (2000) employ data for 63 countries over the period 1960-1995 to 
examine the relation between financial intermediary development and sources of 
growth. They use private credit4 and liquid liabilities5 as measures of financial 
intermediary development. They find that there is a robust, positive link between 
financial intermediary development and both real per capita GDP growth and total 
factor productivity growth (Beck et al. 2000, p.265). 
                                                 
3  Gupta uses M1 (currency plus demand deposits), M2 (M1 plus quasi money), CR (total domestic 
credit), PCR (total private credit), and F (total finance) as the indicators of financial development.  
4  Private credit is equal to the value of credits extended by financial intermediaries to the private sector 
divided by GDP. 
5  Liquid liabilities equal the liquid liabilities of the financial system, calculated as currency plus demand 
and interest-bearing liabilities of financial intermediaries and non-bank financial intermediaries, 
divided by GDP. 
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Fase and Abma (2003) conduct the empirical study for nine emerging economies 
in Asia for a sample period of 25 years (1974-1999)6. They use balance sheet totals of 
the banking sector as the measure of financial development. They report that financial 
development matters for economic growth and that causality runs from the level of 
financial intermediation and sophistication to growth (Fase and Abma 2003, p.16, 20).  
 Carlin and Mayer (2003) examine the interrelation between the structure of a 
country’s financial systems and industrial growth. They use the data from the OECD 
countries over the period 1970 to 1995, and employ the investment of 27 industries as 
the proxy for industrial growth. They report a strong relation between the structure of 
countries’ financial systems and growth of industries in these countries. They found a 
particularly strong relation between the structures of countries’ financial systems and 
the growth of industries that are dependent on external equity and skilled labour (Carlin 
and Mayer 2003, p. 6).   
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) found growth and financial structure to be 
inextricably linked. They claim that growth provides the means to develop financial 
structure, while financial structure in turn allows for higher growth since investment can 
be more efficiently undertaken (Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990, p.457-458). Luintel 
and Khan (1999) empirically examine the long-run causality between financial 
development and economic growth in a multivariate time series framework using data 
from 10 sample countries. Their finding supports the bi-directional causality between 
financial development and economic growth in all the countries analysed (Luintel and 
Khan 1999, p. 402).  
However, Demetriades and Hussein (1996) find very little support for the view 
that finance is a leading sector in the process of economic development. They find 
evidence in quite a few countries that economic growth systematically causes financial 
development. Similarly, Ram (1999) argues that the preponderance of empirical 
evidence does not encourage one to share the view that financial development is 
observed to have a positive effect on economic growth (Ram 1999, p.172).  
 
2.1.3 Transmission Channel 
A series of recent growth studies have analysed the various channels through 
which financial development can contribute to economic growth. Pagano (1993) argues 
                                                 
6  Sample periods for some countries vary. 
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that financial intermediation can affect economic growth “by acting on the saving rate, 
on the fraction of saving channelled to investment, or on the social marginal 
productivity of investment (Pagano 1993, p.621).” This view tends to highlight savings 
and investment as the transmission channel through which financial intermediation 
affects growth.  
The World Bank (1989) believes that efficient financial systems help economic 
growth “partly by mobilising additional financial resources and partly by attracting 
those resources to the best uses (The World Bank 1989, p.40).” Dornbusch and Reynoso 
(1989) also hold a similar view. They observe that financial factors in economic 
development potentially exert an influence through two channels: they affect the 
availability of savings, and also the intermediation of these savings to the highest return 
investment opportunities (Dornbusch and Reynoso 1989, p.204). This view clearly 
suggests that the financial system add to growth through mobilization and the efficient 
use of financial resources. 
Bencivenga and Smith (1991) use savings deposited in banks as the factor 
leading to growth and show that the creation and growth of financial institutions leads 
to a positive relationship between financial intermediation and economic growth.  
Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) find a positive effect of financial development on 
the long-run growth of real per capita GDP. Their findings suggest that the effect of 
financial intermediation on growth is due mainly to its impact on the efficiency of 
investment, rather than its volume. They find that only one-fourth of the effect of 
financial development on growth is channelled through the volume of investment; and 
the rest three-fourth explained by an improved efficiency of investment.  
Demirgucs-Kunt and Levine (1996) offer empirical evidence for the importance 
of stock market development for output growth. Beck et al. (2000) found that the level 
of financial development and the surroundings in which financial intermediaries and 
markets operate influence economic growth.  
Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) suggest a positive effect on per capita growth 
through improvement in the quality of bank loans. This result implies that the 
improvement in the quality of bank loans is the main channel through which economic 
growth is influenced. 
Hermes and Lensink (1996) point out the functions and services provided by 
financial markets to highlight their importance in the process of economic growth. 
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According to them, financial markets create an accepted medium of exchange, which 
facilitates trade among economic agents, and provide various services related to 
stimulating the volume of savings, and transferring these savings to the most efficient 
investment projects. This view is supported by Berthelemy and Varoudakis (1996). 
They observe that the major contribution of a financial system to growth comes from 
the setting up of an efficient and adaptable system of payments. A reliable means of 
exchange is a necessary condition for growth. In cases where no such system exists, 
prohibitive transaction costs cancel out any productivity gains linked to the division of 
labour, and the beginning of some sort of economic growth.  
Levine (1997) argues that financial function may affect economic growth 
through two channels: capital accumulation and technological innovation. Blommestein 
and Spencer (1996); Levine and Zervos (1998); and Beck and Levine (2001) suggest 
that stock market liquidity and bank development positively influences economic 
growth. Rajan and Zingales (1998) emphasize that financial development lowers the 
costs of external financing, and therefore fosters economic growth.  Xu (2000) regards 
investment as an important channel through which financial development affects 
growth. Carlin and Mayer (2003) claim that financial development can affect economic 
growth through industrial growth with increased investment in industries.  
 It is obvious from the above discussion that increased savings, efficient 
investment, active stock market activities, quality bank services, transaction ease, and 
suitable financial structure are the possible channels through which financial 
development can influence economic growth. 
   It can be observed that there is a growing consensus that financial development 
positively influences real growth. Financial development through enhanced banking 
services and stock market activities facilitates financial intermediation. Efficient 
financial intermediation reduces transaction costs and financial risks, and thus 
influences the savings rate. It channels the funds to the most productive enterprises and 
facilitates technological innovation, ultimately helping long-term growth. This view has 
the direct policy implication that developing countries can accelerate their economic 
growth through reforming their financial sector.    
 Despite the widely recognized importance of financial development, many 
governments in the past have obstructed the development process in the financial sector 
by introducing a whole host of restrictions and controls. The following section discusses 
 17
the arguments behind such restrictions and controls, and also highlights the measures 
and consequences of financial repression. 
 
2.2 Financial Repression 
 
Financial ‘repression’, the term coined by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), 
refers to a state where the financial sector is highly regulated and distorted by the 
government through various measures. Interest rate ceilings on bank deposits and loans, 
compulsory credit allocation, heavy reserve requirements, and various types of 
prohibition on international financial transactions are common features of a repressed 
financial system. In such a repressed state, real deposit rates of interest are often 
negative, and foreign exchange rates also become highly uncertain (McKinnon 1991, 
p.11).  
Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995) assert that governments repress financial 
development by “not allowing the financial sector to operate at its full potential by 
introducing all kinds of regulations, laws, and other nonmarket restrictions to the 
behaviour of banks and other general financial intermediaries (p.277).”  
 In a repressed financial sector, the reserve requirements provide an important 
means of forced borrowing from the private sector, and preferred borrowers receive 
heavily subsidized credit from the banking sector. The deposit rate of interest is fixed by 
government regulation, so that it can no longer adjust to bring about a savings-
investment balance. Actual investment is only about 80 per cent of desired investment 
at existing inflation and interest rates (Lewis 1992, p.153). 
Fry (1980) interprets financial repression as the technique of holding 
institutional interest rates, particularly deposit rates of interest, below their market 
equilibrium levels (p.317). 
 The following sub-sections shed light on the reasons behind implementing the 
policy of repression, various repression measures adopted by governments, and the 
consequences of financial repression. 
 
2.2.1 Rationale for Repression 
In most developing countries fiscal deficits are significant and persistent. They 
do not have efficient taxation systems. Therefore, in order to finance their fiscal deficits, 
governments may choose to repress the financial sector because it delivers them easy 
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inflationary revenue (Denizer, Desai et al. 1988, p.2; Roubini and Sala-i-Martin 1992, 
p.28; 1995, p.298). Such ‘easy’ revenues are also known as seigniorage7 revenues. 
Monetary expansion is a much easier method of financing government expenditures. 
The money is simply printed on the backing of government securities. No government 
tax collectors are required, and government expenditures appear to be financed at little 
cost to the public. Legislative approval is often not required (Espinosa and Hunter 1994, 
p.4). 
Seigniorage extraction is a less problematic method of raising revenue. It can be 
accomplished by imposing large reserve requirements on commercial banks. These 
reserve requirements force commercial banks to hold government liabilities such as 
currency or government bonds beyond the point they would otherwise consider optimal. 
Through such large reserve requirements, the monetary authority, and eventually the 
government, avails itself of part of the economy’s savings that would otherwise remain 
with financial intermediaries (Espinosa and Hunter 1994). 
Another frequently cited reason behind financial repression is imposing the anti-
usury law to intervene in the free determination of interest rates, in order to protect the 
public from exploitation. Similarly, the allocation of subsidized credit to the favoured 
sector is another ground for financial repression. Such directed credit programs are 
carried out due to the government’s belief that commercial banks allocate credit in a 
largely speculative and socially undesirable fashion, and that they knew better than 
markets what the optimal allocation of savings was, or what kind of investments were 
more or less desirable (Roubini and Sala-i-Martin 1992, p.7; Espinosa and Hunter 1994, 
p.4). This claim was frequently supported with evidence from high-growth economies 
in East Asia, where governments supposedly manipulated financial systems in order to 
promote targeted industrial expansion (Denizer, Desai et al. 1988p.2). 
 It is also argued that a strict control and regulation of the banking system under 
financial repression would give the monetary authorities a better control over the money 
supply. Similarly, financial repression is associated with interest rates below market 
rates, which reduces the costs of servicing government debts (Roubini and Sala-i-Martin 
1992, p.7).   
                                                 
7  ‘Seigniorage’ is a term derived from the French word ‘seigneur’, which means lord. In medieval times, 
one of the rights of the feudal lord was to coin money that his subjects had no choice but to accept, no 
matter how little gold or silver it contained. Seigniorage was the profit the lord made by exercising this 
right (Espinosa and Hunter 1994, p.4). 
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2.2.2 Repression Measures 
 According to McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), high reserve requirements, 
taxation of financial intermediaries, capital controls, interest rate ceilings, mandatory 
purchases of government debt, and directed credit policies are the direct and indirect 
measures of financial repression.  
The interest rate ceiling is one of the measures most commonly used by 
governments to repress the financial sector. Until the 1970s, economists assumed that 
low interest rates would promote investment spending and economic growth in 
accordance with Keynesian and neoclassical theories (Morisset 1993, p.133). With a 
view to keep the interest rate low, governments through their central banks fix a ceiling 
for interest on deposits and loans. Commercial banks and other financial institutions are 
compelled to set their interest rates strictly following this ceiling. Governments in 
financially repressed regimes tend to control deposit and lending rates below the level 
of the inflation rates, so that real interest rates will tend to be artificially low and 
negative (Roubini and Sala-i-Martin 1995, p.21).  
A high reserve requirement is another measure of financial repression. A reserve 
requirement is one of the common monetary instruments used by the central banks for 
monetary control since reserve ratio plays a key role in money supply. Money supply 
(M), in simple terms consists of currency (CU) and deposits at banks (D): 
DCUM +=            (2.1) 
Currency and reserve (RE) constitute high-powered money (H): 
RECUH +=           (2.2) 
The money supply process can be summarized by three variables: the currency-
deposit ratio, cu = CU/D; the reserve ratio, re = RE/D; and the stock of high-powered 
money, H. Rewriting equations (1) and (2) we get M = (cu + 1)D and H = (cu + re)D. 
We can express the money supply in terms of its principle determinants, re, cu, and H:  
HH
cure
cuM µ=
+
+= 1           (2.3) 
Where µ is the money multiplier given by:   
cure
cu
+
+= 1µ  
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The above relationship clearly reflects the importance of reserve in money 
supply.  
The reserve requirement is expressed as the ratio of reserve to total deposits 
mobilized by the banks. In other words, banks need to keep certain portions of their 
total deposits as reserve. In a financially repressed economy, central banks instruct 
commercial banks to maintain a high cash reserve ratio (CRR) and statutory liquidity 
ratio (SLR). In order to maintain the CRR, a part of the reserve is held in cash in the 
bank’s vault and part is held with central bank. Banks have to pay interest on deposits 
mobilized by them, but they cannot use the CRR equivalent portion of deposits for 
earning purposes. Similarly, banks maintain SLR by putting certain portions of their 
deposits on government-approved securities.  
Reserve requirement creates an artificial demand for government securities. 
Since the banks have to purchase the government bonds, the government is able to 
borrow from the banking sector at an interest rate lower than that charged to the private 
sector (Gupta and Lensink 1997, p.352). This provision crowds-out the private sector 
investment.   
Credit rationing and cheaper credit to the public enterprises as well as to other 
favoured sectors are other measures through which governments exercise financial 
repression. Credit rationing is a condition of loan markets in which the lenders’ supply 
of funds is less than the borrowers’ demand at the quoted contract term (Jaffee 1989, 
p.103). Due to the below market level lending rates, the demand for credit exceeds the 
capacity to supply. Because of such excessive demand for credit, the government 
invariably begins to ration credit among competing users. Similarly, under the repressed 
system, banks are not allowed to invest all of their financial resources on high-yielding 
projects. Instead, they are directed to extend certain portions of their credit to certain 
sectors at a lower interest rate (Denizer, Desai et al. 1988, p.3; Roubini and Sala-i-
Martin 1995, p.6).  
 
2.2.3 Consequences of Financial Repression 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) claim that repressing the financial system 
fragments the domestic capital market, with highly adverse consequences for the quality 
and quantity of real capital accumulation. They highlight the damaging effects of 
repressive policies on economic growth. According to them, various mandated 
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restrictions interact with ongoing price inflation to reduce the attractiveness of holding 
claims on the domestic banking system. In such a repressed system, real deposit rates of 
interest on monetary assets are often negative, and rates also become highly uncertain.  
In a repressed financial system, the flow of loanable funds through the organized 
banking system is reduced, forcing potential borrowers to rely more on self-finance. 
Interest rates on the truncated flow of bank lending vary arbitrarily from one class of 
favoured or disfavoured borrower to another. The process of self-finance within 
enterprises and households is itself impaired. Since the real yield on deposits, as well as 
on coin and currency, is negative, firms cannot easily accumulate liquid assets in 
preparation for making discrete investments. Socially costly inflation hedges look more 
attractive as a means of internal finance. Significant financial deepening outside the 
repressed banking system becomes impossible when firms are dangerously illiquid, 
and/or inflation is high and unstable. Inflows of foreign financial capital may be 
unproductive when the domestic capital market is in disarray and the foreign exchange 
rates are unpredictable (McKinnon 1991, pp.11-12). 
Haslag and Koo (2003) assess the empirical link between financial repression, 
financial development and growth using the data from 119 countries for the 1960-89 
period. They use the inflation rate and the reserve ratio as measures of financial 
repression. They report that countries with high reserve ratios, on average, grow more 
slowly than countries with low reserve ratios. Countries with high reserve ratios also 
tend to have less developed financial systems than countries with low reserve ratios. 
And, countries with high reserve ratios, on average, have high inflation rates as well 
(Haslag and Koo 2003, pp.8-9).  
 Another study conducted by Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995) claim that 
policies of financial repression have negative effects on economic growth. They use 
data from 98 countries for the period of 1960-1985 in their study. They find a 
systematic inverse relation between growth and several measures of financial 
repression, as well as a negative relation between growth and inflation rates (Roubini 
and Sala-i-Martin 1995, p.7). According to them, countries that are financially repressed 
will have higher inflation rates, lower real interest rates, higher base money per capita 
and lower per capita growth than countries that are financially developed. This result 
suggests that financial repression is harmful to economic growth (Roubini and Sala-i-
Martin 1995, pp.17-18).  
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 Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995) also argue that among the many explanations 
given in the literature on the weaker growth performance of Latin America, policies that 
systematically repress the financial sector are among the most convincing. Repressive 
policies hurt economic growth because financial intermediation is an important 
component of the aggregate production function. The marginal product of capital of an 
economy more financially developed is larger than the marginal product of a less 
financially developed economy (Roubini and Sala-i-Martin 1995, p.6). 
  High inflation is one of the main characteristics of a repressed economy. De 
Gregorio (1995) documents the evidence that the level of inflation and its variability, as 
well as money growth, have negative effects on economic growth. Quantitatively, the 
effects of inflation on growth appear to be important. He claims that if inflation rates 
had been half of their level in 12 Latin American countries during the 1950-85 periods, 
per capita GDP growth would have been at least 25 per cent higher. The findings 
suggest that the main channel through which inflation affects growth is through the 
reduction of the productivity of capital (pp.273, 293).  
 The distortions created in the financial system by the policy of repression crowd 
out high-yielding investment, create a preference for capital-intensive projects, 
discourage future savings, and thereby reduce both the quality and quantity of 
investment in an economy (McKinnon 1973; Denizer, Desai et al. 1988; Gupta and 
Lensink 1997). Similarly, taxing interest income on government bonds held by the non-
bank private sector also has a negative effect on capital formation (Gupta and Lensink 
1997, p.368). 
 Denzier et al. (1988) examine relationships between financial restrictions and 
some fiscal indicators using annual data for 25 transition economies for the period 
1990-1996. They report that tax losses are associated with higher real reserve ratios in 
deposit-taking banks, and that positive fiscal balances are associated with higher real 
discount rates. These findings suggest that repressive financial controls may be adopted 
not to finance deficits more cheaply than would be the case under financial 
liberalisation, but to maintain the authority and ensure the survival of those in power 
(Denzier et al. 1988, p.16). 
 Fry (1980) conducts regression analysis using data for 61 developing countries 
for the 1964-1976 period. He argues that estimates of saving and growth functions lead 
to the conclusion that the cost of financial repression appears to be around half a 
 23
percentage point in economic growth foregone for every one percentage point by which 
the real deposit rate of interest is set below its market equilibrium rate (Fry 1980, 
p.317).   
 Kang and Sawada (2000) highlight the status of human capital under financial 
repression. They argue that a policy of repression tends to result in lower human capital 
investment, thus lowering the long run economic growth rate (Kang and Sawada 2000, 
p.437).  
 According to Lewis (1992), in a repressed financial system, the government 
manipulates the banking sector for its seigniorage through the control of reserve 
requirements and regulation of deposit rates, which frequently results in a negative real 
return to saving. In addition, subsidized borrowing rates are offered to favoured sectors 
or groups in the economy, distorting resource allocation and forcing those not favoured 
to borrow at high marginal rates from the banking sector or the informal curb market 
(Lewis 1992, p.152).  
 Fry (1988) points toward the effects of financial repression on the country’s 
balance of payments. He argues that repression can exacerbate the growth-inhibiting 
effects of foreign debt accumulation in developing countries. Financial repression may 
cause capital flight through over-invoicing of imports and under-invoicing of exports. 
The balance of payments deficit on current account rises when such capital flight 
increases. Such illegal capital flight can also affect domestic investment by increasing 
the domestic real interest rate because the financial capital in the domestic market 
becomes scarce (Fry 1988, p.78).  
 The literature discussed above focuses mainly on economic growth and criticises 
the government policies for restrictions on the financial sector. However, the literature 
totally ignores the welfare aspect of the economy. For most countries, economic growth 
may not be the sole objective. They may want to maintain a balance between economic 
growth and social welfare instead. Subsidised credit to favoured sectors mainly serves 
the objectives of social welfare. Similarly, seigniorage also can add to welfare, if the 
governments use such funds judiciously. Therefore, an ideal government can be 
assumed to optimise the growth as well as welfare by adopting some policies of 
restriction. But unfortunately, one cannot find any good example of such a government 
in the real world. 
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It can be seen from the above discussion that governments choose the policy of 
financial repression mainly in order to collect easy money for financing their budget 
deficits, to have control over the monetary instruments to enable them for effective 
regulation, and to direct the capital toward the favoured sectors. The belief that 
government can achieve a socially efficient allocation of resources than the private 
sector is another reason behind the adoption of financial repression policies. But such 
policies of financial repression in practice have been proved to be harmful to economic 
growth.  
Seigniorage collection leads to inflation. High inflation and an interest rate 
below the market equilibrium rate cause real interest rates to be low or negative. When 
the real interest rate is low or negative, it discourages savings and thereby investment. 
Directed credit to the favoured sector results in a low return on investment. Therefore, 
empirical studies have clearly shown that the policies of financial repression are 
negatively correlated with economic growth. 
The widely felt damaging effects of financial repression policies on economic 
growth have given birth to the theories of financial liberalisation. Following these 
theories, countries have been liberalizing their financial system since the 1970s. This 
process is still ongoing in several developing countries. In the subsequent section, the 
theories of financial liberalisation are discussed in some detail. 
 
2.3 Financial Liberalisation 
The economic performance of many countries deteriorated more and more under 
the policy of financial repression. Financial systems in these countries contracted, and 
the efficiency of their lending and of their operations deteriorated, eventually leading to 
widespread bank insolvency. The declared distributional goals of the policies also could 
not be met. Growth and macroeconomic stability were impaired. Negative real interest 
rates resulted in severe disintermediation, capital flight, and a national dependence on 
foreign funding as domestic savers sought to preserve their capital abroad (Caprio, 
Honohan et al. 2001, p.5). From this backdrop, the concept of financial liberalisation 
emerged. 
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2.3.1 Rationale, Objectives and Evidence  
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) recognized that financial repression, which 
consisted of interest rate ceilings, high reserve requirements and directed credit policies, 
reduced the amount of domestic investment and its productivity. They came up with the 
idea of liberalising the financial sector as a cure for the ills caused by repression. Their 
view was supported by a group of economists, who are known as the McKinnon-Shaw 
school. This school of thought provided a theoretical ground for the financial 
liberalisation movement in developing countries.  
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) emphasized the removal of interest rate 
ceilings as the key measure of financial liberalisation. They assumed that removal of 
such ceilings would increase real interest rates, which in turn would stimulate savings. 
The underlying assumption is that saving is responsive to interest rates. The higher 
saving rates would finance a higher level of investment. According to this view one 
should expect to see higher saving rates as well as higher levels of investment following 
financial liberalisation (Reinhart and Tokatlidis 2001, p.4). This school of thought also 
hypothesises that higher interest rates will increase the allocative efficiency of credit by 
shifting funds from inefficient investments to more efficient investments through 
organized sectors. Based on these hypotheses, the McKinnon-Shaw school argued that 
financial liberalisation would lead to higher economic growth (Cho 1990, p.479). 
The main objective of financial liberalisation is to increase the supply and 
improve the allocation of funds for investment (McKinnon 1973; Shaw 1973; Fry 
1988). A number of liberalisation programs supported by the international financial 
institutions over the years have had the explicit objective of increasing interest rates 
from levels that in many cases were substantially negative in real terms (Reinhart and 
Tokatlidis 2001, p.2; Laeven 2003). 
Financial liberalisation often also comprises external liberalisation. The full or 
partial opening of an economy’s capital account permits overseas lending and 
borrowing and attracts multinational corporations and multinational banks into the 
country. The elimination of interest rate ceilings helps attract more savings, while 
together with less lending restrictions, entices banks to supply more credit. Further, 
greater external opening helps to meet the excess demand of credit by providing access 
to international financial markets, and by making domestic intermediaries more efficient 
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through greater competitive pressures following the entry of multinational banks  
(Weller 1999, p.66). 
Financial reforms also consist of the scaling down of directed credit programs. 
This measure allows banks to shift part of their funds from low yielding projects to high 
yielding investments. Barriers to entry in the banking sector are removed or lowered as 
well, and the development of securities markets is stimulated (Laeven 2003, p.6). Entry 
of the banks into the market helps widen the financial system, increasing the banks to 
population ratio. Similarly, development of the securities market avails the capital for 
longer-term investments as well as helps maintain the liquidity in the market.   
Shaw (1973) argues that financial liberalisation brings monetary variables under 
discipline and contributes to the stability of the economy. Increased saving may be used 
in the place of international reserve, and the dependence on foreign aid is reduced. More 
flexible foreign exchange rates can also absorb some of the shocks of international 
trading. Government budgets are not dependent on inflation tax to finance the deficits, 
so there are no bursts of inflation (Shaw 1973, pp.11-12).  
Economists also claim that financial liberalisation allows cross-country risk 
diversification. International capital markets can channel world savings to their most 
productive uses, irrespective of location. Liberalisation also promotes transparency and 
accountability, reducing adverse selection and moral hazard while alleviating liquidity 
problems in financial markets. Moreover, international capital markets help to discipline 
policymakers, who might be tempted to exploit an otherwise captive domestic capital 
market. In this way, financial liberalisation through triggering the financial development 
tends to greatly facilitate economic growth (Obstfeld 1998; Mishkin 2001; Kaminsky 
and Schmukler 2003). 
Thus, the theoretical models mainly predict that financial liberalisation can 
promote economic development by increasing saving, investment, and the productivity 
of capital. However, there is no professional consensus on the net benefits of financial 
liberalisation. The evidence from both developing and developed economies points to 
the mixed results associated with the implementation of financial liberalisation policies.  
Bekaert et al. (2001) argue that financial liberalisation increases economic 
growth. They analyse the effects of liberalisation by employing the data from 95 
countries for the 1980-1997 period, and taking economic growth rates, the components 
of GDP (consumption, government, investment and trade), and the official financial 
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liberalisation indicator as variables. Their findings suggest that financial liberalisation 
proxied by equity market liberalisation leads to a one per cent increase in annual real 
per capita GDP growth over a five-year period. They find this increase to be statistically 
significant (p.34). They also find that the investment to GDP ratio increases, with 
investment partially financed by foreign capital. Another study by Bekaert and Harvey 
(2001) documents that financial liberalisation alone contributes to 30 per cent of the 
total increased growth (p.5). 
Bekaert et al. (2001) also find evidence that consumption to the GDP ratio does 
not increase after liberalisation suggesting that the capital flowing in after liberalisation 
is not wasted on increased consumption. In a number of specifications, consumption to 
the GDP ratio significantly decreases. This is mainly due to reduction or no significant 
increase in government as well as in private consumption. After liberalisation, 
government expenditure decreases because of the elimination or reduction of subsidies 
to the favoured sectors. Similarly, private households are motivated towards investment 
due to the increased opportunity of investment and high return on capital. Bekaert et al. 
(2001) also find that the trade balance deteriorates across all specifications. Both 
imports and exports increase after financial liberalisations, but imports increase more 
than exports. 
Laeven (2003) uses panel data on a large number of firms in 13 developing 
countries to find out whether financial liberalisation relaxes the financial constraints of 
firms. He finds that liberalisation affects small and large firms differently. Small firms 
are financially constrained before the start of the liberalisation process, but become less 
so after liberalisation. The financial constraints of large firms, however, are low before 
financial liberalisation, but become higher as financial liberalisation proceeds. He 
hypothesises that financial liberalisation has adverse effects on the financing constraints 
of large firms, because these firms had better access to preferential directed credit 
during the period before financial liberalisation (2003, p.5).  
Laeven (2003) also finds that countries that have made substantial progress in 
liberalizing their financial sectors have shown dramatic improvements in their political 
climate as well. Successful financial liberalisation seems to require both the political 
will and ability to stop the preferential treatment of well-connected firms that often tend 
to be large.  
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Liberalisation is the unifying theme for policy in the developing world, but there 
is a growing recognition that greater reliance on market forces to coordinate economic 
decision-making has contradictory implications for policy makers. Dooley (1997) 
claims that liberalisation reduces the direct role of the government in the economy and 
hence deepens the complexity of the resource allocation problem, because liberalisation 
gives market mechanisms the decisive edge over planning (p.2). 
For Lewis (1992), financial liberalisation through interest rate reform appears to 
be less of a miracle cure than its proponents often suggest. He claims that requiring zero 
or unchanged profits in the banking sector implies that deposit rate increases are 
matched by borrowing rate increases, which lowers investment demand and offsets 
some of the benefits of the reform. Besides, financial liberalisation leads to inflation and 
higher interest rates as the quantity rationing of investment is replaced by rationing 
through interest rates (p.159). 
Arestis and Demetriades (1999) argue that the early financial liberalisation thesis 
is based on weak theoretical foundations. Specifically, it neglects information related 
problems, such as moral hazard and adverse selection, assumes perfect competition and 
ignores institutional considerations. According to him, the modern version of the 
financial liberalisation thesis, synthesized by the World Bank (1989), partly addresses 
these concerns by emphasizing the role of prerequisites, such as effective banking 
supervision and macroeconomic stability.  
However, the recent financial episodes in South East Asia have shown that even 
where conditions like effective banking supervision and macroeconomic stability appear 
to be satisfied, financial liberalisation could still become the main source of financial 
crises. The various analyses of the South East Asian crises have identified many 
institutional factors that contributed to the crises, such as weaknesses in the legal 
framework governing the operation of financial markets, including bankruptcy laws and 
lack of transparency. One irony is that, before the recent crises, the East Asian 
economies were widely regarded as possessing a strong institutional framework 
conducive to promoting economic growth (Arestis and Demetriades 1999, p.454). 
 
2.3.2 Liberalisation and its Impact on Interest Rates, Savings and Investment 
Financial liberalisation has been equated to a shift towards higher real interest 
rates. Higher real interest rates can increase loanable funds by attracting more 
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household savings to bank deposits. This in turn leads to greater investment and faster 
economic growth (McKinnon 1973; Shaw 1973). 
The interest rate can be seen as the price of borrowed money, or as the 
opportunity cost of lending money for a specified period of time. During this period, 
inflation can erode the real value of financial assets and lenders want to be compensated 
for an expected decrease in the purchasing power of these assets (Bascom 1994, p10). 
The real interest rate is thus the rate adjusted with a due compensation for the 
anticipated inflation. 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) maintain that  by paying a rate of interest on 
financial assets that is significantly above the marginal efficiency of investment in 
existing techniques, one can induce some entrepreneurs to disinvest from inferior 
processes to permit lending for investments in improved technology and increased scale 
in other enterprises. The release of resources from inferior uses in the underdeveloped 
environment is as important as new net saving.  
Morisset (1993) asserts that the most favoured justification for a high interest 
rates policy in the developing countries is derived from the presence of liquidity 
constraints on private investment. Policies that impose artificially low interest rate 
ceilings tend to constrain the supply of capital and lead to an excessive demand for 
capital relative to what would happen if the deposit interest rate were allowed to find its 
market-clearing level. Because the principal constraint on investment is the quantity, 
rather than the cost of financial resources, a rise in interest rates will increase the supply 
of credit to finance private investment (Morrisset 1993, p.134).   
Savings provides the resources for investing in physical capital. So, it is an 
important growth determinant. Financial liberalisation has been advocated on the 
grounds of its favourable impact on saving. According to theory, financial liberalisation 
can affect saving through various channels, which operate in different directions. There 
is strong evidence of a positive and robust relationship between saving and growth 
rates. Countries that save more also tend to grow faster (Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven 
2002). 
Financial liberalisation tends to raise the ratios of private domestic savings to 
income. Real growth of financial institutions provides more investors with access to 
borrowing and gives them incentive to save and to accumulate the equity that makes 
borrowing cheaper. Savings from the foreign sector also respond to liberalisation. The 
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capital flight of domestic funds is reversed, and there is easier access to foreign capital 
markets when distortions of such relative prices as interest rates and foreign exchange 
rates are corrected (Shaw 1973, pp.9-10). 
Moreover, saving is often considered beneficial for its financial dimensions. In 
open economies, raising national savings is a way to reduce the dependence on foreign 
saving, protecting the economy from external shocks. This is an important policy 
concern in a world of increasing financial integration. Together with a strong and well-
capitalized financial system, saving represents a form of self-insurance to reduce the 
economy’s vulnerability to unexpected reversals of international capital flows. In this 
manner, saving can help reduce macroeconomic volatility. Countries that have saved 
more have often benefited from higher growth, and have proved more resilient when 
facing international financial crises (Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven 2002, p.2). 
In the neo-classical growth model, one important channel to increased growth is 
increased savings rates, and hence investment. Investment increases substantially after 
liberalisation. An obvious channel for increased investment is a lower cost of capital, 
brought about by reduced prices of risk and risk exposures. Bekaert and Harvey (2000) 
and Henry (2000) argue that financial liberalisation leads to lower costs of capital. 
Bekaert et al. (2001) maintain that financial liberalisation increases the investment/GDP 
ratio with investment partially financed by foreign capital. 
Lewis (1992) holds the view that raising interest rates on deposits held in the 
banking sector will have two beneficial effects - savings effect and portfolio effect. 
Raising the real return available to income-earners causes consumption to fall and the 
supply of savings to increase. This savings effect alleviates the chronic shortage of 
investment resources. An increase in the rate of return to deposits relative to returns for 
other assets will elicit a portfolio response as wealth-holders move out of other assets 
into deposits in the banking system (p.152). 
While financial liberalisation can affect saving through various potential 
channels, on the whole its net effect is ambiguous. The international evidence suggests a 
positive association between financial development and saving across countries. 
However, empirical studies reveal that the effect of liberalisation on saving is negative. 
Laeven (2003) argues that financial liberalisation may negatively affect the level of 
precautionary savings as a result of improved international risk sharing, thereby 
reducing the overall level of funds available for investment (p.6). 
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Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven (2002) argue that the sign of the interest rate 
elasticity of savings is ambiguous, both theoretically and empirically. Higher interest 
rates increase saving through the substitution effect, but could ultimately reduce the 
saving rate if the associated income and wealth effects are sufficiently strong. This 
theoretical ambiguity has not been solved, and the direction of the response of aggregate 
savings and exogenous increase in the interest rate still remains vastly controversial 
(p.8). 
Financial development leads to higher competition among financial 
intermediaries and hence decreases the interest rate gap between deposits and loans. 
This encourages households to borrow more. Thus, as financial reform relaxes credit 
constraints, increasing the availability of borrowing alternatives, in the aggregate it 
might reduce rather than increase private savings (Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven 2002p. 
10).    
Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven (2002) use data for 35 countries for the 1973-1995 
period to estimate the correlation between financial liberalisation and savings. They find 
a positive, significant relationship between financial reform and saving. A higher degree 
of financial liberalisation is observed in countries that on average save more, although 
simple association does not reveal anything about the direction of causality (p.12). 
Contrary to the view of real interest rate effects on savings, Sarr (2000) argues 
that commercial banks’ ability to lower deposit interest rates can increase deposit 
mobilization. He argues that interest expenses saved can subsidize and lower fees on 
checking and branching services and thus help attract deposits.  
Fry (1988) notes that the empirical evidence shows that when real deposit 
interest rates have any significant effect on national savings ratios, the magnitude is of 
no great policy significance. He argues that only in countries where the real deposit rate 
is negative by a considerable margin can there be much scope for increasing saving 
directly by raising the deposit rate (p.453). Sarr (2000) argues that the deposit interest 
ceiling is not necessarily detrimental to financial deepening, provided the monetary 
policy is committed to low inflation to avoid substantially negative real deposit interest 
rates (p.21). 
Morisset (1993) argues that a number of factors might influence the relationship 
between real interest rates, the supply of domestic credits and private investment. He 
claims that the positive effect on the domestic credit market suggested by McKinnon 
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and Shaw demonstrates that a policy may be offset by the negative effect of a portfolio 
shift from capital goods and public bonds into monetary assets. He estimates a model 
for Argentina over the 1961-1982 period. Argentina has been affected by various 
interest rates policies during the last twenty years. Simulation results indicate that the 
quantity of private investment is little responsive to movements in interest rates 
(Morisset 1993, p.134). 
Bandiera et al. (2000) examine the effects of different financial liberalisation 
measures in eight selected countries from 1970-1994. They found that there was no 
evidence of positive effect of the real interest rate on saving. In most cases the 
relationship was negative. Bayoumi (1993) examines the effects of financial 
deregulation on personal saving. He argues that deregulation produces an exogenous 
short-run fall in saving, some of which is recouped over time. His model is tested using 
data on the eleven standard regions of the United Kingdom. He argues that an 
autonomous fall of 2.25 per cent in the personal saving rate may be attributed to 
deregulation alone.  
Jappelli and Pagano (1994) investigate the role of capital markets on aggregate 
saving and growth. Using a panel of OECD countries for the 1960 to 1987 period, they 
find that financial deregulation in the 1980s has contributed to the decline in national 
saving and growth rates in the OECD countries. 
Loayza et al. (2000) also document that the direct effects of financial 
liberalisation are detrimental to private saving rates. The real interest rate has a negative 
impact on the private saving rate. They find that a 1 per cent increase in the real interest 
rate reduces the private saving rate by 0.25 per cent in the short run.  
Reinhart and Tokatlidis (2001) use data from 50 countries consisting of 14 
developed and 36 developing ones. Their data spans over the 1970-1998 period. Based 
on their findings, they argue that with greater certainty, financial liberalisation appears 
to deliver higher real interest rates, lower investment, but not lower growth. They find 
that, in some regions savings increased following financial sector reforms; but in the 
majority of cases, savings declined following the reforms (p.22). 
Despite the apparent success of interest rate liberalisation in eliminating 
investment rationing, on closer examination the results are not as impressive. These 
more limited real effects arise from the effect of interest rate liberalisation on 
investment demand. The assumption of zero profits in the banking sector means that 
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when the interest rate paid to depositors is raised through government action, the 
borrowing rate must rise as well, in order to avoid large operating losses in the banking 
sector. The rise of real borrowing costs results in a decline in desired real investment. 
Therefore, it appears that the negative response of investment to higher borrowing rates 
swamps the positive effect of higher deposit rates on saving (Lewis 1992, pp.155-156) 
Bascom (1994) notes that, in the countries where financial reform has initially 
been unsuccessful, real interest rates became positive. But, the levels of these rates 
remained too high or were so volatile that they became a disincentive to domestic 
investment. Banks extended credit to unproductive enterprises or projects, resulting in 
large and unsustainable bad debt portfolios, bank failures and business bankruptcies. 
Eventually, government intervention was necessary to protect depositors and to assist 
the distressed banks and their borrowers (p.23). 
 
2.3.2 Credit Availability and Reserve Requirement 
As mentioned earlier, financial liberalisation entails the abolition of ceiling and 
other controls on credit. Direct government intervention in bank credit decisions is 
brought to an end. Under the repressed financial system, households and firms cannot 
borrow the funds in the amount needed by them, due to the existence of credit ceilings. 
Thus, the household and firms face an explicit financial constraint. On the other hand, 
banks are directed to extend cheap credit to a particular sector.  
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) believed that artificially low-cost loans or 
subsidized credit programs might be both unnecessary and unwise. Cheap credit may 
not benefit the poor at all, as it may effectively prevent them from competing for long-
term finance from the organized banking system, and as a result, they are confined to 
getting credit from the village shopkeeper. So, it has been argued that the policy of 
providing cheap bank credit to a few favoured borrowers, or small dribbles to a larger 
number, would have to be discontinued. 
Bascom (1994) asserts that credit rationing schemes are unlikely to match 
available resources with the most productive investments. Instead, resources end up 
financing government deficits or flow into capital-intensive projects undertaken by a 
few large firms whose domestic markets are protected by trade restrictions. Small and 
medium-sized enterprises are often forced to seek out credit from the informal 
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unregulated financial markets or, in the absence of access to both domestic and 
international financial markets, increasingly rely on self-financing.  
Moreover, in a regulated market, bank managers and loan officers face such a 
excessive demand for credit that they are not forced by competition to market their 
product, or to select among competing borrowers or projects on the basis of risk, 
including ability to repay, and rates of return (Bascom 1994, pp. 17-18). 
Caprio et al. (2001) point out that direction of credit, especially through state-
owned banks, reduces the incentive for market-driven financial intermediaries to 
investigate projects and to select those most likely to have an adequate risk-adjusted 
return. It also reduces the motivation to recover delinquent loans and diverts official 
supervision from prudential consideration to verifying compliance with the credit 
allocation policy. They also argue that the financial repression process rarely helped 
distributional goals. The wealthy and well placed, including bank owners, management, 
and staff often collected most of the rents that the ceilings created. The ceilings also 
generated a potential for abuse and corruption (pp. 6-7). 
Financial liberalisation also entails relaxation of high reserve requirements. High 
reserve ratio ensures a ready demand for government securities that help to finance 
government deficits at ceiling interest rates. Monetary expansion connected with 
government financing its deficit by borrowing from the central bank contributes to 
inflationary pressures, or increased inflation tax (Bascom 1994, pp.19-20). The 
relaxation of reserve requirements leads to an increase in the loan volumes to private 
entrepreneurs from the banking sector since part of the reserve maintained by the banks 
to meet the reserve ratio can be used for lending. 
Removal of credit ceilings as well as relaxing other controls like direction of 
credit to the particular sector enables the banking sector to evaluate the projects and 
extend loans to the high yielding ones. Financial constraints of households and firms are 
eliminated with the removal of credit controls. A higher real interest rate leads to 
channelling of funds from informal markets to the formal banking system.  
The McKinnon-Shaw school believes that financial liberalisation increases the 
total credit available to the private sector through various channels. In contrast, a group 
of economists called neo-structuralists argue that financial liberalisation reduces the 
total supply of credit to the businesses. They claim that due to the reserve requirement 
in the banking system, entire funds channelled from curb market to formal banking 
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system cannot be loaned out (van Wijnbergen 1982, 1983; Buffie 1984). Cho (1990) 
disputes the view of the neo-structuralists by arguing that not only banks, but also the 
informal credit markets have to hold some reserve funds if they provide intermediation, 
i.e., lending through collecting deposits, similar to that of banks. This view clearly 
suggests that the total credit supply does not decrease due to reserve requirements in the 
banking system. 
 
2.3.3 Securities Market Development 
Securities market development is another important aspect of financial 
liberalisation. As liberalisation proceeds, banks cease to dominate the entire financial 
system. Securities markets emerge and become an increasingly important source of 
funds for many firms. Since the late 1980s, many emerging market countries have 
amended their laws to allow foreigners to legally invest in their equity markets. As a 
result, foreign portfolio investment into emerging markets increased dramatically. The 
foreign inflow of capital also helped spark a boom in emerging securities prices 
(Kawakatsu and Morey 1999; Henry 2000). 
Laeven (2000) argues that equity market liberalisation has a double effect; it 
directly reduces financing constraints in the sense that more foreign capital becomes 
available, and foreign investors may insist on better corporate governance that indirectly 
reduces the wedge between internal finance and external finance. Hence, the cost of 
capital may go down because of improved risk sharing, or because of the reduction in 
financing constraints or both. 
Bekaert et al. (2001) document that equity market liberalisation, on average, 
leads to a one per cent increase in annual real economic growth over a five-year period. 
Open capital markets may mean more efficient markets, and generally an increase in 
financial development. They decompose GDP into proportions due to investment, 
consumption, government and the trade sector, and report that investment to GDP rises 
after capital market liberalisation. Financial liberalisation may affect economic growth 
by reducing capital market imperfections, which might in turn reduce the external 
finance premium (Bekaert et al. 2001, p.3). 
Levine and Zervos (1998) study whether stock market and banks promote 
economic growth. They find that measures of market liquidity are strongly related to 
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growth, capital accumulation, and productivity, while surprisingly, more traditional 
measures of development such as stock market size are not robustly correlated.  
Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) examine the short and long run effects of 
financial liberalisation on capital markets. They assemble a comprehensive database on 
financial liberalisation for 28 countries for the period January 1973 to June 1999. Their 
results indicate that financial liberalisation is followed by more pronounced boom-bust 
cycles in the short run. However, financial liberalisation leads to more stable markets in 
the long run.  
The efficient markets hypothesis in finance suggests that as markets are made 
more open to the public, prices should come to reflect the increased availability of 
information and be more efficiently priced. But Kawakatsu and Morey (1999) find little 
evidence in the data that liberalisation has changed the behaviour of emerging stock 
market prices. They employ data from nine different countries for the period 1976 to 
1997. Their tests applied to emerging market price indices do not provide evidence that 
markets became efficient by their opening to foreign investors. In fact, most of their 
statistical tests indicate that the markets were already efficient prior to the actual 
liberalisation (p.353). 
They, however, do not take this as evidence that liberalisation has no effect on 
market efficiency and that there is no need for liberalisation. They argue that their 
statistical results indicate that the markets were already efficient prior to the actual 
opening date, which suggests the effect of forward-looking investors (Kawakatsu and 
Morey 1999, p.368). 
Opponents of financial liberalisation hold the view that foreign investments 
toward emerging markets are extremely volatile and depend on changing economic 
conditions. A consequence of volatile investment flows is a high volatility in stock 
prices. The empirical implication is that market volatility should increase after 
liberalisation. In contrast, Domowitz et al. (1998) show that liberalisation may induce 
greater participation by foreign investors, whose entry can reduce price volatility. New 
investors broaden the market, which in turn dampens the shocks on prices from order 
transactions. Foreign investors may also make prices more efficient by increasing the 
accuracy of public information regarding fundamental values (De Santis and 
Imrohoroglu 1997). 
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Levine and Zervos (1998) studied the empirical relationship between various 
measures of stock market development, banking development, and long run economic 
growth. They find that, even after controlling many factors associated with growth, 
stock market liquidity and banking development are both positively and robustly 
correlated with contemporaneous and future rates of economic growth, capital 
accumulation, and productivity growth. Their findings suggest that banks provided 
different financial services from those provided by stock markets.  
 
2.3.4 Liberalising External Account and Capital Flow 
While internal financial reform policies focus on the liberalisation of domestic 
financial markets, external financial reform policies are concerned mainly with current 
and capital account convertibility. Current account convertibility permits the free 
exchange of a country’s currency for foreign currencies to finance international 
transactions in goods, services, and unrequited transfers. Capital account convertibility 
refers to the removal of controls on capital movements, or the opening of the capital 
account of the balance of payments (Bascom 1994, p.69). 
Many developing countries have liberalised their financial markets and, in 
addition, opened up their capital accounts in the course of their financial reforms. An 
expected consequence of this step is an improved access to international financial 
markets. Potentially, there are many gains from increased financial integration. For 
instance, international capital mobility is crucial to global resource allocation, since it 
helps to smooth consumption and reduce risk.  
International capital mobility also allows for investment, and hence growth, 
beyond the premises of domestic saving. Theoretically at least, unrestricted capital 
flows facilitate specialization in the production of financial services, and so benefit the 
international economy. Competition from abroad is introduced and innovation is 
stimulated. Under the circumstances that the global financial market is able to properly 
price the risks and returns inherent in financial claims, global saving can be allocated to 
the most productive investments. Thus, there are potentially important welfare gains to 
be made from external financial liberalisation (Isaksson 2001, p.310). 
Reinhart and Tokatlidis (2001) argue that financial liberalisation appears to 
deliver a higher level of foreign direct investment and high gross capital flows. 
Beginning from the early 1990s, a massive amount of capital flowed into South East 
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Asian countries, as restrictions were lifted gradually. International capital investment 
accounts for sizable proportions of national GDPs in these countries, e.g., 11 per cent 
for Malaysia, 10 per cent for Thailand, 5 per cent for Indonesia, and 4 per cent for South 
Korea (Huang and Yang 2000). 
Sarr (2000) argues that the ability to pay low deposit interest rates is necessary 
for subsidized services to occur, which has implications for early capital account 
liberalisation. Such liberalisation, by aligning deposit interest rates with world interest 
rates may reduce domestic financial deepening potential. Given the potential 
unwillingness of depositors to pay higher service charges to cover operating costs, high 
deposit interest rates and short term foreign borrowing are likely to be the options banks 
will choose to fund their lending activities. These options, in turn, may lead to banking 
crises as macroeconomic conditions – e.g., exchange rate movements – directly affect 
bank’s open foreign exchange positions (Sarr 2000, p.21). 
McKinnon and Pill (1999) present a framework where liberalisation may lead to 
bouts of over-borrowing. This over-borrowing syndrome may be magnified when 
domestic liberalisation is coupled with liberalisation of the capital account. 
Furthermore, if the rising levels of debt are denominated in a foreign currency, this will 
increase a country’s vulnerability to exchange rate fluctuation.  
Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Galindo et al. (2002) argue that financial 
development facilitates economic growth by reducing the costs of external finance to 
firms. Specifically, industrial sectors that are relatively more in need of external finance 
develop disproportionately faster in countries with more-developed financial markets.  
Bekaert at el. (2000) argue that a capital inflow leads to a permanent positive 
price effect. Similarly, Bekaert and Harvey (2000) and Henry (2000) indicate that 
investment increases as a result of capital inflow. If the additional investment is 
efficient, economic growth should increase. However, in the aftermath of the Asian 
financial crises, some economists felt foreign capital had been wasted on frivolous 
consumption and wasteful investment, undermining the benefits of financial 
liberalisation (Bekaert and Harvey 2001, pp. 1-2). 
Isaksson (2001) tries to gauge the degree of international capital mobility and 
determine whether financial liberalisation in developing countries has enhanced access 
to the international financial markets. To do this, he uses a dataset that runs from 1975 
to 1995 and that consists of 90 developing countries from Africa, Asia, Latin America, 
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and the Middle East. The result shows that although the overall capital mobility is low, 
the access to international financial markets improves as a result of financial 
liberalisation (Isaksson 2001, p.335). 
Gruben and McLeod (2002) present evidence from over 100 countries that 
suggests a strong link between capital account openness and lower inflation. They argue 
that full capital account liberalisation is associated with a 3-6 per cent fall in average 
inflation rates. They use the data for 112 countries for the 1973-1989 period (p.225). 
Eichengreen and Mussa (1998) believe that capital account liberalisation and 
financial liberalisation more generally are inevitable for countries that wish to take 
advantage of the substantial benefits from participating in the open world economic 
system. They also recognize that as liberalized systems afford opportunities for 
individuals, enterprises, and financial institutions to undertake greater and sometimes 
imprudent risks, they create the potential for systemic disturbances. 
Lensink et al. (1998) assess the effects of financial liberalisation on capital flight 
in African economies. A portfolio model, in which capital flight is one of the assets, is 
estimated on a sample of nine African countries for 1970-91. Their estimation results 
suggest that financial liberalisation induces a reduction in capital flight.  
 
2.3.5 Financial Liberalisation and Allocative Efficiency 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) argue that interest rate ceilings distort the 
allocation of credit and may lead to under investment in projects that are risky, but have 
a high-expected rate of return. Similarly, directed credit programs are often associated 
with a misallocation of funds. They recommended deregulation of interest rates with a 
belief that a high real interest rate will not only increase the savings and investment rate, 
but will also help direct the available funds to the most productive projects. This view 
suggests that financial reforms improve the allocative efficiency of savings. 
Bekaert et al. (2001) claim that from increasing investment, financial 
liberalisation may improve the efficiency of capital allocation. An obvious channel 
through which this could occur is the financial development and improved market 
efficiency the liberalisation might bring about.  
Wurgler (2000) demonstrates an empirical link between financial development 
and the efficiency of capital allocation. He shows that countries with developed 
financial sectors increase investment more in their growing industries and decrease 
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investment more in their declining industries than those with undeveloped financial 
sectors.  
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) argue that financial intermediaries can invest 
more productively than individuals in the curb markets because of their better ability to 
identify investment opportunities. So, a formal financial market promotes growth 
because it allows a higher rate of return to be earned on capital, and growth in turn 
provides the means to implement costly financial structures. Financial development, in 
the form of better accounting and disclosure rules, and better corporate governance 
through institutions, will reduce the wedge between the cost of internal and external 
funds and enhance growth, especially for firms that are most reliant on external 
financing. 
In contrast, the neostructuralists claim that the official banking sector is less 
efficient than the financial markets outside of it, such as informal credit markets in 
intermediating financial resources. They argue that informal credit markets provide 
complete intermediation, while banks are absorbing some funds for reserve 
requirements (van Wijnbergen 1983; Buffie 1984).  
Cho (1990) challenges the claim of the neostructuralists by arguing that the 
efficiency of credit allocation by informal credit markets is limited by their narrower 
information base. The customers of specific lenders in informal credit markets are 
usually limited to a small group of borrowers whose credibility is determined by their 
location and by private information networks. These characteristics of informal credit 
markets limit their capacity to allocate credit efficiently. Informal credit markets also 
fail, like repressed banks, to identify productive borrowers well and to finance lumpy 
investments that can exploit economies of scale. Furthermore, as the degree of risk 
pooling is limited, and their loans are poorly protected, the interest rate of informal 
credit markets is usually extremely high, which reflects a high-risk premium. Since a 
low interest rate leads to an inefficient allocation of credit, the extremely high interest 
rate, which may far exceed the productivity of borrowers, also leads to inefficient 
allocation. In light of these factors, it seems obvious that the banking sector can allocate 
credit more efficiently if the interest rate ceilings are eliminated, or if ceilings are 
increased to reflect market conditions (Cho 1990, p.479).  
Galindo et al. (2001) investigate whether financial liberalisation has increased 
the share of investment going to firms with a higher marginal return to capital. To this 
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end, they develop a summary index of the efficiency of the allocation of investment. 
They then examine the relationship between this index and various measures of 
financial liberalisation. The results suggest that in the majority of cases financial reform 
has lead to an increase in the efficiency with which investment funds are allocated. 
Their empirical investigation is based on firm level panel data for 12 developing 
countries for the 1990 – 1998 period. Their results provide empirical support for the 
idea that financial liberalisation has led to an improvement in the efficiency with which 
investment funds have been allocated. The results strongly support a positive, 
significant and strong effect of financial liberalisation on the efficiency with which 
investment funds are allocated (Galindo et al. 2001, p.22).  
Gupta and Lensink (1996) examine the effects of financial liberalisation on 
allocative efficiency. The allocative efficiency is assumed to be affected if deregulation 
leads to a reallocation of a given amount of investments between the two sectors. It is 
argued that higher interest rates would induce the selection of projects with higher rates 
of return, thus raising the average productivity of investment, and hence growth, even if 
the effect on savings was negligible (Gupta and Lensink 1996, p.36). 
King and Levine (1993b) argue that a more developed financial system fosters 
productivity improvements by choosing higher quality entrepreneurs and projects, by 
more effectively mobilizing external financing for these entrepreneurs, by providing 
superior vehicles for diversifying the risk of innovative activities, and by revealing more 
accurately the potentially large profits associated with the uncertain business of 
innovation. In these ways, better financial systems stimulate economic growth by 
accelerating the rate of productivity enhancement (King and Levine 1993b). 
 
2.3.6 Financial Intermediation 
McKinnon-Shaw school advocated financial liberalisation also on the grounds 
that it creates efficiency gains through increased financial intermediation by the formal 
financial sector. Generally, financial development is the prerequisite for increased 
financial intermediation. Financial liberalisation is thought to be associated with 
increased financial development that reduces the imperfections of financial markets, 
resulting in a reduction in the cost of capital and an increase in the level of investment. 
Increased financial development in turn has been shown to enhance economic growth 
(King and Levine 1993a; Beck, Levine et al. 2000).  
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Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that financially constrained industries grow 
faster in more financially developed countries. Laeven (2003) documents that the 
liberalisation of the banking sector reduces the imperfections firms face when dealing 
with financial markets. Equity market liberalisation directly reduces financing 
constraints in the sense that more foreign capital becomes available. Foreign investors 
may insist on better corporate governance, which helps reduce the wedge between 
internal finance and external finance. Hence, the cost of capital may go down because of 
improved risk sharing and the reduction in financing constraints (Bekaert, Harvey et al. 
2001, p.4). 
Financial liberalisation provides market forces a dominant role in setting 
financial asset prices and returns, allocating credit, and developing a wider array of 
financial instruments and intermediaries. All these changes are aimed at improving the 
efficiency of financial intermediation, raising saving and investment, improving the 
efficiency of investment, and spurring growth. Financial reform, translated into more 
developed financial intermediation, alters significantly a country’s financial system. 
(Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven 2002). 
Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven (2002) further claim that financial development can 
imply an increase not only in the availability of credit funds and instruments, but also in 
saving instruments and devices. A deeper financial system should be capable of 
providing alternative saving instruments that more adequately match individual 
preferences, risk-aversion and income profiles. Credibility in the soundness and 
sustainability of banks, for example, should increase the incentives for households to 
participate in the financial system (Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven 2002, p.10). 
In the process of financial liberalisation, the size of the financial system is 
widened as new banks and financial institutions enter into the system. It is also thought 
that rapid branch extensions take place. Fry (1988) notes: “the small amount of 
empirical evidence on branch proximity suggests that increased branch proximity has 
raised national saving ratios substantially (by 1 to 5 percentage points over a 20 year 
period) in six Asian developing countries (Fry 1988, p.453).”  
Reinhart and Tokatlidis (2001) use data from 50 countries- consisting 14 
developed and 36 developing countries- for the 1970-1998 period. They argue that 
financial liberalisation also enhances financial deepening by providing greater access to 
internal capital markets. 
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Galindo et al. (2002) argue that financial liberalisation is an instrument that, 
under certain conditions, promotes financial sector development and through it can 
stimulate the relative growth rate of sectors that rely on external funding. In order to 
promote development, though, other structural reforms that support the proper 
behaviour of financial markets have to be in place. Hence, even if systems reach full 
liberalisation, the impact of liberalisation on domestic credit market growth can be null 
if rules and institutions that support creditor rights are not in place. If the proper legal 
set-up is in place, the impact of liberalisation on growth can be notable (pp.26-28). 
Pill and Pradhan (1997) claim that by following financial liberalisation, market 
determination of interest rates should result in modestly positive real interest rates. 
These, in turn, will increase the resources available to the financial system, since bank 
deposits offering a competitive return will attract savings that were previously held 
outside the formal financial sector. Moreover, positive real interest rates will provide an 
incentive for borrowers to invest in more productive activities, thereby improving the 
productivity of the economy as a whole. Consequently, financial liberalisation should 
lead to an increase in both the quantity and the quality of financial intermediation by the 
banking system (Pill and Pradhan 1997, p.8).  
Since the mid-1970s, several Latin American and Asian countries have 
implemented financial reform policies aimed at reducing government control and 
eliminating distortions in the financial sector. The outcome of these policies, however, 
has not been uniform. The success and failure of financial liberalisation programs is 
said to be dependent on the proper sequencing of the liberalisation process. In the 
following section this aspect of liberalisation will be discussed. 
 
2.4 Sequencing of Financial Liberalisation Process 
McKinnon (1991) argues that the sequencing of the liberalisation process is of 
critical importance. In his view there is an optimal order of liberalisation, which may 
vary for different liberalizing economies depending on their initial conditions. 
According to him, governments should not undertake all liberalizing measures 
simultaneously (p.4). 
The optimal order of liberalisation advocated by McKinnon consists of 
balancing government’s finances in the first place. In other words, fiscal control should 
precede financial liberalisation. Second in the order of liberalisation is the opening of 
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the domestic capital market so that depositors receive, and borrowers pay, substantial 
real interest rates. But, unrestricted borrowing and lending can only proceed 
satisfactorily once the price level is stabilized and fiscal deficits are eliminated. 
Similarly, the banking system should be freed to set interest rates on deposits and loans, 
and freed from heavy reserve requirements (McKinnon 1991, pp. 4-6). 
After the liberalisation of domestic trade and finance, there is an appropriate 
pace for the liberalisation of the foreign exchanges. On the balance of payments side, 
current accounts should be liberalized first and foreign exchange convertibility on 
capital account should be the last stage in the optimal order of liberalisation. The 
premature elimination of exchange controls on foreign capital flows could lead to 
unwarranted capital flight, or an unwarranted build-up of foreign indebtedness, or both. 
(McKinnon 1991, pp. 7-10). 
Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) find that the pattern of liberalisation varies 
across regions, with developed countries liberalizing their stock markets first and 
developing economies opening their domestic financial sector first (p.37). They argue 
that liberalisation unveils new problems in the banking system as protected domestic 
banks suddenly get access to new sources of funding triggering protracted financial 
booms. During financial repression, banks are protected from outside competition, 
badly regulated, and badly supervised and do not have the pressure to run efficiently. In 
such a scenario, a standard recommendation on sequencing is to first clean up domestic 
financial institutions and change government institutions, then deregulate the industry 
and open up the capital account (p.33). 
Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven (2002) claim that excessively rapid financial reform 
often leads to unsustainable credit and activity booms, which then lead to financial 
crises. These risks increase significantly in the absence of prudential regulation and 
strong supervision of banks and other liberalized capital market segments (p.7). 
Girma (2003) notes that premature liberalisation of the financial sector could 
have a devastating impact on national economy, as is evidenced by the financial crisis in 
East Asian countries. He argues that in such a context, a gradual and cautious move 
towards liberalizing the financial sector in developing countries is not a choice but a 
necessity (p.5). 
Mehran and Laurens (1997) assert that the speed of liberalisation needs to be 
determined in the context of a country’s overall reform program. Financial sector 
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reforms need to be supported by structural reforms in other economic sectors. Countries 
with serious macroeconomic and financial imbalances, or inadequate regulatory and 
supervisory frameworks, or whose financial institutions are insolvent, are likely to run 
into serious problems if they liberalize interest rates too early or too rapidly. If 
liberalisation is premature, controls on interest rates may need to be reintroduced. Thus, 
the better the fundamentals, the faster a country can go with interest rate reform (p.33). 
Liberalizing too fast poses certain dangers- but too slow a pace can also defeat 
reform programs. Reforms may lose momentum and new distortions could emerge if 
liberalisation takes too long. In determining the appropriate sequencing of interest rate 
liberalisation, the authorities need to distinguish not only between loan and deposit 
transactions, but also between wholesale and retail transactions. Interest rates on 
wholesale transactions between sophisticated entities should be liberalised first, 
followed by lending rates and, lastly, deposit rates. This gradual approach safeguards 
the profitability of banks while allowing time for people and firms to adjust to 
liberalisation (Mehran and Laurens 1997, p. 34). 
Pill and Pradhan (1997) hold the view that if financial reforms are to succeed, 
they must be implemented in an appropriate macroeconomic, financial, and institutional 
environment. Macroeconomic stability is a prerequisite for successful financial 
liberalisation. In the generally successful cases, macroeconomic imbalances were 
largely eliminated, balance of payments and fiscal deficits were manageable, and 
inflation was relatively low before financial reforms were introduced. While 
macroeconomic stability is essential for successful financial liberalisation, a sound 
banking system is also extremely important. The benefits associated with financial 
reform are contingent on the financial system being “well behaved” throughout the 
liberalisation process (Pill and Pradhan 1997, pp. 7-8). 
Similarly, if competition among banks in the newly deregulated financial sector 
is weak, liberalisation may result in lower real deposit rates rather than the anticipated 
movement toward modestly positive, equilibrium levels. Monopolistic banks can exploit 
the opportunity offered by the abolition of interest rate controls to widen the margins 
between their deposit and lending rates, in order to increase profits. When financial 
deregulation is implemented and especially where non-performing loans are inherited 
from the pre-reform era, interest rate liberalisation should be accompanied by structural 
reforms including restructuring bank balance sheets to remove bad debt, privatising 
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publicly owned banks, and introducing measures to promote competition in the banking 
sector (Pill and Pradhan 1997). 
Financial liberalisation also creates opportunities for banks to make poor lending 
decisions. If, prior to reform, banks have not made loans based on market criteria, their 
ability to manage credit evaluation and allocation is likely to have either atrophied or 
never been developed. Newly liberalized banks may therefore be prone to making poor 
lending decisions. Therefore, strengthening the management and risk evaluation 
capabilities of bank managers in a newly liberalized environment should be an integral 
part of the liberalisation process (Pill and Pradhan 1997, p 9). 
Wyplosz (2002) describes three different strategies – wait, buckle up, and one 
step at a time – to reap the benefits of liberalisation with minimal costs. In his opinion, 
most countries will eventually liberalize, but this needs to be done as a matter of 
priority. The effects of liberalisation in the developing and the developed countries 
suggest that it may be useful to wait until a proper economic, and, possibly political 
infrastructure has been built. Liberalisation is also a source of widespread instability. 
Therefore, it is important to set up adequate welfare systems before liberalizing. Free 
markets may raise efficiency, but, at least initially, they are known to increase 
inequality. The boom years must be used to prepare for the bust years. The most 
delicate steps are the liberalisation of the domestic financial markets and of the capital 
account. Spacing out these steps over several years seems reasonable (Wyplosz 2002, 
p.21).  
Bascom (1994) finds that price stability – or, more broadly, macroeconomic 
stability – is important for a successful financial reform program. The control of 
inflation has been a determining factor in achieving sustainable levels of positive real 
interest rates. Effective inflation control, however, depends on the ability of the 
government to control monetary expansion, which in turn depends, among other things, 
on the condition and financing of the government’s budget deficit (pp. 35-36). 
The capital account may be liberalized after domestic interest rates are made 
competitive with international interest rates. However, in an inflationary environment, if 
domestic financial market reforms are to be considered credible and sustainable, the 
fiscal deficit must first be controlled. Large fiscal deficits financed by monetary 
expansion or inflation tax would require the central bank to keep the level of domestic 
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interest rates low while imposing high reserve requirements on commercial banks 
(Bascom 1994, p.70). 
According to Bascom (1994) a principle of reform sequencing is that 
international capital controls should only be lifted after the domestic financial market 
has been satisfactorily reformed and domestic interest rates have been increased to 
internationally competitive levels. In turn, the level of domestic interest rates can be 
increased only after the fiscal deficit is under control (1994, p.71). 
Another set of reform sequencing issues relates to the liberalisation of the capital 
and current accounts, including the reduction of tariffs and removal of capital controls. 
Some counties have followed different sequencing paths in implementing their capital 
and current account liberalisation policies. With the fiscal deficit under control, 
domestic financial markets liberalized, and domestic real interest rates established at 
internationally competitive levels, the opening of the capital account would tend to 
generate significant capital inflows. A successful current account liberalisation policy 
that may include a reduction of import tariffs, an elimination of import quotas, and 
currency convertibility, generally requires a real exchange rate depreciation to assist the 
transition to the tradable-goods sector from a protective to a liberalized environment. 
Thus, in most cases, the capital and current accounts should not be simultaneously 
liberalized (Bascom 1994, p.71). 
The above discussion suggests that the speed and the sequencing of financial 
liberalisation process is important in order to reap the fruits of liberalisation, but varies 
across countries depending upon their initial economic conditions. In general, 
liberalisation measures, when taken in a favourable policy environment, have 
considerable advantages to promote and sustain long-term economic growth. 
 
2.5 Financial Liberalisation and Welfare 
One of the major drawbacks of financial liberalisation cited frequently by the 
critics of liberalisation is that it ignores welfare and leads to unequal distribution of 
income. Under the financial liberalisation process, market becomes dominant, 
competition prevails in the market, government subsidies are cut, and the deprived 
sector and the strategically important sector, e.g., manufacturing industries, no longer 
get government protection. As a result, the deprived sector becomes more deprived and 
the sector needing preferential treatment in the initial period cannot be developed. 
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 In contrast, the proponents and supporters of financial liberalisation advocate 
that the policy enhances welfare and equalises the distribution of income. Some 
economists, on the other hand, claim that the effects of financial liberalisation on 
welfare are ambiguous.   
Welfare, in simple terms, encompasses employment opportunities, appropriate 
level of wages, supply of essential goods and services to the general public, and the like. 
In a poverty-ridden economy, reducing the incidence of poverty also may come under 
welfare. Similarly, redistribution of national income also is viewed to be closely related 
to welfare. 
 Shaw (1973) claims that financial liberalisation contributes to the stability of 
growth in output and employment. A rise in interest rates and foreign-exchange rates 
relative to wage rates may both raise employment and increase the wage share of 
income. Thus, financial liberalisation tends to equalize the distribution of income (p. 
11). 
Edwards (1989) argues that since tariffs are always welfare reducing, the 
financial liberalisation which involves the elimination or reduction of tariffs is welfare 
increasing. Reducing the extent of regulations in specific sectors, reducing the extent of 
labour market distortions, and relaxing the capital controls altogether will increase the 
employment opportunities, and total unemployment will decline. As a result, the net 
effect of these reforms will be welfare increasing (p. 60).  
Kahkonen (1987) also possesses similar views. He argues that lowering lending 
rates and relaxing capital controls increases investment and thereby improves welfare. 
Therefore, complete financial liberalisation increases welfare unambiguously. Partial 
liberalisation, as he claims may cause welfare losses in the short run because raising the 
artificially low domestic deposit rate in the presence of tariffs increases savings but 
worsens intertermporal allocation by causing oversaving (pp. 539-540). 
Edwards and van Wijnbergen (1986) relate domestic financial liberalisation with 
external sector liberalisation. They claim that trade tariff reductions increase welfare 
unambiguously only if the domestic financial market is unregulated, and raising the 
deposit rate will unambiguously cause welfare gains only under free trade. If the capital 
account is liberalized in the presence of trade distortions, welfare can be negatively 
affected. The reason for this is that if the funds obtained from abroad are used to 
increase investment, the pre-existing distortion will be amplified (p. 147). 
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Krueger (1986) argues that welfare could be improved by liberalizing the 
financial market and permitting the real interest rate to become positive. Since exchange 
rate overvaluation and artificially low nominal interest rates tend to work in the same 
direction, and encourage the introduction of overly capital-intensive activities relative to 
efficient resource allocation, there is a presumption that moving either the exchange rate 
or the interest rate in an appropriate direction is likely to improve welfare (p. 24). 
Krueger also claims that reforms in labour market and freeing up agricultural prices to 
bring them more closely in line with relative prices available on the international market 
are likely to be welfare-improving (p.23). 
 Bhattarai (1998) claims that financial liberalisation improves the distribution of 
income by raising the wage rate of rural labour. Rural labour intensive sectors invest 
more with increased access to financial institutions and demand more labour to 
complement additional capital employed in these sectors. More additional demand for 
unskilled labour than for the skilled labour causes a rise in the ratio of the rural to urban 
wage rate significantly in the liberalized regime. Over time, redistribution occurs 
through the labour market and ultimately results in larger welfare gains for rural 
households than for urban households (p.1). 
Battle (1997) on the other hand, argues that financial liberalisation has an 
ambiguous effect on welfare. The direct effect of an increase in the deposit rate is 
welfare improving because, with a low initial tariff, savings increase from a level that 
was previously suboptimal. Since a higher deposit rate causes a transfer of income from 
expenditure to savings, the demand for non-traded goods will decrease. The excess 
supply due to price rigidity will worsen, thus, the effect on welfare will become 
negative. Additionally, since consumption falls, aggregate employment will fall causing 
welfare deterioration (p.286). 
Edwards (1986) argues that even if a liberalisation process results in an overall 
welfare gain, there are sectors that will gain and sectors that will lose from it. According 
to him, as a result of trade liberalisation that is a by product of financial liberalisation, 
production of exportables and nontradables will increase, production of importables will 
decline, and wages relative to all goods will increase. Increased wages means a welfare 
gain; thus trade liberalisation is welfare improving.   
Daitoh (2003) claims that financial liberalisation in developing countries may 
aggravate welfare unless the liberalisation reform in the labour market proceeds in 
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advance, or at least simultaneously. Under the repressed financial system, the wage 
rates tend to be artificially high and the interest rates tend to be artificially low. Under 
the low interest rate policy, the urban unemployment declines. The policy of 
liberalisation increases the interest rate, but does not reduce the artificially high wage 
rate, which results in increased unemployment (p.16). 
Wyplosz (2002) holds the view that free markets may raise efficiency but, at 
least initially, they are known to increase inequality. Therefore it is important to set up 
adequate welfare systems before liberalising the financial system. 
Fry (1988) asserts that financial repression in the form of consumer borrowing 
constraints may improve welfare. The distortionary welfare loss created by the 
borrowing constraint is offset by faster growth that in turn increases the wage. This 
welfare gain grows over time while the distortionary loss remains constant. Hence 
welfare loss is unlikely to outweigh welfare gain except for the initial generation (p. 
123) 
Mesa-Lago (1997) studied the effects of financial liberalisation in eight Latin 
American countries for the 1980-90 period. He documents that the implementation of 
economic restructuring policies in the fiscal crisis period resulting from a heavy debt 
burden has resulted in welfare loss in this region. After the implementation of 
liberalisation policies the regional GDP per capita declined, the real minimum wages in 
urban areas declined, the open unemployment rate in urban areas rapidly increased, the 
poverty incidence for the population increased, the regional average rate of inflation 
increased 26 times, and public expenditures in social services were cut, afflicting the 
most vulnerable segments of the population (pp. 500-501).  
Mesa-Lago (1997) claims that capital and business mainly benefited from 
economic reform, but labour and the poor mostly suffered from the effects of that 
reform due to the rising unemployment, shrinking real minimum wages and pensions, 
increase in prices of essential consumer goods, reduction in social services, and 
expanding poverty and income inequality.  
The above discussion shows that there is no unanimous view about the welfare 
and income distribution effects of financial liberalisation. The policy of financial 
repression as discussed earlier was justified under the grounds of welfare and equal 
distribution of income, but that policy could not achieve those objectives. Financial 
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liberalisation emphasises increased competition and output growth; so it is obvious that 
the welfare aspect is not its main objective.  
 
2.6 Financial Liberalisation and Financial Fragility 
Theoretical models predict that financial liberalisation can promote economic 
development, by increasing saving, investment, and the productivity of capital. 
However, much of the evidence from financial liberalisation episodes from both 
developing and developed economies points to significant destabilizing consequences, 
including incidents of severe financial crises. The implementation of financial 
liberalisation programs, especially in developing countries with weak institutions, has 
created many more problems than it has solved (Arestis and Demetriades 1999, p. 441). 
 Increasing openness and economic liberalisation have been credited with 
fostering higher growth and record capital inflows in many emerging market countries. 
For many countries, especially in Asia but to some extent also in Latin America, the 
first part of the 1990s was characterized by considerable optimism and buoyant growth. 
However, recent financial crises, beginning with Mexico in 1994-1995, the Asian crisis 
of 1997-1998, and the crises in Russia, Brazil and several other Latin American 
countries in 1998-1999 have tempered this optimism (Glick et al. 2001, p.1). 
Weller (1999) argues that emerging economies are becoming more susceptible 
to both currency and banking crises after financial liberalisation. She uses data for 27 
emerging economies from 1973 to 1998. Her analysis indicates that the likelihood of 
currency crises may increase with stronger reactions to financial variables than to real or 
external trade variables. Similarly, as financial liberalisation creates more competitive 
pressures for domestic banks, financial fragility may result from increased international 
financial competition. It may simply help to create an optimistic overall outlook in an 
initial ‘deregulation euphoria’ which breeds expansion of credit for projects of lesser 
quality (p. 69). 
Weller (1999) suggests that liberalizing economies should focus on setting up 
the necessary stabilizing institutions before opening their economies, as they are likely 
to experience an increase in the likelihood of banking and currency crises without 
countervailing measures (p. 76). 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2001) argue that financial liberalisation 
increases financial fragility by giving banks and other financial intermediaries more 
 52
freedom to take on risk. The risk of bank insolvency and, more generally, of systemic 
banking crises may be greater in liberalized financial systems (p. 96). 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2001) study the impact of financial 
liberalisation on financial fragility using a data set for 53 developed and developing 
countries during the 1980-95 period (p. 99). Their study shows that financial 
liberalisation is a significant factor leading to banking sector fragility. This effect is at 
work even after controlling for variables capturing the state of the macroeconomy. This 
suggests that, even if it is carried out after macroeconomic stabilization is achieved, 
financial liberalisation still increases financial fragility (p. 105). 
The main reason behind increased banking sector fragility is that the removal of 
interest rate ceilings and the reduction of barriers to entry reduce bank franchise values, 
thus exacerbating moral hazard problems. Interest rate ceilings and entry restrictions 
create rents that make a banking license more valuable to the holder. It is the risk of 
losing this valuable license, which induces banks to become more stable institutions, 
with better incentives to monitor the firms they finance and manage the risk of their 
loan portfolio. Thus, when a reform – such as financial liberalisation – leads to 
increased bank competition and lower profits, this erodes franchise values, distorting the 
risk-taking incentives of the institution. Unless the reform effort incorporates an 
adequate strengthening of prudential regulations and supervision to realign incentives, 
lower franchise values are likely to lead to increased fragility (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache 2001, p. 110). 
Arphasil (2001) asserts that financial liberalisation exposes threats to financial 
stability through capital movements. It allows financial intermediaries to gain easy 
access to risky investments and to misallocate resources. The liberalisation of interest 
rates and capital account transactions lead to a credit boom, mostly financed by short-
term borrowings from abroad. Such a boom built on an unstable foundation ultimately 
leads to financial crisis as shown by the experience of the East Asian crisis during 1997-
1998.  
Arestis and Demetriades  (1999) argues that increased short-term capital inflows 
have a number of destabilizing consequences. First, they are a direct source of 
macroeconomic instability by putting upward pressure on the exchange rate of the 
receiving country. Second, capital inflows inflate asset prices, and therefore have 
positive wealth effects, which contribute to increased imports and inflation (P.450).  
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Chin and Jomo (2001) and  Arestis and Demetriades (1999) support the view 
that financial liberalisation increases financial fragility even if it is carried out after 
macroeconomic stabilization is achieved. The East Asian crises, in which the initial 
macroeconomic conditions were very favourable, have vividly shown that even in the 
best of circumstances, financial liberalisation remains a treacherous policy exercise. 
Liberalisation undermines effective financial governance, both at the international and 
national levels, increasing the vulnerability of the system to crisis.  
Wyplosz (2002) uses data from 27 developing and developed countries for the 
sample period 1977-1999, to examine whether financial liberalisation is hazardous. His 
finding is that financial liberalisation is considerably more destabilizing in developing 
countries than in developed counties. Following financial liberalisation, developing 
countries tend to go through a boom-bust cycle (p. 3). 
Wyplosz views liberalisation as a source of macroeconomic instability since it 
increases exchange rate volatility. He argues that many countries in Europe and Asia 
have been able to grow fast over decades while retaining heavy-handed financial 
restraints. This alone shows that there is no urgency to undertake liberalisation. And 
when it is being taken, it should be approached with great caution (p. 22). 
Mishkin (1999) argues that financial deregulation and liberalisation often leads 
to lending booms, both because of increased opportunities for bank lending, and also 
because of financial deepening in which more funds flow into the banking system. 
Although liberalisation and financial deepening are positive developments for the 
economy in the long run, in the short run, the lending boom may outstrip the available 
information resources in the financial system, helping to promote a financial collapse in 
the future. Lending booms have been a feature of financial liberalisation in many 
countries and have often been followed by banking crises (pp. 1530-31). 
Crotty and Lee (2002) argue that misconceived financial liberalisation was the 
proximate cause of the East Asian financial crisis of 1997. Traditional state-guided 
bank-based financial systems, insulated from international financial markets through 
tight capital controls, were perhaps the institutions most responsible for the East Asian 
economic “miracle.” Restructuring of finance, labour, and product markets has failed to 
recreate the preconditions necessary for renewed long-term egalitarian growth. 
Therefore, liberalisation should be rejected in favour of a “democratised and 
modernized state-led growth model (p. 328)”. 
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 Bascom (1994) argues that high and volatile interest rates associated with 
financial reform can have liquidity and solvency effects on companies accustomed to 
financing their operations and capital formation with bank credit. The implementation 
of financial reform policies becomes more difficult when the banking system is in a 
situation of financial crisis. The deregulation of interest rates and the removal of entry 
restrictions on new banks, which are desirable under normal circumstances, may not be 
appropriate when the banking system is in the throes of financial distress. As a result of 
the financial liberalisation policies, promoters of new financial institutions may be 
motivated by the need to access easy financing for their own businesses. This can create 
further credit concentration in the banking system and aggravate the crisis (p. 174). 
 McLeod (1998) argues that the world has entered a new era of financial fragility. 
This new era has been ushered in by a huge and growing pool of highly mobile financial 
capital – including funds mobilised by rapidly expanding banking and financial systems 
in many developing counties – and by the global trend to openness in regard to capital 
flows (pp. 348-49). 
 Jackson (1999) names capital account convertibility, fixed exchange rates, 
excessive expansion of domestic lending accompanied by gross misallocation of 
investments by the private sector, and absence of regulatory and supervisory capacities 
to control excesses in the financial sector as the major factors responsible for the East 
Asian financial crisis of 1997. Excessive borrowing abroad, primarily by the private 
sector, is the hallmark of this crisis. In the five years prior to the crisis, the borrowings 
of banks and non-banks in the affected countries grew very rapidly. In particular, banks 
in each country rapidly increased their net foreign liabilities by large percentages during 
the four years prior to the crisis. By the time the crisis broke in mid-July 1997, total 
external indebtedness had reached large proportions, exceeding 50 percent of GDP in 
Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines (p. 3). 
 Although external aspects (fixed exchange rates, high interest rates, and 
excessive borrowing from abroad) are among the important causal factors in this crisis, 
the crisis would not have occurred without internal weaknesses as well: inadequate 
supervisory institutions, traditional banking practices, and, most of all, poor investment 
decisions made by the private sector of each country (Jackson 1999, p. 5). 
Wade (2001) argues that liberalizing the financial sector and opening the capital 
account is dangerous when the banks have little experience in international financial 
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markets, and when non-banks also borrow abroad. It is doubly dangerous in the context 
of a bank-based financial system and a high debt-to-equity corporate sector. It is triply 
dangerous when the exchange rate is pegged. When, in addition, the banks and non-
banks are essentially unsupervised, a banking-cum-currency crisis is just waiting to 
happen (p. 67). 
Financial liberalisation is regarded as the source of financial crisis. However, it 
is critical to the efficient functioning of financial markets so that the markets can 
channel funds to those with the most productive investment opportunities. Getting funds 
to those with the most productive investment opportunities is especially important to 
emerging market countries because these investments can have especially high returns, 
thereby stimulating rapid economic growth. Therefore, the dangers associated with 
financial liberalisation do not mean that countries should not pursue a liberalisation 
strategy. However, some strong measures should be implemented to prevent the 
financial system from crises. These include sustainable macroeconomic policies and 
competent macroeconomic management, sound prudential regulations and strong 
supervisory framework.  
 
2.7 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, we have reviewed literature on financial liberalisation and its 
impact on the economy. We have found that economists differ in their viewpoints 
regarding the role of finance in economic growth. Three different views are found in the 
literature concerning the potential role of finance on economic growth. The first view 
considers finance as a critical element of growth. The second view regards finance as a 
relatively unimportant factor in growth. And, the third view claims that the financial 
development may potentially have negative impact on growth. 
A series of studies have been devoted to analyse the direction of causality 
between financial development and economic growth. Most contemporary studies 
suggest that the direction of causality runs from the financial to real development. These 
studies have shown that increased savings, efficient investment, active stock market 
activities, quality bank services, transaction ease, and suitable financial structure are the 
possible channels through which financial development can influence economic growth. 
Similarly, some studies have also claimed that there exists a bi-directional relationship 
between financial development and economic growth. Contrary to the these assertions, 
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some studies do not find any significant causal relationship between financial 
development and economic growth. 
 Despite the widely recognized importance of financial development, many 
governments in the past have repressed their financial systems mainly in order to collect 
easy money for financing their budget deficits, to have control over the monetary 
instruments to enable them for effective regulation, and to direct the capital toward the 
favoured sectors. But such policies of financial repression in practice have been proved 
to be harmful to economic growth. The widely felt damaging effects of financial 
repression policies on economic growth have given impetus to financial liberalisation.  
The main objective of financial liberalisation is to increase the supply and 
improve the allocation of funds for investment. Under the liberalisation process, the 
barriers to entry in the banking sector are removed and the securities market is 
developed. Entry of the new banks into the market helps widen the financial system, 
increasing the banks to population ratio. Similarly, development of the securities market 
increases supply of the capital for longer-term investments and helps maintain the 
liquidity in the market.  
Financial liberalisation has been equated to a shift towards higher real interest 
rates, which can increase loanable funds by attracting more household savings to bank 
deposits. However, empirical findings do not support this assumption. Most of the 
empirical studies have reported the interest rate effects on savings to be either 
inconclusive or negative.  
Under the financial liberalisation process, the relaxation of reserve requirements, 
abolition of credit ceilings, and scaling down of the directed credit programs leads to an 
increase in the volume of loans to private entrepreneurs from the banking sector. 
However, neo-structuralists do not agree with this view.  
Many developing countries have opened up their external accounts in the course 
of their financial reforms in order to gain the access to international financial markets. 
Flow of foreign capital facilitates specialization in the production of financial services, 
introduces competition from abroad, and stimulates innovation. However, it may also 
lead to bouts of over-borrowing.  
The speed and the sequencing of financial liberalisation process is important in 
order to reap the fruits of liberalisation, but varies across countries depending upon their 
initial economic conditions. The optimal order of liberalisation advocated by McKinnon 
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consists of balancing government’s finances in the first phase, opening of the domestic 
market in the second phase and liberalisation of the external account in the last phase. 
The supporters of financial liberalisation advocate that the policy enhances 
welfare and equalises the distribution of income. Some economists, on the other hand, 
claim that the effects of financial liberalisation on welfare are ambiguous. Similarly, 
much of the evidence from both developing and developed economies points to 
significant destabilizing consequences of financial liberalisation, including incidents of 
severe financial crises. The implementation of financial liberalisation programs, 
especially in developing countries with weak institutions, may create new problems.  
 It can be seen from the survey of the literature that a series of studies have 
examined various aspects of the financial liberalisation in parts but the literature lacks a 
comprehensive study on the overall impact of the policy. Most of the empirical studies 
concentrate on analysing the growth aspects of the financial liberalisation and very few 
examine the impact of the policy on financial stability. However, no such studies can be 
found in the literature presenting empirical evidence on effects of the policy on 
redistribution of income, although some studies have included theoretical discussions on 
this aspect. This type of gap in the literature has motivated this study to conduct a 
comprehensive empirical investigation on the overall impact of the financial 
liberalisation policy.  
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Chapter 3 
LIBERALISATION PROCESS IN NEPAL 
 
This chapter presents the economic scenario of the country and discusses the key 
aspects of the financial liberalisation process in Nepal. In section 1, an overview of the 
Nepalese economy is presented. The picture of the Nepalese financial system before 
liberalisation is portrayed in section 2. Finally, various policy measures implemented 
under the financial liberalisation process are discussed in section 3.  
 
3.1 An Overview of the Nepalese Economy 
 
Nepal is a land-locked South Asian country sandwiched between two giant 
countries - India and China. The total area covered by the country is 147181 square 
kilometres, the total population is 23.2 million1 and the average rate of population 
growth is 2.2 per cent. About 86 per cent of the population resides in rural areas. 
Nepal was divided into various small principalities before 1768 AD. King 
Prithvi Narayan Shah performed the unification of the Nepal kingdom by conquering 
these principalities. Till 1768, Nepal was limited to the present Kathmandu valley, 
which had 3 different principalities in it. Since the unification, the kingdom has 
remained as a sovereign country, successfully escaping from the British occupation as 
well as from the colonization of other countries. 
Nepal was freed in 1951 from the century long Rana family rule2. After the 
political change of 1951, Matrika Prasad Koirala became the first prime minister from 
the general public. From 1952 to 1959, the country initiated various reforms, institution 
building, and development works under three different prime ministers. The first five-
year development plan started in 1956. A multiparty political system was introduced in 
1959 that had a short life of about 2 years. From 1961 to 1991, one party political 
system prevailed in the kingdom. After the popular movement of 1991, the country 
                                                 
1  Population Census 2001, Central Bureau of Statistics, His Majesty’s Government of Nepal. 
2  During the Rana rule, the King remained as a ceremonial figure and the Prime Minister ruled the 
country. The prime ministerial post was received by birth, as only the son or the brother of the Rana 
prime minister could become the next prime minister. 
 59
again adopted a multiparty political system. But due to the weaknesses in exercising the 
multiparty system as well as due to the inability of the governments to uplift the 
economic status of the general public, the country has been going through a serious 
political crisis. In this backdrop, Maoist rebels3 have been waging guerrilla war against 
the government and the monarchy since 1996.  
After the royal palace massacre4, Prince Gyanendra, brother of the then King 
Birendra, became the new king in June 2001. In October 2002, King Gyanendra 
dissolved the elected House of Representatives and nominated a cabinet to run the 
country’s administration. One after another, three different governments were 
nominated by the king, but all of them failed to work in accordance to the king’s 
wishes. As a consequence, King Gyanendra finally assumed the power by himself in 
February 2005, and has formed the cabinet under his own chairmanship. Since this 
event, the country has gone under the direct rule of the king. 
Nepal is one of the least developed countries in the world with a per capita 
income of USD 240 per annum. About 38 per cent of the population live below the 
poverty line, and the majority of the rural population come under this category. Only 
53.7 per cent of the population is literate and the average life expectancy is 59.7 years. 
 Low economic growth and unequal income distribution has been the main 
features of Nepalese economy. Planned development efforts initiated from 1956 have 
not been able to raise the economic status of the people to a satisfactory level. A variety 
of geo-political and structural constraints, such as land-lockedness, rugged terrain, 
limited resources, low income, low savings, higher rate of population growth, limited 
transportation facilities, limited infrastructures, and an unstable political system have 
hindered the economic development of the country. 
 
3.1.1 Structure of GDP 
The agriculture sector, which also encompasses fisheries and forestry, is the 
backbone of the Nepalese economy. In fiscal year (FY)5 2003, the contribution of this 
sector to GDP was 39 per cent, whereas the contribution of all other non-agriculture 
sectors accounted for 61 per cent (Figure 3.1).  
                                                 
3  Nepal Communist Party (Maoist). 
4  King Birendra, Queen Aiswarya and other members of the royal family were shot dead on 1 June 2001. 
Crown Prince Deependra, who later killed himself, is said to be responsible for these killings. 
5  Nepalese fiscal year begins on 16 July and ends on 15 July of the next year.  
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About 80 per cent of the country’s population is engaged in the agriculture 
sector. But, the contribution of this sector to GDP is gradually declining. The 
contribution of this sector to GDP was 72 per cent in FY 1976. During the last 28 years, 
the annual average share of agriculture sector in GDP has remained at 52 per cent. 
 
Figure 3.1 Structure of GDP 
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Source: Economic Survey, various issues, His Majesty’s Government of Nepal, 
Ministry of Finance. 
 
Despite being the backbone of the economy, Nepalese agriculture sector is still 
undeveloped. Use of traditional farming method, lack of irrigation facilities, lack of 
agricultural inputs and others has compelled this sector to depend upon the vagaries of 
nature. As a result, weather conditions hugely determine the level of agricultural output.  
Due to the unfavourable weather conditions in FY 1977, 1980, 1983, 1987, 1992, 1993 
and 1995, the agricultural sector recorded a real negative growth (Figure 3.2), which 
caused the GDP growth to remain at low level during these years. In FY 2003, this 
sector is estimated to have achieved a growth rate of 2.5 per cent. The annual average 
growth rate of agriculture sector during the last 28 years has remained at 2.6 per cent. 
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Figure 3.2 Real Growth Rate of Agricultural Sector 
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Source: Economic Survey (various issues), His Majesty’s Government of Nepal, 
Ministry of Finance. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Real Growth Rate of Non-agricultural Sector 
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Source: Economic Survey (various issues), His Majesty’s Government of Nepal, 
Ministry of Finance. 
 
The contribution of the non-agricultural sector to GDP is increasing. The share 
of the non-agricultural sector in GDP increased to 61 per cent in FY 2003 from 28 per 
cent in FY 1976 (Figure 3.1). Despite the increasing share in the GDP, the growth rate 
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of the non-agricultural sector is declining (Figure 3.3). The growth rate of this sector 
reached 11.0 per cent in FY 1985, which came down to 4.3 per cent in FY 2001 and 
became negative in FY 2002. However, this sector is estimated to have grown by 2.9 
per cent in FY 2003. During the period of 1976-2003, the average annual growth of this 
sector has remained at 6.0 per cent. 
The declining growth of the non-agricultural sector can be attributed to 
industrial insecurity, political instability, a low level of development activities, 
inadequate infrastructure, weak business confidence, low level of private investment, 
and high cost of funds. Among the non-agriculture sectors, the construction sector 
contributed 11 per cent, the community and social services sector contributed 10 per 
cent, and the trade, restaurant and hotel sector also contributed 10 per cent to GDP in 
the fiscal year 2003. Similarly, the contributions from manufacturing, and transport, 
communication and storage stood at 9 per cent and 8 per cent, respectively. Sectors 
making smallest contribution to GDP are electricity, gas and water, and mining and 
quarrying. Contribution of these sectors to GDP accounted for 2 per cent and 1 per cent, 
respectively (Figure 3.4). 
 
Figure 3.4 Sectoral Contributions to GDP 
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3.1.2 Growth of GDP 
The growth of the real GDP has been highly uneven during the last 28 years 
(Figure 3.5). It grew by 4.0 per cent on an average during 1976-2003. During this 
period, the real GDP growth rate was recorded at a high level of 9.3 per cent in FY 
1981, and the negative growth rates were recorded in 1980 and 2002. The negative real 
GDP recorded in 1980 was mainly due to the negative growth in the agriculture sector, 
whereas that was due to the negative growth in the non-agricultural sector in 2002. In 
FY 2003, the real GDP is estimated to have grown by 2.7 per cent. 
 
Figure 3.5 Growth Rate of Real GDP 
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Source: Economic Survey (various issues), His Majesty’s Government of Nepal, 
Ministry of Finance. 
 
3.1.3 Government Finance  
Total government expenditures have increased by an annual average of 15.7 per 
cent during the 1976-2003 period (Figure 3.6). Out of the total expenditure, the growth 
of regular expenditure exceeded the growth of development expenditure. The regular 
expenditure during this period recorded an annual average growth of 18.2 per cent, 
whereas development expenditure grew by an annual average of 13.6 per cent only. 
These figures clearly depict that much of the available resources were spent on 
maintaining law and order, and as a result, development activities received less 
resources.  
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Figure 3.6 Government Expenditure Pattern 
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Figure 3.7 Government Budget 
-40.0
-20.0
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
Year
R
s.
 in
 B
ill
io
n
Total Expenditure Revenues Grants Deficits
 
Source: Economic Survey (various issues), His Majesty’s Government of Nepal, 
Ministry of Finance. 
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Revenue is the most important source of financing government expenditures. 
But it has contributed only about 60 per cent of the total actual expenditures (Figure 
3.7). In total revenue, tax revenue contributes more than 70 per cent and in the total tax 
revenue, the contribution of the direct taxes is less than 15 per cent. The portion of 
foreign grants also is very small. As a consequence, the government budget deficits are 
persistently increasing. On an average, the budget deficits remained at 32.5 per cent of 
the annual budget and 6.1 per cent of the GDP in the last 28 years. For this reason, the 
development activities have to be financed by external as well as internal borrowings. 
This phenomenon has been the limiting factor of development activities in the country. 
  
3.1.4 Monetary Expansion 
The primary objectives of monetary policy in Nepal are to keep inflation rates 
low, facilitate economic growth and secure a reasonable level of surplus in the balance 
of payments. In order to achieve these objectives, the monetary aggregates-based 
monetary policy strategy framework has been put in place. 
The ever-increasing budgetary deficit of the government has put increasing 
pressure on monetary expansion. As a result, the money supply is showing an increasing 
trend. Against this backdrop, the central bank has adopted a monetary policy stance 
which is directed basically at maintaining domestic price stability and securing a 
reasonable level of balance of payments on the one hand and providing an adequate 
level of liquidity to stimulate the economic activities in the economy on the other. The 
monetary policy stance also aims at softening interest rates for stimulating economic 
activities. 
The narrow money (M1) increased by 8.6 per cent in FY 2003 from the previous 
year and reached to Rs.83.8 billion, whereas broad money (M2) increased by 9.8 per 
cent in this period and reached Rs.245.9 billion (Figure 3.8 and 3.9). The growth rate of 
M2 has been higher than that of M1. The average annual growth rate of M1 stood at 
16.1 per cent during 1976-2003, while that of M2 stood at 18.7 per cent during the same 
period. 
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Figure 3.8 Monetary Expansion 
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Source: Quarterly Economic Bulletin, Mid-July 2004, Nepal Rastra Bank. 
 
 
Figure 3.9 Monetary Growth  
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3.1.5 Balance of Payments 
In the external trade front, both the exports and imports show an increasing 
trend, while the growth rate of imports is higher than that of exports resulting in a 
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increased negative trade balance. Total exports in 2003 registered a growth of 6.4 per 
cent compared to the previous year, while the total imports in the same period grew by 
15.8 per cent. In the payments front, the current account balance recently has registered 
a rapid negative growth mainly due to the increasing negative trade balance. The current 
account deficit in 2002 was Rs.20.8 billions, which increased in 2003 by 25 per cent 
and reached Rs.26.0 billions. 
 
Figure 3.10 Balance of Payments  
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Source: Quarterly Economic Bulletin, Mid-July 2004, Nepal Rastra Bank 
 
  
3.1.6 Inflation 
The annual rate of inflation has remained below 10 per cent during most of the 
period after 1993, except in 1999. In FY 1999, the rate of inflation reached 11 per cent. 
The consumer price index (1995=100) in 2003 stood at 148.9. The annual average rate 
of inflation during the 1976-2003 years remained at 8.5 per cent.   
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Figure 3.11 Inflation 
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Despite several planned efforts, the economic status of the country has not 
improved to a satisfactory level. Incidence of poverty is still high. As a consequence, 
Nepal has remained as one of the poorest countries in the world. As mentioned earlier, 
the country currently is suffering from a serious socio-economic and political crises due 
mainly to its economically-backward state. 
 
3.2 Nepalese Financial System Before Liberalisation 
Until the mid 1980s, the Nepalese financial sector comprised of two commercial 
banks, two Development banks, two insurance companies, and three other institutions, 
namely the Security Exchange Centre, the Employees Provident Fund and the Credit 
Guarantee Corporation. Most of these institutions were state owned. 
The establishment of Nepal Bank Limited (NBL) in 1937 was the first step 
toward establishing an organised financial system in Nepal. Prior to that, the Nepalese 
financial system was unorganised and comprised of informal financial institutions like 
landlords, moneylender and shopkeepers.   
 At that time, Indian currency was widely in circulation in Nepal. The Nepalese 
economy was predominantly non-monetised and highly influenced by the Indian 
market. With a view to facilitate the use of Nepalese currency and help banking 
development in the country, the Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB) - the central bank of the 
country, was established in 1956 under the Nepal Rastra Bank Act 1955. During the 
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initial phase, the main focus of the Nepal Rastra Bank was on replacing the circulation 
of Indian currency by Nepalese currency. 
  In 1959, Nepal Industrial Development Corporation (NIDC) was established to 
meet the long-term and short-term credit needs of the industrial sector. The corporation 
provides financial and technical assistance for setting up, expansion and modernization 
of the industries. In 1963, the Co-operative Bank was established to provide 
institutional credit to co-operative members. This bank did not extend credit to the non-
member farmers. In 1964, the Land Reform Savings Corporation was established with 
the implementation of a land reform program in the country.  
In order to meet large agricultural credit requirements, the Agricultural 
Development Bank of Nepal (ADBN) was established in 1968, and the Co-operative 
Bank and the Land Reform Savings Corporation merged with it. An increasing need for 
banking services was felt along with increased economic activities in the country. To 
fulfil such needs, Rastriya Banijya Bank (RBB), the second commercial bank of the 
country was established in 1966 with 100 per cent government ownership. Similarly, 
Credit Guarantee Corporation was established in 1974 and Securities Marketing Centre 
was established in 1976. 
 Like in other developing countries, an administered interest rate was a striking 
feature of the financial sector in Nepal. NRB made frequent changes in the interest 
structure. Therefore, it was the state, not the market that determined the interest rate. 
 NRB used to issue treasury bills (TBs) on behalf of the government without any 
bidding from the participants. TBs used to be issued with an exogenously determined 
coupon rate. Such an interest rate fixed for the TBs almost always remained below the 
market interest rate. This was a deliberate attempt to make funds available to the 
government at the cheapest possible rate. Consequently, market participation was rather 
low. In fact, the commercial banks did not buy TBs enthusiastically.  
NRB adopted direct monetary policy stance. Under this policy, the behaviour of 
the market was directly controlled in terms of both volume and the price of loans. The 
Bank introduced a cash reserve ratio (CRR) in 1966 and statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) 
in 1974. SLR in the form of holding government securities was primarily intended at 
securing commercial banks’ resources for government use. In other words, this 
instrument was used to deny credit to the private sector. This also interfered in the 
portfolio choice of commercial banks.  
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The Securities Marketing Centre was established in 1977 with a view to develop 
secondary market for the government papers. To make the government papers popular 
and thereby help finance government deficit, an institutional set up of secondary 
transactions for these papers was needed. In this regard, the Centre was established to 
provide liquidity to the government papers.  
 
3.2.1 Deposit Mobilization by Commercial Banks 
NBL was the first bank to extend the modern banking services in the country. In 
the absence of a central bank, this bank assumed also the role of central bank until the 
establishment of NRB in 1956. After the establishment of RBB in 1966, two 
commercial banks gradually extended their activities in various parts of the country. 
Total deposits mobilized by these commercial banks increased by an annual average of 
22.4 per cent during the last decade before liberalisation, which spanned from 1975 to 
1984.  
 
Figure 3.12 Total Deposits at Banks 
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  Source: Quarterly Economic Bulletin, Mid-July 2004, Nepal Rastra Bank 
 
The total deposit collected by the commercial banks is composed of demand 
deposit, saving deposit, fixed deposit and margin deposit. In the total deposit, the fixed 
deposit had the largest share whereas margin deposit had the smallest share. In 1984, 
the share of demand, saving, fixed and margin deposits stood at 22 per cent, 19 per cent, 
55 per cent and 4 per cent, respectively.  
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Figure 3.13 Composition of Deposits 
(FY 1984) 
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Source: Quarterly Economic Bulletin, Mid-July 2004, Nepal Rastra Bank 
 
3.2.2 Loan Disbursement by Commercial Banks 
The total credit extended by the commercial banks increased from Rs.1.3 billion 
in 1975 to Rs.5.8 billion in 1984. The average annual growth rate of the total credit 
stood at 18.7 per cent during this period. 
 
Figure 3.14 Total Loan Disbursement 
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Source: Economic Survey 1995, His Majesty’s Government of Nepal, Ministry of 
Finance. 
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Figure 3.15 Composition of Loan by Purpose 
(FY 1984) 
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Source: Economic Survey 1995, His Majesty’s Government of Nepal, Ministry of 
Finance. 
 
A purpose-wise breakdown of credit (Figure 3.14) shows that the commerce 
sector occupied the largest share in the total credit and the share of general use and 
social purpose credit came in second place in the year 1984. General use and social 
purpose loans are loans extended for general consumption and social activities, which 
can be viewed as unproductive expenses. Agriculture and service sector received the 
smallest share of the credit from the commercial banks in the same year. 
 
3.2.3 Credit-Deposit Ratio of Commercial Banks 
 The credit-deposit ratio of commercial banks showed an increasing trend from 
the year 1977 to 1981. But it declined from 1982 and continued until the year 1984. In 
the year 1984, the credit-deposit ratio stood at 81.7 per cent. This shows that the credit 
mobilization activities of commercial banks remained sluggish during the second half of 
that decade.  
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Figure 3.16 Credit-Deposit Ratio 
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Source: Economic Survey 1995, His Majesty’s Government of Nepal, Ministry of 
Finance. 
 
3.2.4 Branch Expansion of Commercial Banks 
Both commercial banks expanded their branches gradually to spread their 
services nationwide. Under the Intensive Banking program, the government aimed at 
establishing one bank branch for every 30 thousand population. Under this program, 
commercial banks opened their new branches even in such locations where the bank 
branch was not commercially viable. In 1984, the total number of commercial bank 
branches reached 357, out of which 49 were in the Kathmandu valley and the rest 
spread over the cities and villages outside the valley.  
 
3.2.5 Performance of Development Banks  
 Nepal Industrial Development Corporation (NIDC), the first development bank 
of the country, was established with the objective to help the development of the 
industrial sector through providing much needed financial resources. Before the 
establishment of this corporation, NRB directly provided the financial assistance to 
establish some industries. After its establishment, NIDC has been the main provider of 
industrial credit in the country.  
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Figure 3.17 Credit Operations of NIDC 
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Source: Quarterly Economic Bulletin, Mid-July 2004, Nepal Rastra Bank. 
  
Loan disbursement of NIDC did not increase during the period between 1975-
1984. Loan recovery also remained uneven and low. As a result, the outstanding loan of 
NIDC gradually increased during this period (Figure 3.16). 
The Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal (ADBN), the second development 
bank of the country, was established with the objectives to mainly meet the credit needs 
of rural farmers and thus help in the development of the agricultural sector of the 
country. The then Co-operative Bank and Land Reform Savings Corporation were 
merged into this bank. This bank has been providing credit to rural farmers for 
agricultural farming, agro-based cottage industries, livestock and other small 
businesses. 
The total loan disbursement of ADBN has been uneven during the 1975-1984 
period. It had an increasing trend from 1975 to 1978, and then a decreasing trend from 
1979 to 1981. However, from 1982 it recorded a gradual increase. The recovery also 
showed a similar trend, but the outstanding loan amount recorded a gradual increase 
throughout the period of 1975-84. ADBN started commercial banking activities in 1984 
through its limited urban branches with a view to mobilize internal resources in order to 
meet its ever-increasing lending needs.  
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Figure 3.18 Credit Operations of ADBN 
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Source: Quarterly Economic Bulletin, Mid-July 2004, Nepal Rastra Bank. 
 
 The Nepalese financial system before liberalisation was quite small, regulated 
and inefficient. Due to the limited number of banks and other financial institutions, the 
country remained under served. There was no competition among banks and the quality 
of service provided by the banks remained much lower than desired.  
 Due to the lack of appropriate credit information systems, defaulters of one bank 
could get loans from another bank. Consequently, the portion of bad loans in the banks’ 
total loans portfolio increased. Even the loan extended to the government enterprises 
against the government guarantee remained unpaid for quite a long time. As a result of 
this, the financial position of commercial banks continued to deteriorate. 
 Two commercial banks and two development banks were the major players in 
the Nepalese financial system. The chronic ailment of these banks led the financial 
system toward instability. This situation forced the country to adopt the policy of 
financial reform and liberalisation.  
The following section discusses various policy measures employed under the 
financial liberalisation process in Nepal. 
 
3.3 Financial Liberalisation Measures 
 The financial liberalisation process in Nepal started in 1984. Since then, various 
liberalisation measures have been implemented in order to widen and deepen the 
financial system. These measures are discussed below.  
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3.3.1 Removal of Entry Barriers (1984) 
Financial liberalisation in Nepal started evidently with the removal of entry 
barriers in the banking system. Until 1984, only two government-owned commercial 
banks were operating in the market. With the objective of promoting healthy 
competition among banks, the Commercial Bank Act 1974 was amended in 1984, 
which removed the entry barriers to the private sector in the commercial banking 
industry. This was done mainly to attract private joint venture banks with foreign 
collaboration with the hope that such banks would bring in much needed foreign capital 
and technical know-how, infuse modern banking skills to the domestic banks, and, 
widen as well as deepen the national financial structure (Acharya et al. 1998, p.27). 
Following the amendment of the Act, joint venture banks started to enter the financial 
system. Nepal Arab Bank Limited, the first private bank, was established in 1984, as a 
joint venture with Arab Bank. The total number of commercial banks reached 17 and 
the total number of commercial bank branches reached 431 in July 2004 (Nepal Rastra 
Bank 2004). 
 In 1985, the Finance Companies Act was enacted in order to allow finance 
companies to enter the financial system. This was done with the objective of serving 
small borrowers and meeting the demand for consumer credit. But this Act could not 
produce the desired response in the market, as the Act was not clear and transparent 
(Acharya et al. 1998, p.27). Only one finance company was established under the 
government sector in 1989. To make the Act clear and transparent, the Finance 
Company Act 1985 was amended in 1992. Following this amendment, there has been a 
very fast growth in the establishment of finance companies. The number of finance 
companies in July 2004 reached 59 (Nepal Rastra Bank 2004). 
 
3.3.2 Deregulation of Interest Rate (1984) 
Interest rate deregulation started in November 1984 with partial freedom 
provided to the commercial banks to fix the interest rates from 1.0 percentage points to 
1.5 percentage points above the minimum administered rates for different types of term 
deposits. In May 1986, this range was eliminated, allowing the banks to offer higher 
interest rates to any level above the fixed minimum level. In August 1989, the interest 
rate was completely deregulated. Since then, commercials banks and financial 
institutions are free to set both the deposits and loans rates. The objective of interest rate 
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deregulation was to let the market decide the true cost of capital, keep real deposit rates 
positive, thereby, stimulating savings and creating a competitive environment in the 
financial system so as to benefit both the depositors and borrowers (Khatiwada 1999, 
p.17).  
 
3.3.3  Reforms in Treasury Bill Issuance (1988) 
Treasury bills carried a coupon rate, which used to be generally low. 
Commercial banks were not interested in investing in such low yielding bills. As a 
result, Nepal Rastra Bank used to hold a large chunk of treasury bills, exacerbating the 
excess liquidity in the economy (Khatiwada 1999, p. 20). To rectify this anomaly, NRB 
commenced auctioning of TBs since November 1988. Initially, the auctioning was done 
on a monthly basis. As the market matured, auctioning frequency was increased to 
every fortnight, and then to weekly from December 1991 (Acharya et al. 1998, p.31). 
After the introduction of auctioning, commercial banks began to hold increasing shares 
of such bills. 
 
3.3.4 Introduction of Prudential Norms (1988) 
 With the objective of helping in the sustainable development of the financial 
sector through creating a healthy banking environment, a set of prudential norms was 
introduced in 1988. Such norms put in place by NRB included capital adequacy 
requirement, loan classification, loan loss provisioning, interest income recognition, 
single borrower limit, and account disclosure norms. Most of these norms were revised 
in 1991. The requirements, ratios, limits, types, and formats set in these norms have 
been changed from time to time. 
 The Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) initially was linked to the total deposits 
mobilized by the banks. In 1991, CAR was tied up with the total risk weighted assets 
and off-balance sheet transactions of the banks. It was done in order to follow the 
international practice. Starting from FY 2005, the commercial banks as well as 
development banks are required to maintain a minimum of 6 per cent core capital and 
the total capital funds should not be less than 12 per cent of their risk-weighted assets. 
(Nepal Rastra Bank 2005a; 2005b). 
 Commercial banks initially were directed to classify their loans into four 
categories namely pass, substandard, doubtful, and loss. After the re-categorization of 
loans in 1991, the banks were required to classify their loans into six categories based 
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on the overdue period. Since 2002, the loans are categorised again into four categories, 
viz, pass, substandard, doubtful, and loss. 
 Along with the introduction of loan classification norms, commercial and 
development banks were directed to set aside certain funds as loan loss provisioning. 
Since 2002, such provisioning is 1 per cent for pass, 25 per cent for substandard, 50 per 
cent for doubtful, and 100 per cent for bad category loans (Nepal Rastra Bank 2005a; 
2005b).  
 With the objective of avoiding the over-concentration of the bank resources in 
the hands of a few people as well as lowering the risk elements, single borrower limit 
was introduced in 1989.  Since FY 2003, the single borrower limit is 25 per cent of the 
capital base for fund based lending and 50 per cent for non-fund based lending. Such 
limits are the same for both the commercial and development banks (Nepal Rastra Bank 
2005a; 2005b). 
 Before the introduction of the norms related to interest income recognition, the 
banks used to show accrued interests as their income. On the basis of profits based on 
such accounting, dividend and bonus used to be paid. As a consequence, the financial 
health of the banks started to deteriorate. To check this trend, a new prudential norm 
was introduced in 1989, which redefined the interest income on the actual basis instead 
of accrual basis. According to this norm, interest income is recognized only when it is 
received in cash. 
 Another norm introduced in 1989 was related to disclosure of the financial 
information of financial institutions. To maintain a common accounting year in line 
with the fiscal year of His Majesty’s Government of Nepal, financial institutions were 
directed to adopt the fiscal year starting on the 1st of the Nepali calendar month Shrawan 
(16 July) and ending on the 31 of Ashadh (15 July). Similarly, NRB developed common 
formats for financial institutions to prepare their balance sheet, profit and loss account, 
and classification of loans, advances and reserves. 
 
3.3.5  Establishment of Credit Information Bureau (1989) 
With a view to check the possible fraud and irregularities in banking 
transactions, the Credit Information Bureau was established in 1989. Every commercial 
bank has to supply necessary credit information to the Bureau and the Bureau in turn 
supplies credit information to all other banks. On the basis of credit information 
received from the banks, the Bureau prepares a defaulters list and a black list. Prior to 
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the establishment of the Bureau, a defaulter of one bank could obtain a loan from 
another bank. With the help of the credit information supplied by the Bureau, it has 
become easier for the banks to avoid the risky lending. 
 
3.3.6  Shift in Monetary Policy Stance (1989) 
The way monetary policy is conducted has a direct impact on the financial 
sector. After the full liberalisation of the interest rate and elimination of credit ceilings, 
the monetary policy stance has been changed from direct to indirect. Under the indirect 
monetary policy stance, there is no direct control on the price or interest as well as on 
the volume of loans of commercial banks. Market behaviour is aligned through the use 
of indirect monetary policy instruments such as bank rate, cash reserve requirement, and 
open market operations.  
 
3.3.7  Strengthening of Government Owned Commercial Banks (1991) 
To evaluate the financial positions of the two state-owned commercial banks – 
RBB and NBL, a study was conducted with the financial support of the UNDP in 1989. 
The study recommended a series of corrective and preventive measures to improve their 
financial performance. To implement the recommendation of the study, the government 
provisioned a supplementary budget of Rs.3.45 billion in 1991. The fund was used for 
the recapitalisation of two banks and to repay the government guaranteed overdue loans 
(Acharya et al. 1998, p.31).  
 
3.3.8  Reform in Capital Market (1992)   
The Securities Marketing Centre was established in 1977 with the objective of 
developing markets for the government securities. The centre carried out both 
regulatory and operational functions. In 1984, it was converted into the Security 
Exchange Centre, but the functions carried by it remained almost the same. The reform 
in capital market started with the amendment in the Security Exchange Act in 1992. 
Operational and regulatory functions were separated in 1993. The Security Exchange 
Board was established to look after the regulatory functions and at the same time the 
Nepal Stock Exchange Centre was created to carry out the trading of the securities 
(Khatiwada 1999, p.21).  
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3.3.9  Reduction in the Reserve Requirement (1993) 
  The banks were required to meet the high reserve requirement in the form of the 
Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) introduced in 1966 and Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) 
introduced in 1974. CRR was imposed for monetary control and prudential norms, 
whereas SLR was imposed to provide a captive market for government securities. The 
SLR was completely abolished in August 1993. After the complete liberalisation of the 
interest rate in 1989, the CRR however, was revised upward from 9 per cent to 12 per 
cent of the domestic deposits. Since April 1998, the CRR has been gradually revised 
downward. As of November 2003, the average CRR to be maintained by the 
commercial banks is 7.75 per cent of their domestic deposits (Nepal Rastra Bank 2003a, 
p.vii). 
 
3.3.10 Introduction of Floor Trading of Securities (1994)  
In January 1994, floor trading of the stocks was introduced under the Nepal 
Stock Exchange Centre. Due to this new arrangement, trading in stocks started to boom, 
and the number of listed companies as well as the market capitalization increased 
gradually. The number of companies listed in the Centre stood at 114 in July 2004. 
 
3.3.11 Enactment of Development Bank Act (1996)  
 Nepal Industrial Development Bank (NIDC), established in 1959, and the 
Agricultural Development Bank (ADBN) established in 1968 were the two 
developments banks operating in the market to meet the long-term credits. To allow 
new development banks in the market, the Development Bank Act was enacted in 1996. 
The number of development banks including NIDC and ADBN has reached 25 in July 
2004 (Nepal Rastra Bank 2004). This includes five regional development banks that are 
carrying micro credit operations in rural villages.  
 
3.3.12 Revision of Nepal Rastra Bank Act (2001) 
The Nepal Rastra Bank Act 1955 was revised in 2001. This Act has made NRB 
an autonomous institution. As in other developing countries, central bank of Nepal – 
Nepal Rastra Bank previously had to work under government control. As a result, the 
bank could not implement monetary policies as well as financial sector policies 
independently. It is expected that the revised Act will serve the requirements of a 
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modern central bank as part of the government's overall financial sector development 
and modernization program (Pyakuryal 2002, p.7).  
 
3.3.13 Restructuring of Rastriya Banijya Bank and Nepal Bank Limited (2002)   
The financial health of RBB and NBL was reported to be gradually deteriorating 
for quite some time. A diagnostic study carried out by KPMG-Barents Group in 1998 
reported that these two banks would need between Rs. 25 to 30 billion for 
recapitalisation. To improve the financial health of these two banks, the restructuring 
process started with the technical and financial assistance of the World Bank. In this 
process, NRB has handed over the management of NBL to the ICC Consulting Group of 
Bank of Scotland in July 2002. Another professional group - Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu 
was selected for managing Rastriya Banijya Bank. But since this Group breached the 
contract, Nepal Rastra Bank hired Mr. Bruce F. Henderson, an American bank 
Professional, as the Chief Executive Officer of RBB in December 2002. Under the new 
management, restructuring activities are being carried out in these banks (Nepal Rastra 
Bank 2003a, p.ix).     
 
3.3.14 Enactment of Debt Recovery Act (2002)     
RBB and NBL gradually accumulated a huge proportion of non-performing 
assets (NPA). Such assets of RBB stood at 52 per cent and in the case of NBL; it 
reached 62 per cent of the total loans in 2003 (Kantipur National Daily 2003). The 
increasing NPA in the banking sector was attributed to the lack of strong legal measures 
for the recovery of loans. To address this issue, the Debt Recovery Act was enacted in 
2002. This Act is expected to reduce the increasing pressures of bad loans in banks and 
financial institutions. 
 
3.4 Concluding Remarks 
Until the mid 1980s, the Nepalese financial system was small and highly 
regulated. There were less than a dozen government-owned banks and financial 
institutions including two commercial banks. The central bank adopted a direct 
monetary policy stance and controlled the volume as well as the price of loans. There 
was no competition in the market and the banks were inefficient in their functioning. 
Due to the lack of prudential rules and vigilance agencies, defaulters of one bank got 
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loans from another. All these factors collectively caused the financial system to become 
weak day by day. This situation required for a drastic reform of the financial sector of 
the country.  
Compelled by the above situation, Nepal started financial liberalisation process 
in 1984. Under this process, various policy instruments have been implemented. Some 
policy instruments were aimed at increasing the competition and efficiency in the 
financial market, which included removal of entry barriers to commercial banks, finance 
companies and development banks, and restructuring of two state-owned banks. In 
order to improve the efficiency of money and capital markets, measures such as 
auctioning of Treasury Bills (TBs) and floor trading of securities were introduced. The 
policy instruments such as interest rate deregulation, reduction in reserve requirement 
and changing the monetary policy stance from direct to indirect were implemented with 
a view to pursuing market-driven monetary policy. Similarly, introduction of prudential 
norms, establishment of Credit Information Bureau, revision of Nepal Rastra Bank Act, 
and enactment of Debt Recovery Act were aimed at ensuring the integrity of banks and 
maintenance of the stability of the financial system of Nepal. All of these policy 
instruments were expected to complement each other in achieving the overall objectives 
of competition and efficiency, smooth functioning of money and capital markets, and 
attainment of stability in the financial sector of Nepal.     
The implementation of various financial liberalisation measures might have 
brought some changes in the financial sector and in the economic sphere of the country. 
But the nature and the extent of such changes are not known since no systematic study 
has been conducted so far to evaluate the impact of the policy. In this context, this study 
aims at examining the overall impact of the various financial liberalisation measures in 
Nepal. 
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Chapter 4 
ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter introduces the hypotheses, methods and models used in this study. 
It starts with an aggregated framework for impact evaluation developed in section 1. In 
section 2, different sets of hypotheses are presented in three broad groups, viz growth, 
distribution, and stability. Section 3 discusses about the construction of a financial 
liberalisation index. This index is a summary of all the financial liberalisation measures, 
and is used throughout this study as the main indicator of the degree of financial 
liberalisation. In section 4 through 11, econometric models are constructed specifying 
the relationship between various sets of variables in order to test the hypotheses 
presented in section 2. Section 12 discusses the nature and the sources of the data used 
in this study. 
 
4.1 Aggregated Framework for Impact Evaluation 
 From the literature survey in Chapter 2, it is clear that most of the previous 
studies on financial liberalisation have focused on some particular aspect and 
generalised their findings as the overall impact of the policy. A few country-focussed 
studies have tried to analyse various aspects of financial liberalisation, but these have 
been done in fragmented parts and are incomplete. Hence, the literature lacks the single 
integrated framework to study the overall impact of the policy. In this regard, this study 
tries to bridge this gap by proposing an aggregated framework for studying the overall 
impact of financial liberalisation.  
The common objective of any economic policy is to achieve social welfare, 
which comprises an optimal combination of growth, distribution and stability. The 
particular emphasis on these dimensions, however, may differ according to the society 
or the country, and according to the time. Financial liberalisation is also an economic 
policy. Therefore, the impact evaluation of the policy would be unambiguous and 
meaningful if done against the above three dimensions.  
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In this study, the following three-dimensional framework is employed in order to 
investigate the impact of financial liberalisation in Nepal. 
 
Figure 4.1 Three Dimensions of Financial Liberalisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above framework is based on the BCG matrix1. There are altogether eight 
possible scenarios and each scenario represents a different impact status. These 
scenarios are presented in Table 4.1 below. 
  
Table 4.1 Possible Scenarios 
Scenario Growth Equality Stability 
I High High High 
II High Low High 
III Low High High 
IV Low Low High 
V High High Low 
VI High Low Low 
VII Low High Low 
VIII Low Low Low 
Note: “Low” also encompasses the negative degree of impact 
                                                          
1 A matrix developed by the Boston Consultancy Group in the 1970s. The original matrix is two-
dimensional and depicts four different portfolio positions of a firm based on the growth and the market-
share status.   
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 In the above framework, scenario-I is the ideal case where all the dimensions, 
viz, growth, welfare and stability are high. On the other extreme, scenario-VIII is the 
worst possible case where all these dimensions are low. Scenario-III, V and VII 
represent the case of a financially repressed economy, where the emphasis is on welfare, 
or the redistribution of income. Scenario-V is better than scenario-III and VII, but the 
case of most of the developing countries resemble scenario-VII, where welfare is 
achieved to some degree but the economic growth, and the stability (specifically the 
financial stability) are low.   
Similarly, scenario-II and VI represent possible outcomes of financial 
liberalisation. The main focus of financial liberalisation is on economic growth and 
financial stability, and it is viewed as not addressing the welfare aspect properly. 
However, most of the developing countries have experienced scenario-VI instead of 
scenario-II, where growth is achieved to some extent, but welfare and stability have 
deteriorated. Growth achieved with reduced welfare and increased financial fragility 
generates socio-economic problems, which subsequently cause severe political 
problems.  
 
4.2 Hypotheses 
As mentioned above, the main objective of this study is to examine the impact of 
financial liberalisation in Nepal on the national economy in general, and on the financial 
system in particular. Following the framework presented in the preceding section, the 
following groups of hypotheses are tested in this study. 
Growth: McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) hypothesised that financial 
liberalisation accelerates economic growth and enhances efficiency through positive 
interest rates effect on savings and investment. This group of hypotheses is aimed at 
examining the impact of financial liberalisation measures on the various aspects of 
growth and efficiency.  
The financial liberalisation theory suggests that the removal of entry barriers 
will lead to an increase in the number of financial institutions in the market and as a 
result the financial sector will be widened. To examine this assertion, the following 
hypothesis is tested in the Nepalese context: 
 
H1: Financial liberalisation widened the financial sector in Nepal. 
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The financial liberalisation theory argues that the deregulation of interest rates 
will raise real interest rate. The higher real interest rate would stimulate savings and 
thereby investment, despite the rise of the user cost of capital. To analyse this argument, 
the following hypothesis is tested: 
 
H2: Financial liberalisation increased domestic savings and investment in Nepal. 
 
Under the financial liberalisation process increased savings, increased 
investment and increased efficiency is believed to accelerate economic growth and 
industrial development. In this regard, the following hypothesis is tested:   
 
H3: Financial liberalisation accelerated economic growth and industrial 
development in Nepal. 
 
The financial liberalisation policy is believed to increase the financial depth of 
the economy by increasing financial resources available to investors. In this context the 
following hypothesis is tested: 
 
H4: Financial liberalisation enhanced financial deepening in Nepal. 
 
The positive real interest rate under the financial liberalisation process is argued 
to improve the resource allocation since the funds are expected to be channelled from 
inferior projects to high yielding projects. In order to evaluate this argument, the 
following hypothesis is tested: 
 
H5: Financial liberalisation improved resource allocation in Nepal. 
 
Equality: Equal distribution of income is one of the vital issues in developing 
countries. The pattern of distribution of income is reflected in employment status and 
inequality status of an economy. In this regard, the following two hypotheses are tested 
in this study: 
 
H6: Financial liberalisation increased employment opportunities in Nepal. 
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H7: Financial liberalisation improved distribution of income in Nepal. 
 
Stability: A strong and stable financial sector can aid in the economic growth of 
a country. Instability in this sector may bring severe consequences affecting the entire 
economy. In this study, the following hypothesis is tested in order to examine the 
impact of the financial liberalisation policy on financial stability: 
 
H8: Financial liberalisation improved financial stability in Nepal. 
 
 The testing of the above hypotheses should explain the relationship between 
various combinations of dependent and explanatory variables. By analysing the nature 
of such relationships, some inference can be drawn regarding the impact of financial 
liberalisation.  
The above mentioned hypotheses are tested by analysing relevant explanatory 
variables along with a summary index of the financial liberalisation policy. The index 
comprises all the components, or policy measures of financial liberalisation. 
Appropriate proxies or indicators for these components are used wherever suitable. The 
following section introduces components of the financial liberalisation process in Nepal, 
and offers a composition of these components as the financial liberalisation index.  
 
4.3 Financial Liberalisation Index 
Financial liberalisation is a process that involves the implementation of a 
number of policies. In order to show the degree or the level of financial liberalisation at 
a particular time, a financial liberalisation index (FLI) for Nepal is constructed based on 
principal components method following Bandiera, Caprio et al. (2000), and Laeven 
(2003). Bandiera, Caprio et al. (2000) construct a financial liberalisation index for eight 
developing countries by including eight main components of financial liberalisation in 
their index, which are (1) interest rates, (2) procompetition measures, (3) reserve 
requirements, (4) directed credit, (5) banks’ ownership, (6) prudential regulation, (7) 
stock markets, and (8) international financial liberalisation. Laeven (2003) constructs a 
similar index for 13 developing countries. He includes six measures of financial 
liberalisation but excludes the measures related to stock markets and external sector in 
his index. Previously, Demetriades and Luintel (1997) constructed a financial repression 
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index for India using the principal components method. They included nine different 
repressionist policies in their index. Following the same method, Laurenceson and Chai 
(2003) construct a similar financial repression index for China.  
In this study, eight major policy components of financial liberalisation have been 
used to construct the financial liberalisation index for Nepal. The policy components 
include (1) interest rate deregulation, (2) removal of entry barriers, (3) reduction in 
reserve requirement, (4) easing in credit controls, (5) introduction of prudential 
regulations, (6) stock market reform, (7) privatisation of state-owned banks, and (8) 
external account liberalisation.  
The main focus of this study is on domestic financial liberalisation. However, 
external account liberalisation, which belongs to international financial liberalisation, 
also has been included in the index since the international market situation may have 
some influence on the domestic financial market.  
In order to derive the financial liberalisation index, some arbitrary value is 
assigned to each of the financial liberalisation policy variables (Table 4.2). Each policy 
variable can take a value between 0 and 1. When a particular sector is fully liberalised, 
that policy variable takes a value of 1 and when that sector remains regulated, it takes a 
value of 0. To capture the scenario of partial and phase-wise gradual liberalisation of a 
particular sector, partial values like 0.33, 0.50, and 0.66 have been assigned. A value of 
0.50 indicates the first phase of partial deregulation in a two-phased deregulation 
process, whereas a value 0.33 and 0.66 indicate the first and second phase, respectively, 
in a three-phased deregulation process. The two-phased process takes a value of 1 in the 
second phase and the three-phased case takes a value of 1 in the third phase. In other 
words, if a sector is fully liberalised in a single phase, the value assigned in this case is 
1. But if the liberalisation is completed in two phases, then 0.5 is assigned for the first 
phase and 1 for the second. Similarly, if the liberalisation takes place in three phases, 
then the number assigned is 0.33 for the first phase, 0.66 for the second phase and 1 for 
the last phase.  
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Table 4.2 Financial Liberalisation Policy Variables2  
Year IRD REB RRR ECC IPR SMR PSB EAL 
1970 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1971 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1972 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1973 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1974 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1975 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1976 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1977 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1978 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1979 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1980 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1981 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1982 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1983 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1984 0.33 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1985 0.33 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1986 0.66 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1987 0.66 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1988 0.66 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1989 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1990 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1991 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1992 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1993 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.50 
1994 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.50 
1995 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.50 
1996 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.50 
1997 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.50 
1998 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.50 
1999 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.50 
2000 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.50 
2001 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 
2002 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 
2003 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 
               Note: Number assigned - 0 for none, 1 for full, and 0.33, 0.50 and 0.66 for partial-
gradual deregulation. 
 
 
The description of the policy variables and their implementation date are 
presented below. 
 
                                                          
2 See Appendix A, Table A.1 for quarterly data. 
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IRD  (Interest Rate Deregulation) – Interest rate partially deregulated with 
ceilings in 1984, ceilings removed in 1986, and completely deregulated 
in 1989. 
REB  (Removal of Entry Barriers) – 1984. 
RRR  (Reduction in Reserve Requirements) – 1993. 
ECC  (Easing in Credit Controls) – 1991. Some control still exists, as 
commercial banks are required to channel certain portions of their loan 
portfolio to a productive sector and rural sector. 
IPR  (Implementation of Prudential Rules) – A set of prudential rules 
implemented in 1988. But the central bank became independent only in 
2001.  
SMR (Stock Market Reform) – Floor trading of stocks started in 1994. 
PSB (Privatisation of State-owned Banks) – At the initial phase, the 
managements of two ailing state-owned banks were given to foreign 
parties on contract in August 2002; and it has been planned to privatise 
the ownership of these banks after their financial health becomes better 
under the new management. 
EAL  (External Account Liberalisation) – The current account became fully 
convertible in 1993, but the capital account by and large still remains 
inconvertible.  
 
From the values presented in Table 4.2, the financial liberalisation index (FLI) 
for Nepal is derived. To this end, the weight of each of the components is calculated by 
employing the principal component method. The composition of the FLI can be 
expressed in the following terms: 
ttttttt SMRwIPRwECCwRRRwREBwIRDwFLI 654321 +++++=   
EALwPSBw t 87 ++      (4.1) 
where wi is the weight of the component given by the respective eigenvector of 
the selected principal component. 
The eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the correlation matrix of financial 
liberalisation policy variables are as follows: 
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Table 4.3 Eigenvalues and Eigenvectors of the 
Correlation Matrix of Policy Variables  
 
      Variables Eigenvectors (λk) 
  
 λ1 λ2 λ3 
         IRD 0.373 0 0.477 
        REB 0.334 0 0.589 
        RRR 0.394 0 0.325 
        ECC 0.393 0 0.079 
        IPR 0.377 0 0.189 
        SMR 0.381 0 0.380 
        PSB 0.000 1 0.000 
        EAL 0.390 0 0.366 
   Eigenvalues (λk) 5.558 1 0.935 
 
 
Taking the first principal component (λ1), which accounts for 74 per cent of the 
total variance3, in the eight policy variables and substituting the respective eigenvalues 
for wi’s in equation (4.1): 
tttttt IPRECCRRRREBIRDFLI 377.0393.0394.0334.0373.0 ++++=  
ttt EALPSBSMR 390.0000.0381.0 +++       (4.2) 
The index for the individual policy components are calculated by substituting 
the values for IRD, REB, RRR, ECC, IPR, SMR, PSB and EAL in equation (4.2) from 
Table 4.2 and multiplying by the respective values of w. The financial liberalisation 
index for each year is derived by summing up the calculated values of all the eight 
policy components for the respective year. The calculated individual and total index are 
presented in the Table 4.4. 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 ΣλK = 5.558 + 1.000 + 0.935 = 7.493. λ1 = 5.558/7.493 = 0.74. 
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Table 4.4 Financial Liberalisation Index (FLI) for Nepal4 
Year IRD REB RRR ECC IPR SMR PSB EAL FLI
1970 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1971 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1972 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1973 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1974 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1975 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1976 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1977 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1978 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1979 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1980 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1981 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1982 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1983 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1984 0.123 0.334 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.457
1985 0.123 0.334 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.457
1986 0.246 0.334 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.580
1987 0.246 0.334 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.580
1988 0.246 0.334 0 0 0.189 0 0 0 0.769
1989 0.373 0.334 0 0 0.189 0 0 0 0.896
1990 0.373 0.334 0 0 0.189 0 0 0 0.896
1991 0.373 0.334 0 0.197 0.189 0 0 0 1.092
1992 0.373 0.334 0 0.197 0.189 0 0 0 1.092
1993 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0 0 0.195 1.681
1994 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0.381 0 0.195 2.062
1995 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0.381 0 0.195 2.062
1996 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0.381 0 0.195 2.062
1997 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0.381 0 0.195 2.062
1998 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0.381 0 0.195 2.062
1999 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0.381 0 0.195 2.062
2000 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0.381 0 0.195 2.062
2001 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.377 0.381 0 0.195 2.251
2002 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.377 0.381 0 0.195 2.251
2003 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.377 0.381 0 0.195 2.251
 
The figure of the financial liberalisation index (FLI) given in the last column of 
the above table is presented in Figure 4.2. 
 
 
                                                          
4 Quarterly FLI used in empirical tests. See Appendix A, Table A.2. 
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Figure 4.2 Financial Liberalisation Index 
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The above figure reveals that the decade of 1984 – 1994 was the main period of 
the implementation of financial liberalisation measures in Nepal.  
 As discussed, earlier financial liberalisation comprises eight different policy 
components. The effects of the implementation of these policy components are reflected 
in the change of certain variables. In this context, analysing such a reflection is 
particularly useful in examining the impact of the individual policy component. Since 
FLI is unobservable, the policy makers basically use the individual components for the 
policy changes. From this view point also, the study of the individual components also 
become important regarding the impact evaluation of the financial liberalisation.      
The variables used in this study as the indicators of various policy components 
are given in Table 4.5. 
 It is assumed that implementation of a policy component would directly bring 
some change in the respective indicators. In such a case, policy implementation itself 
means manipulating the indicator. Such an indicator is not available for two policy 
components IPR and PSB.  
In order to evaluate the policy impact, summary index of financial liberalisation 
(FLI) and the respective indicators of the individual policy components are used 
wherever appropriate.  
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Table 4.5 Policy Components and Indicators 
S.N. Policy Component Indicator(s) 
1. Interest Rate Deregulation (IRD) Interest Rates (deposit, lending, 
refinance) 
2. Removal of Entry Barriers (REB) Population density per bank branch 
3. Reduction in Reserve 
Requirement (RRR) 
Statutory liquidity requirement and 
cash reserve requirement rate 
4. Easing in Credit Controls (ECC) Bank credit to private sector vis-a-
vis the public sector 
5. Implementation of Prudential 
Rules (IPR) 
None 
6. Stock Market Reform (SMR) Market capitalisation value 
7. Privatisation of State-owned 
Banks (PSB) 
None 
8. External Account Liberalisation 
(EAL) 
Foreign direct investment and 
balance of payments statistics 
 
The following sections introduce dependent and explanatory variables related to 
each hypothesis and present the econometric framework for testing these hypotheses.  
 
4.4 Financial Sector Widening  
The first group of hypotheses outlined in section 4.2 is aimed at examining the 
impact of financial liberalisation on various aspects of growth and efficiency. This 
section sheds light on the effects of liberalisation, particularly on the financial sector 
widening.  
One of the expected outcomes of financial liberalisation is a widening of the 
financial sector. It is assumed that as entry barriers are removed, new banks and other 
financial institutions grow in number and size of activity, and thus the financial sector 
gets widened. As a consequence, the financial services become easily available to a 
larger population. To examine this hypothesis, i.e., whether the financial liberalisation 
has helped widen the financial sector in Nepal, the data on the total volume of bank 
transactions is analysed. The total volume of bank transactions (VBT) is defined as: 
TCBTDBVBT +=   (4.3) 
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where, 
 TDB = Total deposits of commercial banks that include demand deposit, 
saving deposit, and fixed deposit; and, 
 TCB = Total credit extended by commercial banks to the private sector as 
well as the public sector. 
It is assumed that the volume of bank transactions can reflect the degree of 
financial sector widening. Main indicators of financial sector widening include extended 
banking services, positive real deposit rate, increased credit availability, and increased 
inflow of foreign capital. When the banking services get extended to a larger 
population, it is natural to see an increased volume of bank transactions reflected in 
bank deposits and credits. When there is a real positive deposit interest rate, it is 
expected that the savings will increase, which is also reflected in the bank deposits. 
Credit is one of the main components of bank transactions. Hence, increased credit 
availability is, obviously, reflected in the total volume of bank transactions. Similarly, 
since foreign capital inflow normally comes through the banking channel, it is also 
captured in the total volume of bank transaction. Therefore, in this study, the total 
volume of the bank transaction (VBT) is taken as a proxy of financial sector widening.  
It can be argued that a certain amount of financial sector widening takes place 
even in a non-liberalised financial system due to the upward trending nature of 
economic activities. However, if financial liberalisation has a positive effect on 
financial sector widening, then the speed of the widening process must be faster in a 
liberalised regime than in a non-liberalised regime. Examining the relationship between 
relevant variables can portray this picture.   
As mentioned above, the total volume of the bank transaction (VBT) is used here 
as the proxy of financial sector widening. The relationship between VBT and FLI can 
be analysed by using the following equations: 
tttttt eFLIPBBIRRGDPRVBT +++++= 54321 ααααα   (4.4) 
where 1α  is the intercept, 2α , 3α , 4α , and 5α are the coefficients of the 
respective variables, and te  is the white noise which is assumed to be normally 
distributed with mean and variance 0 and 2σ , respectively.  
In the above equation, real gross domestic product (GDPR), real interest rate 
(IRR), and average population density per bank branch (PBB) also have been included 
as these are the key determinants of the volume of the bank transaction (VBT). Besides, 
 96
IRR and PBB can depict the effect of the individual policy components related to these 
variables. 
Using the natural log (L) form, the above equation can be written as follows: 
tttttt eFLILPBBIRRLGDPRLVBT +++++= 54321 ααααα     (4.5)                   
In this equation, IRR and FLI are at level form, as some of the observations of 
these variables are zero or negative, and these cannot be converted into the log form. 
The expected signs of the coefficients 2α , 3α , and 5α  are positive, whereas that of 4α  
is negative. The signs of 3α , 4α  and 5α are specifically critical in testing the hypothesis 
H1 outlined in section 4.2. 
  
4.5 Interest Rate, Savings and Investment 
 In order to test the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis of financial liberalisation, the 
relationship between interest rates, bank savings, and bank credits are analysed. The 
following equation is used to examine the interest rate effect on savings. 
 tttttt eFLIPBBDRRGDPRTDR +++++= 109876 ααααα      (4.6)
 In this equation, the regressand is real time deposits held at banks (TDR) and the 
regressors include a real gross domestic product (GDPR), a real deposit rate (DRR), an 
average population density per bank branch (PBB) and a financial liberalisation index 
(FLI). This equation can be rewritten in the natural log form as follows: 
tttttt eFLILPBBDRRLGDPRLTDR +++++= 109876 ααααα     (4.7) 
In the above equation, the coefficients 7α , 8α , and 10α  are expected to be 
positive while the coefficient of 9α  is expected to be negative. The signs of 8α , and 10α  
being positive and at the same time that of 9α  being negative would mean that the first 
part of the hypothesis H2 can not be rejected.  
To examine the effect of interest rate on investment, the following relationship is 
also analysed.   
ttttt BCBRRFRLRRTDRTBCR 1514131211 ααααα ++++=   
    ttt eFLIPBB +++ 1716 αα          (4.8)  
 where, 
TBCR =  Real Total Bank Credit (credit extended by banks to the private 
sector as well as to the public sector) 
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TDR =  Real Time Deposits (saving and fixed deposits at banks) 
 LRR =  Real Lending Rate (average of the various category lending 
rates) 
RFR =  Real Refinance Rate (interest rate charged by the central bank 
on the refinance credit provided to banks) 
BCBR =  Real Borrowing by banks from the Central Bank, which also 
includes refinance credit 
PBB =  Average population density per bank branch (total population 
divided by total number of bank branches) 
 Real total bank credit (TBCR) is used here as the proxy of the investment. The 
equation can be transformed into the following natural log form: 
 ttttt BCBRRFRLRRLTDRLTBCR 1514131211 ααααα ++++=  
      ttt eFLILPBB +++ 1716 αα     (4.9) 
 In the above equation, LRR, RFR, and BCBR are in level form, as some of the 
observations in these variables are zero or negative. The signs of the coefficients 12α , 
15α  and 17α  are expected to be positive, while the signs of the coefficients 13α , 14α  and 
16α  are expected to be negative. The signs of 15α  and 17α being positive and at the same 
time the sign of 16α being negative would lead to non-rejection of the second part of the 
hypothesis H2. 
 
4.6 Economic Growth and Industrial Development 
The ultimate objective of implementing the financial liberalisation policy is to 
achieve a higher rate of economic growth and industrial development. In an agriculture-
based economy like Nepal, the issue of industrial development becomes crucial for the 
sustainable long-run economic growth.  
To examine the impact of financial liberalisation on the economic growth, the 
following relationship is estimated: 
ttttt eFLIIRRFDGDPP ++++= 21201918 αααα     (4.10) 
 where, 
GDPP =  Per capita real gross domestic product 
FD =  Financial depth proxied by the ratio of total bank deposit 
liabilities divided by nominal gross domestic product 
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IRR =  Real Interest Rate proxied by one-year saving deposit rate 
 Equation (4.10) can be transformed into natural log form as follows: 
 ttttt eFLIIRRLFDLGDPP ++++= 21201918 αααα       (4.11) 
 In the above equation, 19α , 20α  and 21α  are expected to be positive. The signs 
of all these coefficients being positive would mean that the first part of the hypothesis 
H3 is not rejected.   
 The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) can be segregated into agricultural and non-
agricultural GDP. The agriculture sector consists of agriculture, fisheries and forestry, 
whereas the non-agriculture sector consists of 8 different sub-sectors: viz 1) mining and 
quarrying, 2) manufacturing, 3) electricity, gas, and water; 4) construction, 5) trade, 
restaurants, and hotels; 6) transport, communication and storages; 7) financial and real 
estate; and, 8) community and social services. Non-agricultural GDP, excluding the 
community and social services sub-sector, can be used as a proxy for industrial 
development. To analyse the effects of financial liberalisation on industrial 
development, the following relationship is examined: 
ttttt eFLIIRRTBCRNGDPR ++++= 25242322 αααα    (4.12) 
where, 
NGDPR = Real non-agriculture GDP (Contribution of Community and 
Social Services sub-sector excluded)  
 Equation (4.11) is transformed into the following natural log form: 
 ttttt eFLIIRRLTBCRLNGDPR ++++= 25242322 αααα     (4.13) 
 In order to support the second part of the hypothesis H3, the signs of the 
coefficients of LTBCR, IRR, and FLI (viz 23α , 24α  and 25α ) should not be negative. 
  
4.7 Financial Development 
 The main emphasis of financial liberalisation lies on the financial development 
of a country. A highly developed financial system is regarded as a catalyst to economic 
growth and development. The level of financial development is indicated by the level of 
financial depth. Such depth is proxied by the ratio of bank deposit liabilities to nominal 
GDP (King and Levine 1993a; Demetriades and Luintel 1996a; 1996b; 1997). To 
examine the impact of financial liberalisation on financial development, we analyse the 
following relationship: 
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 ttttttt eFLIPBBIRRVBTPGDPPFD ++++++= 313029282726 αααααα  (4.14) 
 In the above equation, VBTP is the per capita volume of bank transactions. All 
the other variables included in this equation have been used in the previous equations 
too, and discussed in respective sections above. The equation can be rewritten in the 
natural log form as follows: 
 ttttttt eFLILPBBIRRLVBTPLGDPPLFD ++++++= 313029282726 αααααα
           (4.15) 
 The expected signs of 27α , 28α , 29α  and 31α  are positive, and that of 30α  is 
negative. The positive signs of 28α , 29α  and 31α , and negative sign of 30α would lead to 
non-rejection of the hypothesis H4. 
 
4.8 Efficiency in Resource Allocation 
 Another expected outcome of financial liberalisation is efficiency in financial 
administration and in resource allocation. To achieve a higher economic growth, it is 
necessary that the scarce financial resources be allocated efficiently in a manner 
ensuring highest productivity. 
 The administrative efficiency of the financial sector can be reflected in the 
interest rate spread of banks. The interest rate spread is the gap between the lending rate 
and the deposit rate. A higher deposit rate is preferred by the depositors, whereas a 
lower lending rate is preferred by the borrowers. In this context, the volume of both the 
deposit and lending can be increased by a lower interest rate spread. Such a lower 
interest rate is possible when the banks increase their administrative efficiency and 
reduce the administrative cost. Figure 4.3 below shows the interest rate movements in 
Nepal during the period of 1970-2003.  
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Figure 4.3 Interest Rate Movement in Nepal 
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 The above graph clearly shows that the interest rate spread increased along with 
the implementation of the financial liberalisation policy. The spread is much higher in 
the post-liberalisation regime (after 1984) compared to that in the pre-liberalisation 
regime (before 1984). This situation is undesired and unexpected and suggests that the 
financial liberalisation policies have not been able to exert a healthy competition in the 
financial system.  
 The McKinnon-Shaw school hypothesize that interest rate deregulation leads to 
a higher or positive deposit and lending rates. The higher lending rate in turn helps in 
moving scarce financial resources from low yielding projects to high yielding ones. In 
the Nepalese case, the data on project-wise return is not available, so a direct test of 
interest rate effects on investment is not possible.  
It is a common assumption that the private sector is more efficient than public 
sector in utilising the financial resources, and that efficiency can be reflected in the 
growth of the non-agricultural GDP. From this point of view, the relationship between 
the share of the bank credit to private sector and the share of the non-agricultural GDP 
in terms of total GDP can portray a picture of the impact of financial liberalisation on 
resource allocation.  
 To examine the impact mentioned above, the following equation is estimated: 
 tttttt eFLIPBBIRRSBCPSNGDP +++++= 3635343332 ααααα   (4.16) 
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where, 
 SNGDP = Share of the non-agricultural GDP in total GDP 
 SBCP = Share of bank credit to private sector in total bank credit 
In the above equation, IRR, PBB and FLI are included for the complete 
information. The natural log form of the equation is as follows: 
tttttt eFLILPBBIRRLSBCPLSNGDP +++++= 3635343332 ααααα   (4.17) 
In order to support the hypothesis H5, the coefficients of LSBCP, IRR and FLI 
should be positive and the coefficient of LPBB should be negative. 
 
4.9 Employment Opportunities  
 As mentioned earlier, about 80 per cent of the population of the country is 
engaged in the agriculture sector. Disguised unemployment is prevalent in this sector as 
more people are actually needed than normally engage in a small piece of family owned 
land, mainly due to the lack of other employment opportunities. Industry and service are 
the other sectors generating full time employment opportunities. Regarding the 
employment status, the labour force of the country can be divided into three groups, viz 
fully employed, underemployed (disguised unemployment), and fully unemployed. 
Table 4.6 shows the employment status during 1997 – 2001.  
 
Table 4.6 Employment Status 
                      (Population in Thousand) 
Detail 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Total Labour Force 9,888 9,938 10,185 10,300 10,416
Fully Unemployed Population 366 417 397 340 521
Percentage  3.7 4.2 3.9 3.3 5.0
Underemployed Population 4,381 4,382 4,389 4,385 3,333
Percentage 46.3 45.6 44.7 43.4 32.3
Underemployed Population as 
Full Unemployed Equivalent5 
(Percentage)* 
 
 
14.8 
 
 
14.7 
 
 
14.4 
 
 
14.2 
 
12.4
Total Unemployment 18.5 18.9 18.3 17.5 17.4
Source: Economic Survey 2002; 2003, His Majesty’s Government of Nepal, 
Ministry of Finance 
* Calculated 
                                                          
5 Disguised unemployment or underemployment is defined as employment for less than 8 months in a 
year. The under employment of 4,381 thousand people in 1997 is approximately equal to full 
employment of [(4,381*8)/12]= 2,921 thousand, i.e., full unemployment of 1,460 thousand people.    
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The data on the employment status is not available for the studied period. Due to 
this difficulty, the impact of financial liberalisation on employment cannot be evaluated 
directly. So, as an alternative, the data on bank credit to the employment generating 
sectors, viz, the agriculture, industry and service sectors are analysed to get the 
impression of change in the employment status as a result of the financial liberalisation. 
The simple assumption behind this is that increased bank credit would result in 
increased employment opportunities, in these sectors. In fact, increased capital does not 
necessarily result into increased employment opportunities since such capital might be 
used for other inputs. For example, the additional capital in the agricultural sector might 
be used in purchasing agricultural inputs like improved seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, tools 
and equipment, and or in acquiring land. However, since the traditional farming system 
in Nepal has not seen that much technological change, it can be assumed that the 
additional capital would be spent on additional labour and other agricultural inputs, at 
least proportionately. In the case of the industry and service sectors, increased capital 
flow also may indicate growing numbers of enterprises and/or increased production. In 
both cases, it can be assumed that new or additional labour will be used.  
tttttt eFLIPBBIRRFDPBCIA +++++= 4140393837 ααααα   (4.18) 
where, 
 PBCIA  = Per capita bank credit to industry sector and agriculture sector 
According to their concentration, the agriculture sector portrays the picture of 
the rural area, and the industry and service sectors depict the situation in the urban area. 
As PBCIA is composed of both industrial sector credit and agricultural sector credit, it 
gives the impression of changes in employment opportunity in both the rural as well as 
the urban area.  
The natural log form of equation (4.18) is given below: 
tttttt eFLILPBBIRRLFDLPBCIA +++++= 4140393837 ααααα   (4.19) 
 The signs of the coefficients of LFD and FLI are expected to be positive, while 
that of the coefficient of LPBB is expected to be negative. In the case of the coefficient 
of IRR, the sign may be positive or negative. If the signs of 38α  and 41α are negative 
and that of 40α  is positive, then the hypothesis H6 is rejected. 
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4.10 Poverty Alleviation and Redistribution of Income  
 The financial sector may help alleviate poverty by providing credit facilities to 
the poor sections of the population. Similarly, moving the financial resources from the 
urban areas in order to promote investment in the rural areas can facilitate the 
redistribution of income, as most of the rich people live in the urban areas and most of 
the poor in the rural areas. 
 Poverty line is defined as the annual per capita income of Nepalese rupees (NRs) 
4,404 at 1995/96 prices6. Therefore, the population with the annual per capita income of 
less than NRs 4404 fall below the poverty line. Table 4.7 depicts the poverty scenario of 
Nepal.  
 
 
Table 4.7 Poverty Scenario of Nepal 
Fiscal Year Poverty Incidence (%) Gini Coefficient 
1977 36.0 NA 
1985 41.2 0.3000 
1991 49.0 NA 
1997 42.0 0.3500 
1998 41.5 0.3535 
1999 40.1 0.3540 
2002 38.1 0.3575 
Source: Midterm Evaluation of the Ninth Plan (1997-2002); Nepal Human 
Development Report 1998; Nepal Human Development Report 2001 
 
The available data on poverty shows that poverty incidence in Nepal increased 
persistently until 1991, then started to decrease gradually. But the inequality in income 
distribution, measured by the gini coefficient7, is constantly increasing.    
 Since the majority of the poor live and work in rural areas, the flow of credit to 
rural areas may be taken as one of the indicators of the financial sector’s role in 
                                                          
6 1 US$ = NRs 57.03. 
7  Gini coefficient value 0 refers to the equal distribution, and value 1 refers to the extremely unequal 
distribution of income. 
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redistribution of income and poverty alleviation (Acharya 2003, p.147). In this regard, 
the credit against the security of agriculture products and the credit against the security 
of gold and silver are of significant importance. It should be noted that since the credits 
on the security of gold and silver are small credits and the administrative procedures 
involved are straightforward, this credit is easily accessible by the poor. Due to the 
cultural values and social practices, the poor also tend to posses some gold and silver as 
ornament, but such possession is very small in quantity. Therefore, the credit against the 
security of agricultural products and gold and silver are the credits used mainly by the 
poor population, and can be treated as the proxy of the bank credit to poor population 
(BCPP).  
It can be argued that the bank’s indebtedness may make one’s financial position 
worse. But if the person were to depend on the local moneylender, his or her financial 
position would become much worse because of the high interest rate charged on the 
credit. It is the general assumption that increased bank credit to the poor population will 
help increase the employment, productivity and income of the poor; and thus help the 
redistribution of income, and poverty reduction process. 
In this regard, to evaluate the impact of financial liberalisation on the 
redistribution of income and poverty reduction, the following relationship is tested: 
tttttt eFLIPBBIRRFDSBCPP +++++= 4645444342 ααααα   (4.20) 
where, 
 SBCPP  =  Share of the bank credit to the poor population (credit against 
the security of agricultural products and gold and silver) 
Equation (4.20) can be presented in the natural log form as follows: 
tttttt eFLILPBBIRRLFDLSBCPP +++++= 4645444342 ααααα   (4.21) 
In the above equation, 43α  and 46α  are expected to be positive whereas 45α  is 
expected to be negative. In the case of 44α , the sign can either be positive or negative. If 
the coefficients 43α  and 46α  are positive, and 45α  is negative, then the hypothesis H7 is 
not rejected. 
 
4.11 Financial Stability 
 Financial liberalisation is alleged to be prone to financial fragility, as several 
evidences from developing as well as developed countries have pointed out the 
destabilizing consequences of the policy. In many countries, financial liberalisation has 
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been followed by a currency and banking crisis. Increased competition, lower profits, 
freedom to take high risk, easy access to risky resources, misallocation of resources, 
unfavourable capital movement, moral hazard problems, and increased exchange rate 
volatility have been the reasons behind such crises. 
Reducing government capital spending also could have potentially adverse 
effects upon the economy’s infrastructure and impede economic performance. The 
reason is that governments provided infrastructure might complement private capital 
and thus improves its productivity (Harvey and Kearney 1994, Aschaurer 1989). 
The financial stability is reflected in the performance of the banking system, 
which is specifically related to the loan performances, and which can be shown by the 
figures of return on the bank assets and amount of the bad loans. In the Nepalese 
context, the data on return on the bank assets and bad loans, or the non-performing 
assets (NPA) are not available for the required time period. Therefore, as an alternative, 
the following relationship is analysed in order to examine the link between financial 
liberalisation and financial fragility in Nepal. 
 ttttt eFLIPBBLRRCDR ++++= 50494847 αααα     (4.22) 
where, 
CDR  =  Credit-deposit ratio of banks (total credit extended by banks 
divided by the total deposit liabilities) 
 The above equation can be transformed in the following natural log form:  
 ttttt eFLILPBBLRRLCDR ++++= 50494847 αααα     (4.23) 
 In order to support the hypothesis H8, the coefficients of LRR and FLI need to 
be positive, while the coefficient of LPBB should be negative. 
 
4.12 Nature and Sources of Data 
 In this study, 19 different variables are analysed8. Out of them, 18 are economic 
time series related to macroeconomic and banking sectors, and the remaining variable is 
the policy variable, which is a composite index of the eight different financial 
liberalisation policy measures. 
This study covers a period of 34 years ranging from 1970 to 2003. Therefore, 
most of the data covers this period. However, due to unavailability, the data related to 
                                                          
8 See Appendix B for the Graph of these variables. 
 
 106
non-agricultural gross domestic product (LNGDPR and LSNGDP) cover the period of 
28 years, from 1976 to 2003. Similarly, the time series related to the type of bank 
credits (LPBCIA and LSBCPP) cover the period of 26 years, from 1976 to 2001. Due to 
the introduction of a new classification of bank credit, the data for these time series are 
not available since 2002. 
 In this study, quarterly data have been used starting from the first quarter (Q1) of 
1970 to the fourth quarter (Q4) of 2003, covering a total 136 quarters. However, as 
mentioned above, in the case of non-agricultural GDP related data, it ranges from Q1 in 
1976 to Q4 in 2003, covering a total 112 quarters. Similarly, the data on the two bank-
credit related time series cover a total of 104 quarters as these data ranges from Q1 in 
1976 to Q4 in 2001.   
 All the data except gross domestic product related time series, viz, LGDP and 
LNGDP are available in a quarterly frequency. To make the data compatible with other 
time series, the frequency of these two series (LGDP and LNGDP) have been converted 
from annual to quarterly, following the quadratic-match sum method (EViews 5 User's 
Guide 2004, pp 107-112). Similarly, population data, which has been used to convert 
some time series into per capita terms, also has been converted from annual to quarterly 
frequency using the same method.  
Most of the macroeconomic data are obtained from the Economic Survey 
published every year by His Majesty’s Government of Nepal, Ministry of Finance. 
Banking data are taken from the Quarterly Economic Bulletin published by Nepal 
Rastra Bank, the central bank of Nepal. The data on the number of bank branches for 
1970:Q1 to 1975:Q3 have been obtained from Nepal Bank Limited and Rastriya 
Banijya Bank, since the Quarterly Economic Bulletin publishes the data on bank 
branches only for the period 1975:Q4 onwards. International Financial Statistics 
database and Asian Development Bank database also are utilised for the data on some of 
the macroeconomic time series. In order to compile the data on policy variables, the 
policy implementation dates have been taken from various publications from the Nepal 
Rastra Bank.  
A summary statistics of the data set is presented in Table 4.8 below. 
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Table 4.8 Summary Statistics of Data Set 
   No. of    Standard
S.N. Variable Observations Average Median Deviation
1 FLI 136 0.8770 0.6140 0.8987
2 LVBT 136 10.7014 10.7416 1.0246
3 LGDPr 136 10.5080 10.4139 0.3968
4 IRR/DRR 136 1.6605 1.7700 5.5764
5 LPBB 136 10.9819 10.8084 0.4098
6 LTDr 136 9.8572 9.9777 1.1162
7 LTBCr 136 9.8145 9.8299 1.0451
8 LRr 136 4.9815 5.5908 5.7291
9 RFr 136 0.5156 1.4922 5.6550
10 BCBr 136 404.2065 114.2844 517.2653
11 LGDPP 136 7.6661 7.5945 0.1840
12 LFD 136 -0.3422 -0.2239 0.6502
13 LNGDPr 112 9.8553 9.9335 0.6269
14 LVBTP 136 7.8595 7.9018 0.8071
15 LSNGDP 112 -0.7492 -0.6519 0.2638
16 LSBCP 136 -0.2150 -0.2213 0.1326
17 LPBCIA 104 5.7729 5.8625 1.1714
18 LSBCPP 104 -1.4306 -1.3119 0.3390
19 LCDr 136 -0.3512 -0.3668 0.1515
 
 
Among the total nineteen variables, FLI, IRR/DRR, LRr, RFr and BCBr are 
expressed in the level form while the rest fourteen variables are in the natural log. The 
table reflects a wide dispersion of FLI, IRR/DRR, LRr, RFr, BCBr and LFD, as their 
standard deviations are greater than the averages. 
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Chapter 5 
UNIT ROOT TEST 
 
As the long-term relationship between various time series and the pattern of 
effect of one variable on another variable will be analysed, cointegration and causality 
tests between various sets of variables will be conducted. Before starting the 
cointegration and causality tests, it is essential to check each time series for stationarity. 
If a time series is non-stationary, the regression analysis done in a conventional way 
will produce spurious results1. Therefore, in order to examine this property of the time-
series, the unit root test is conducted first. In this chapter, various methods and models 
of unit root test are discussed and the test results are presented. In section 1, stationarity 
and nonstationarity of the time series are discussed. Section 2 presents various unit root 
test methods with and without structural change. In section 3, a sequential procedure for 
the unit root test is developed. Finally, the unit root test statistics are presented and the 
results are analysed in section 4. 
  
5.1 Stationarity and Nonstationarity 
 A time series is considered to be stationary if its mean and variance are 
independent of time. If the time series is non-stationary, i.e., having a mean and or 
variance changing over time, it is said to have a unit root. Therefore, the stationarity of a 
time series is examined by conducting the unit root test. 
A non-stationary time series can be converted into a stationary time series by 
differencing. If a time series becomes stationary after differencing one time, then the 
time series is said to be integrated of order one and denoted by I(1). Similarly, if a time 
series has to be differenced d times to make it stationary, then it is called integrated of 
                                                          
1 In regressing a time series variable on another time series variable, the test statistics may often show a 
significant relationship between these variables even though no such relationship exists between them. 
This type of regression is known as ‘spurious regression’. According to Granger and Newbold (1974), 
an R2 greater than the Durbin-Watson value is a good rule of thumb to suspect that the estimated 
regression is spurious. 
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order d and written as I(d). As the stationary time series needs not to be differenced, it is 
denoted by I(0). 
 
5.2 Unit Root Test Methods 
There are several methods available for the unit root test. This section briefly 
discusses these methods and models. Dickey-Fuller (DF), Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF), and Phillip-Perron (PP) test methods are commonly used to examine the 
stationarity of a time series. 
 The Dickey-Fuller (DF) model is as follows: 
ttt eyy ++= −1αµ                5.1  
Where µ is an intercept and et is a white noise. In this model, the null hypothesis 
is α = 1 (nonstationary series) against the alternative hypothesis of 1<α  (stationary 
series).  
 The error term in the DF test might be serially correlated. The possibility of such 
serial correlation is eliminated in the following Augmented Dickey-Fuller model: 
t
k
i
ititt eyyy +∆++=∆ ∑
=
−−
1
1 βδµ           5.2 
 where 1−= αδ  
The null hypothesis of ADF is δ = 0 against the alternative hypothesis of δ < 0. 
Non-rejection of the null hypothesis implies that the time series is nonstationary, 
whereas rejection means the time series is stationary. 
Phillips and Perron (1988) have suggested a nonparametric test as an alternative 
to the ADF test. Although the ADF test has been reported to be more reliable than the 
PP test, the problem of size distortion and the low power of the test make both these 
tests less useful (Maddala and Kim 2003, p.81,98). 
Perron (1989) introduced the concept of structural change in the unit root test. 
He shows that inclusion of structural change in the unit root test might give a different 
result. He conducted unit root test employing his model on Nelson and Plosser (1982) 
data and found that 11 of the 14 series were stationary. In his model, he allows one time 
structural change to occur at a time TB (1<TB<T).  
Following are the models developed by Perron (1989) for three different cases: 
Null Hypothesis: 
Model (A)  tttt eyTBdDy +++= −1)(µ          5.3 
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Model (B)  tttt eDUyy +−++= − )( 1211 µµµ         5.4 
Model (C)  ttttt eDUTBdDyy +−+++= − )()( 1211 µµµ        5.5 
Where  D(TB)t = 1   if t = TB + 1,   0 otherwise, and 
 DUt = 1   if t > TB,   0 otherwise. 
Alternative Hypothesis: 
Model (A)  ttt eDUty +−++= )( 121 µµβµ         5.6 
Model (B)  ttt eDTty +−++=
*
121 )( βββµ                    5.7 
Model (C)  tttt eDTDUty +−+−++= )()( 121211 ββµµβµ       5.8 
Where  *tDT  =  t – TB, and DTt  =  t  if  t > TB, 0 otherwise. 
The first model (Model A) permits an exogenous change in the level of the 
series, whereas the second model (Model B) permits an exogenous change in the rate of 
growth. The third model (Model C) allows change in both.  
Perron (1989) models include one known structural break. These models cannot 
be applied where such breaks are unknown. Therefore, this procedure is criticised for 
assuming a known break date, which raises the problem of pre-testing and data-mining 
regarding the choice of the break date (Maddala and Kim 2003).  
Zivot and Andrews (1992), Perron and Vogelsang (1992), and Perron (1997) 
have developed unit root test methods that include one unknown structural break.  
Zivot and Andrews (1992) models are as follows: 
  Model with Intercept 
∑
=
−− +∆++++=
k
j
tjtjttt eycytDUy
1
1)( αβλθµ         5.9 
Model with Trend 
∑
=
−− +∆++++=
k
j
tjtjttt eycyDTty
1
1
* )( αλγβµ       5.10 
Model with Both Intercept and Trend 
∑
=
−− +∆+++++=
k
j
tjtjtttt eycyDTtDUy
1
1
* )()( αλγβλθµ     5.11 
 Where )(λtDU  = 1 if t > λT , 0 otherwise; 
  λλ TtDTt −=)(
*  if λTt > , 0 otherwise. 
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The above models are based on the Perron (1989) models. However, these 
modified models do not include DTb. On the other hand, Perron and Vogelsang (1992) 
include DTb, but exclude t in their models. The Perron and Vogelsang (1992) models are 
given below: 
Innovational Outlier Model (IOM) 
∑
=
−− +∆++++=
k
i
titittbtt eycyTDDUy
1
1)( αθδµ       5.12 
Additive Outlier Model (AOM)– Two Steps 
ttt yDUy ~++= δµ          5.13 
and  
∑ ∑
= =
−−− +∆++=
k
i
k
i
titititbit eycyTDwy
0 1
1
~~)(~ α       5.14 
 y~  is derived after removing an estimate of the deterministic part of the time 
series y (Perron and Vogelsang 1992, p.304). 
Perron (1997) includes both t (time trend) and DTb (time at which structural 
change occurs) in his Innovational Outlier (IO1 and IO2) and Additive Outlier (AO) 
models.  
 Innovational Oulier Model allowing one time change in intercept only (IO1): 
∑
=
−− +∆+++++=
k
i
titittbtt eycyTDtDUy
1
1)( αδβθµ                5.15 
   Innovational Oulier Model allowing one time change in both intercept and slope 
(IO2): 
∑
=
−− +∆++++++=
k
i
titittbttt eycyTDDTtDUy
1
1)( αδγβθµ     5.16 
Additive Outlier Model allowing one time change in slope (AO): 
    ttt yDTty ~
* +++= δβµ         5.17 
  where *tDT = 1(t > Tb)(t – Tb) 
    ∑
=
−− +∆=
k
i
tititt eycyy
1
1
~~~ α        5.18 
 The above Innovational Outlier models represent the change occurring 
gradually, whereas the Additive Outlier model represents the change occurring rapidly. 
 More recently, some new methods have been proposed for unit root test with 
multiple structural breaks (Lumsdaine and Papell 1997; Bai and Perron 2003).  
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5.3 Sequential Test Procedure 
It is clear from the above discussion that there are several methods for the unit 
root test. In this study, the methods allowing one unknown structural break are 
employed. It is assumed that excluding the information on the additional break would 
not affect the result that much as the methods allowing one unknown structural break 
are designed to pick up the most significant break. Moreover, in the case of employing 
multiple structural breaks too, certain restrictions regarding the number of breaks has to 
be imposed, like selecting 2, 3 or 4 breaks and abandoning the rest.    
There are quite a few softwares featuring various unit root tests. These include 
Shazam, Microfit, EViews, RATS, and others. The results given by different softwares 
and different test methods are dissimilar and in some cases contradictory. For some 
time-series one method may return a reliable and realistic result; but it may not be the 
case for other time series.  
Different models are given for the time series with intercept only, with trend 
only, and with both. Similarly, different models are prescribed for the time series with 
structural break and with time trend. In such a case, certain judgement based on 
economic theory has to be applied in order to make assumptions about the nature of the 
time series. But such assumptions may not be true always and may lead to 
misspecification and totally wrong inferences. For these reasons, one faces the problem 
of selecting an appropriate method of test.     
 Economic fundamentals and available information cannot be ignored while 
using the test results given by a particular test method. Different types of test methods 
or models may be appropriate for different time series in order to get the results 
consistent with economic theories. In such a case, sticking to only one method for all 
the time series could be inappropriate. This is more so in the case of dealing with a large 
number of time series in a single research.  
Against the above background, a sequential procedure based on the general to 
specific approach has been developed and employed in this study in order to select 
suitable models for the unit root test. The procedure is as follows: 
 
1.  Run Perron (1997): Innovational Outlier Model (IO2)  
 As mentioned earlier, this model includes t (time trend) and DTb (time of 
structural break), and both intercept (DU) and slope (DT). 
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  - Check t and DTb statistics.  
  -  If both t and DTb are significant, check DU and DT statistics. 
  -  If both DU and DT are significant, select this model.  
  -  If only DU is significant, go to Perron (1997): IO1 model. 
This model includes t (time trend) and DTb (time of structural break), and DU 
(intercept) only. 
  -  If only DT is significant, go to Perron (1997): Additive Outlier model (AO)  
  This model includes t (time trend) and DTb (time of structural break), and slope 
(DT) only. 
  In some cases, t and DTb may be insignificant in IO2 but significant in IO1 or 
AO. Therefore, IO1 and AO tests should be conducted after IO2 in order to 
check the existence of such condition.      
2. If only t is significant in 1 above, go to Zivot and Andrews (1992) models: 
   Zivot and Andrews (1992) models include t but exclude DTb. 
  -    Run Zivot and Andrews test with intercept, trend and both separately, and 
then compare the results. Select the model that gives the results consistent 
with the economic fundamentals and the available information. 
3. If only DTb is significant in above 1, go to Perron and Vogelsang (1992) models: 
  Perron and Vogelsang (1992) models include DTb, but exclude t. 
  -  Run IOM and AOM. Compare the statistics and select the appropriate model. 
4. If both t and DTb are not significant in 1, then run ADF (without structural break). 
 
The main reasoning behind employing the above sequential procedure is that the 
inclusion of irrelevant information and the exclusion of relevant information may lead 
to misspecification of the model. For example, the Perron 1997 – IO2 model includes t, 
DTb, DU and DT. If the test results of a time series show that the DT is not relevant or 
significant, then using this model (IO2) for that time series involves the risk of the 
misspecification, because the irrelevant information (DT) is included in the model. In 
this case, the model that includes t, DTb and DU, but excludes DT should be preferred. 
This means that Perron 1997-IO1 model may be appropriate for this time series. On the 
other hand, if the Perron 1997-IO1 model is employed for a time series, which has 
significant t, DTb, DU and DT, misspecification may occur because the Perron 1997-
IO1 model excludes DT from the model.      
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Following the procedure outlined above, a set of mixed methods is selected for 
the unit root test in this study. The results given by this set of mixed methods are more 
realistic and consistent with the economic fundamentals and known facts. These results 
are presented in the following section. 
 
5.4 Unit Root Test Statistics 
 The summary test statistics given by various unit root test models are presented 
in Table 5.1 to 5.5 below.  The results are compared in Table 5.6 and Table 5.7, and the 
list of selected models for each time series and their results are presented in Table 5.8.  
 
 
Table 5.1 Perron 1997 - IO2 Model Results  
 
 Variables Tb k t DTb DU DT Tα = 1  Result
1 FLI 1992:03 4 *   * -4.4619  N 
2 LVBT 1975 01 12 *   * -3.2692   N 
3 LGDPr 1978 04 12  *  * -5.3723 * S 
4 IRR/DRR 1979 03 11     -6.1978 * S 
5 LPBB 1976 01 11     -3.2706   N 
6 LTDr 1975 02 12 *   * -5.6118 * S 
7 LTBCr 1989 03 12 *   * -3.6944   N 
8 LRr 1979 03 11     -7.1149 * S 
9 RFr 1979 03 11     -7.0035 * S 
10 BCBr 1988 03 4     -4.7839   N 
11 LGDPP 1978 04 12 * *  * -5.2232 * S 
12 LFD 1975 02 10 * *   -6.0476 * S 
13 LNGDPr 1993 01 9 *    -3.9371   N 
14 LVBTP 1975 01 12 * *   -3.3199  N 
15 LSNGDP 1999 02 10 *    -3.6252  N 
16 LSBCP 1987 02 4     -4.3645   N 
17 LPBCIA 1987 04 9 *    -5.1157 * S 
18 LSBCPP 1991 03 8    * -3.1773  N 
19 LCDr 1975 02 12 *   * -4.9432   N 
   S = Stationary, N = Non-stationary 
 
* Significant at 5% level (in the case of t, DTb, DU, and DT, coefficient close to zero, 
and T-statistics significant at 5% level) 
 
 Critical value for Τα = 1 at 5% is -5.08 
 
 The above unit root test results given by the Perron 1997- IO2 model suggest 
that out of the total 19 variables, 8 are stationary and the rest 11 are non-stationary 
series. However, the given statistics of t, DTb, DU and DT are not significant for any of 
the series. It should be noted that the term ‘significant’ here means two different things. 
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In the case of Tα=1, the T-statistics greater than the critical value of the given level is 
considered to be significant and this indicates that the time series is stationary. In the 
case of t, DTb, DU and DT, the coefficient close to zero and their T-statistics significant 
at the 5 per cent level is considered to be significant, since the null hypothesis is that 
these values equal zero.  
In other words, if the value of t, DTb, DU and DT are close to zero, but the T-
statistics are not significant, then these results are not meaningful. Similarly, if these 
values are not close to zero, but the T-statistics are significant, then the significance of 
the T-statistics only has no meaning, because the required values are not close to zero. 
Therefore, the value of t, DTb, DU and DT close to zero and their T-statistics significant 
at a given level at the same time is a required condition for these values to become 
significant. From the results of the above table, it can be inferred that this model is not 
relevant for any of the time series considered in this study. 
 
 
Table 5.2 Perron 1997 – IO1 Model Results 
 
 Variables Tb k t DTb DU Tα = 1  Result
1 FLI 1992:03 8 *   -4.3893  N 
2 LVBT 1986 02 12 *  * -3.7463   N 
3 LGDPr 1973 04 12 * * * -3.7238  N 
4 IRR/DRR 1975 02 11    -4.9801 * S 
5 LPBB 1976 01 11 *  * -3.3511   N 
6 LTDr 1975 02 12 *   -5.1961 * S 
7 LTBCr 1986 02 12 *  * -4.0601   N 
8 LRr 1979 03 11    -5.3826 * S 
9 RFr 1975 02 11    -5.3241 * S 
10 BCBr 1989 02 4    -4.7437   N 
11 LGDPP 1973 04 12 * * * -3.6742  N 
12 LFD 1975 02 10 *   -5.9357 * S 
13 LNGDPr 1992 04 9 * * * -4.1086   N 
14 LVBTP 1986 02 12 *  * -3.7547  N 
15 LSNGDP 1992 01 10 *   -3.5597  N 
16 LSBCP 1992 03 4    -4.7649   N 
17 LPBCIA 1987 04 9 *   -5.1304 * S 
18 LSBCPP 1987 04 8 *   -3.3505  N 
19 LCDr 1995 03 12 *   -4.8425   N 
 S = Stationary, N = Non-stationary 
 
* Significant at 5% level (in the case of t, DTb, and DU, coefficient close to zero 
and T-statistics significant at 5% level) 
 
 Critical value for Τα = 1 at 5% is –4.80 
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 The results of the Perron 1997 – IO1 model presented in Table 5.2 above show 
that among the time series considered in this study, 6 are stationary series and the rest of 
the series (13) have unit roots. However, all of the parameters (viz, t, DTb, and DU) are 
significant only for LGDPr, LGDPP and LNGDPr. This fact indicates that Perron 1997 
– IO1 model is suitable for these three time series. 
 
 
 
Table 5.3 Perron 1997 – AO Model Results 
 
 Variables Tb k t DT Tα = 1  Result
1 FLI 1978 04 8 * * -2.5766  N 
2 LVBT 1973.01 12  * -3.1282   N 
3 LGDPr 1978 03 9 * * -3.0812  N 
4 IRR/DRR 1975 02 11   -4.3553  N 
5 LPBB 1985 03 12 * * -3.4495   N 
6 LTDr 1980 04 5 * * -3.9549  N 
7 LTBCr 1995 02 12 * * -2.8173   N 
8 LRr 1986 01 8   -3.5980  N 
9 RFr 1975 04 11   -4.6859 * S 
10 BCBr 1980 02 4   -4.3553   N 
11 LGDPP 1978 02 12 * * -3.0888  N 
12 LFD 1973 01 10   -2.9105  N 
13 LNGDPr 1999 01 9 * * -3.1655   N 
14 LVBTP 1973 01 12  * -3.1947  N 
15 LSNGDP 1997 03 9 * * -3.1911  N 
16 LSBCP 1982 02 4   -4.0418   N 
17 LPBCIA 1988 02 12 *  -3.4176  N 
18 LSBCPP 1991 03 8 * * -3.2040  N 
19 LCDr 1990 01 12 * * -4.3822   N 
   S = Stationary, N = Non-stationary 
 
* Significant at 5% level (in the case of t and DT, coefficient close to zero and 
T-statistics significant at 5% level) 
 
 Critical value for Τα = 1 at 5% is –4.65 
 
 
 The Perron 1997-AO model statistics reported in the above table show that out 
of the total 19 time series, only one time series (RFr) is stationary, and all the rest are 
non-stationary. When compared with the Perron 1997-IO2 and IO1 model, this (AO) 
model seems to be inclined toward non-rejecting the unit root in the time series. It 
should be noted that the IO2 and the IO1 models are innovational outlier models that are 
associated with a gradual change in the time series, while the AO model is an additive 
outlier model that shows a rapid change.    
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In the above table, the values of t and DT are found to be significant for more 
than half of the time series. These series include FLI, LGDPr, LPBB, LTDr, LTBCr, 
LGDPP, LNGDPr, LSNGDP, LSBCPP, and LCDr. This result suggests that the Perron 
1997-AO model is suitable for these ten time series.  
 
 
 
Table 5.4 Zivot and Andrews 1992 Model Results 
(With both intercept and slope) 
 
 Variables         Tb k t Tα = 1  Result
1 FLI 1993 01 0 * -4.2687  N 
2 LVBT 1982 03 2 * -2.4992   N 
3 LGDPr 1979 02 1 * -4.4348  N 
4 IRR/DRR 1975 05 3  -7.1772 * S 
5 LPBB 1999 01 0 * -6.1179 * S 
6 LTDr 1999 01 1 * -6.1179 * S 
7 LTBCr 1982 03 3 * -3.5249   N 
8 LRr 1975 04 3 * -6.8249 * S 
9 RFr 1975 04 3  -7.1562 * S 
10 BCBr 1999 01 2  -6.0885 * S 
11 LGDPP 1999 01 1 * -6.0885 * S 
12 LFD 1999 01 0  -6.0885 * S 
13 LNGDPr 1988 04 1 * -6.2195   S 
14 LVBTP 1999 01 2 * -6.0885 * S 
15 LSNGDP 1988 04 1 * -5.6607 * S 
16 LSBCP 1984 03 1 * -6.0695 * S 
17 LPBCIA 1983 04 2  -4.8676  N 
18 LSBCPP 1988 02 0  -3.3875  N 
19 LCDr 1976 02 3  -3.9856   N 
 
 S = Stationary, N = Non-stationary 
 
* Significant at 5% level (in the case of t, coefficient close to zero and T-
statistics significant at 5% level) 
 
 Critical value for Τα = 1 at 5% is –5.08 
 
 
 The test statistics given by the Zivot and Andrews 1992 model (with both 
intercept and slope) is presented in Table 5.4 above. The statistics suggest that t is 
significant for the 12 time series, but not significant for the rest series. Based on the 
significance of t, it can be argued that this model might be suitable for the 12 time 
series, viz FLI, LVBT, LGDPr, LPBB, LTDr, LRr, LGDPP, LNGDPr, LVBTP, 
LSNGDP and LSBCP. 
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Table 5.5 Perron and Vogelsang 1992 Model Results 
(Innovational Outlier Model) 
 
 Variables      Tb k DTb DU          Tα  Result
1 FLI 1994 01 8   -2.7722  N 
2 LVBT 1978 04 12  * -1.1197   N 
3 LGDPr 1974 01 12  *  * -1.2295  N 
4 IRR/DRR 1979 04 12     -2.1313  N 
5 LPBB 1976 01 4   *  -3.3530  N 
6 LTDr 1973 03 1  * -1.3702  N 
7 LTBCr 1981 04 10  * -1.6410   N 
8 LRr 2002 03 12    -2.2272  N 
9 RFr 2002 03 8     -3.1374  N 
10 BCBr 1989 02 4     -4.3252 * S 
11 LGDPP 1974 01 12 *  *  -0.6777  N 
12 LFD 1979 01 11   -1.2990  N 
13 LNGDPr 1994 01 9     -0.5056   N 
14 LVBTP 1978 04 12  * -0.9974  N 
15 LSNGDP 1994 01 9   -0.5214  N 
16 LSBCP 1989 02 11    * -3.4023  N 
17 LPBCIA 1984 04 9  * -0.5254  N 
18 LSBCPP 1999 04 8     -2.6722  N 
19 LCDr 1975 03 12     -2.2702   N 
   S = Stationary, N = Non-stationary 
 
 Critical value for Τα = 1 at 5% is –4.19 
 
* Significant at 5% level (in the case of DTb, coefficient close to zero and 
T-statistics significant at 5% level) 
 
 
As mentioned earlier, the Perron and Vogelsang model includes DTb and DU. It 
can be seen in Table 5.5 above that both the DTb and DU are significant only for LGDPr 
and LGDPP. This shows that the model is suitable only for these two series. Regarding 
the stationarity of the time series, this model shows that only one time series in the 
group of 19 is stationary and all the rest are non-stationary. This result is identical with 
the Perron 1997 –AO model regarding the number of stationary and non-stationary time 
series. However, these models differ regarding the stationary time series because the 
Perron 1997-AO model finds RFr to be stationary, while Perron and Vogelsang model 
finds BCBr to be stationary. 
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Table 5.6 Unit Root Test Result Comparison 
 
    Perron 1997  
Zivot & 
Andrews
Perron & 
Vogelsang   
 Series IO2 IO1 AO Both IOM Result
1 FLI N N    N*   N * N N 
2 LVBT N N N   N * N N 
3 LGDPr S    N *     N *   N *     N * N 
4 IRR/DRR S S N S N S 
5 LPBB N N     N *   S* N N 
6 LTDr S S     N *   S* N N 
7 LTBCr N N     N *   N * N N 
8 LRr S S N   S* N S 
9 RFr S S S S N S 
10 BCBr N N N S S N 
11 LGDPP S    N *     N *   S*     N * N 
12 LFD S S N S N S 
13 LNGDPr N    N *     N *   S* N N 
14 LVBTP N N N   S* N N 
15 LSNGDP N N     N *   S* N N 
16 LSBCP N N N   S* N S 
17 LPBCIA S S N N N N 
18 LSBCPP N N     N * N N N 
19 LCDr N N     N * N N N 
S = Stationary, N = Non-stationary, * = Significant 
 
 
 
Table 5.7 Unit Root Test Summary Result  
 
  Perron 1997  
Zivot & 
Andrews 
Perron & 
Vogelsang
 IO2 IO1 AO Both IOM 
Stationary Series 8 6 1 7 1 
Non-stationary Series 11 13 18 12 18 
Total 19 19 19 19 19 
 
 
The results given by various models are compared in Table 5.6 and 5.7. It can be 
seen from Table 5.6 that there is a unanimous result for only the five time series, which 
are FLI, LVBT, LTBCr, LSBCPP and LCDr.  All the models considered in this study 
find these five time series to be non-stationary. On the other hand, Table 5.7 suggests 
that Perron 1997- AO, and Perron and Vogelsang models are inclined to not rejecting 
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the unit root hypothesis, whereas such inclination of Perron 1997–IO1, IO2 and Zivot 
and Andrews models are almost the same.  
 Regarding the power of test, the Perron and Vogelsang 1992 model is robust. 
The testing power of Perron 1997 models and Zivot and Andrews models are almost the 
same (Wilson 2004). Therefore, wherever relevant, the Perron and Vogelsang 1992 
model is preferred to the other models. Among Perron 1997, and Zivot and Andrews 
1992 models, the Perron 1997 model is selected, as this model is more comprehensive. 
 
 
 
Table 5.8 Selected Models and Results  
 
S.N. Series Selected Model Tb       Tα = 1   Result 
1 FLI Zivot and Andrews 1993 01 -4.2627   N 
2 LVBT Zivot and Andrews 1982 03 -2.4992   N 
3 LGDPr Perron and Vogelsang 1974 01 -1.2295   N 
4 IRR/DRR Perron IO2 1979 03 -6.1978 *  S 
5 LPBB Perron AO 1985 03 -3.4495  N 
6 LTDr Perron AO 1980 04 -3.9549  N 
7 LTBCr Perron AO 1995 02 -2.8173  N 
8 LRr Zivot and Andrews 1975 04 -6.8249 * S 
9 RFr Perron IO2 1979 03 -7.0035 * S 
10 BCBr Perron IO2 1988 03 -4.7839   N 
11 LGDPP Perron and Vogelsang 1974 01 -0.6777   N 
12 LFD Perron IO2 1975 02 -6.0476 * S 
13 LNGDPr Perron AO 1999 01 -3.1655   N 
14 LVBTP Zivot and Andrews 1999 01 -6.0885 * S 
15 LSNGDP Perron AO 1997 03 -3.1911   N 
16 LSBCP Zivot and Andrews 1984 03 -6.0695 *  S 
17 LPBCIA Perron IO2 1987 04 -5.1157 * S 
18 LSBCPP Perron AO 1991 03 -3.2040  N 
19 LCDr Perron AO 1990 01 -4.3822   N 
S = Stationary, N = Non-stationary 
 
Critical values at 5% level: 
 
 Perron IO2 = -5.08 
 Perron IO1 = -4.80 
 Perron AO = -4.83 
 Zivot and Andrews = -5.08 
 Perron and Vogelsang = -4.19 
 
 
 The unit root test conducted applying a set of different test methods - results 
presented in Table 5.8 above, show that out of the total 19 time series considered in this 
study, 12 are non-stationary and the rest (7) are stationary. Regarding the reported 
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structural break date, the 8 time series underwent the structural break during pre-
liberalisation era (1970 – 1983), whereas the 11 time series underwent the structural 
break during the post-liberalisation era (1984 – 2003). Although the structural break 
date is statistically very important in the unit root test, it does not have a direct 
economic meaning. The only inference that can be made from the above test results is 
that the change in the economic sphere of the country has been higher during the post 
liberalisation era than that during the pre-liberalisation era.  
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Chapter 6 
COINTEGRATION AND CAUSALITY TEST 
 
As stated earlier, the main objective of this study is to analyse the impact of 
financial liberalisation on various aspects of the Nepalese economy. To this end, the 
study of the relationships among relevant time series is essential in portraying the true 
picture of this impact. This chapter is dedicated to investigating the relationship among 
various time series related to the Nepalese financial system and the national economy. 
The investigation follows the methodological framework developed in Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5, and the main focus is on the long-term relationship.  
The first section of this chapter discusses the concept of cointegration and the 
reasons for employing the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) modelling approach of 
cointegration, as is used in this study. The test statistics of the ARDL model are 
presented and interpreted in Section 2 through Section 9. Finally, the concept of the 
causality test is discussed and the empirical test results are presented in Section 10.   
 
6.1 Cointegration and ARDL Approach 
The concept of cointegration is associated with the long-run equilibrium 
relationship between two or more variables. The economic interpretation of 
cointegration is that if two or more variables are linked to form an equilibrium 
relationship spanning the long run, even though the series themselves in the short run 
may deviate from the equilibrium, they will move closer together in the long run 
equilibrium (Harris and Sollis 2003, p.34.).  
There are several methods available for conducting the cointegration test. The 
most widely used methods include the residual based Engle-Granger (1987) test, and 
maximum likelihood based Johansen (1991; 1995) and Johansen-Juselius (1990) test. 
Due to the low power and other problems associated with these test methods, the OLS 
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based autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach to cointegration has become 
popular in recent years1. 
The ARDL modelling approach pioneered by Charemza and Deadman (1992), 
Pesaran and Pesaran (1997), Pesaran and Smith (1998), and Pesaran and Shin (1999) 
has numerous advantages. The main advantage of this approach lies in the fact that it 
can be applied irrespective of whether the regressors are I(0) or I(1) (Pesaran and 
Pesaran 1997, pp. 302-303). Another advantage of this approach is that the model takes 
sufficient numbers of lags to capture the data generating process in a general-to-specific 
modelling framework (Laurenceson and Chai 2003, p.28). Moreover, a dynamic error 
correction model (ECM) can be derived from ARDL through a simple linear 
transformation (Banerjee et al. 1993, p.51). The ECM integrates the short-run dynamics 
with the long-run equilibrium without losing long-run information. It is also argued that 
using the ARDL approach avoids problems resulting from nonstationary time series 
data (Laurenceson and Chai 2003, p.28).  
In Chapter 5, it has been shown that the time series considered in this study are a 
mix of the I(0) and I(1) series. The cointegration test methods based on Johansen (1991; 
1995) and the Johansen-Juselius (1990) require that all the variables in the equation be 
of equal degree of integration, i.e. I(1). Therefore, these methods of cointegration 
cannot be employed in this study. Moreover, it has also been illustrated in Chapter 5 
that a slight change in assumptions or specification may affect the result of the unit root 
test greatly, and as a consequence, a stationary time series may be found to be a 
nonsataionary series and vice versa. For these reasons, even the stationarity of the time 
series are ascertained by the unit root test, and found that all of the variables to be 
nonstationary, there still remains some risk of misspeciafication. Therefore, the ARDL 
modelling approach of cointegration is employed in this study.  
To illustrate the ARDL modelling approach, the following simple model is 
considered here:  
tttt ezxy +++= δβα          (6.1) 
                                                          
1 A number of recent studies employ the ARDL modelling approach to cointegration instead of the 
cointegration test methods based on Johansen (1991; 1995) and Johansen-Juselius (1990). Some of the 
examples are: Ghatak and Siddiki (2001), Atkins and Coe (2002), Laurenceson and Chai (2003), 
Morley (2003), Bahamani-Oskooee and Nasir (2004), Oxley et al. (2004), and Wilson and Chaudhri 
(2004). 
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where yt, xt and zt are three different time series; et is a vector of stochastic error 
terms; and α and β are the parameters. For the above equation, the error correction 
version of the ARDL model is given by: 
tttt
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−
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0 λλλεδβα  (6.2) 
The null hypothesis in (6.2) is 0321 === λλλ , which means the non-existence 
of the long run relationship.  
The ARDL method estimates (p+1)k number of regressions in order to obtain 
optimal lag length for each variable, where p is the maximum number of lag to be used 
and k is the number of variables in the equation. As the data used in this study are in a 
quarterly frequency, 4 is selected as the maximum lag (p) to be used, following Pesaran 
and Pesaran (1997). The model can be selected using the model selection criteria like 
Schwartz-Bayesian Criteria (SBC) and Akaike’s Information Criteria (AIC). SBC is 
known as the parsimonious model: selecting the smallest possible lag length, whereas 
AIC is known for selecting the maximum relevant lag length. In this study, the model is 
selected based on the prediction power of the model. For this, two separate models are 
selected based on SBC and AIC criteria. The prediction errors of these models are 
compared using the last 4 observations in the series, and the model with the higher 
prediction power is selected.  
To ascertain the appropriateness of the ARDL model, the diagnostic test and the 
stability test are conducted. The diagnostic test examines the serial correlation, 
functional form, normality and heteroscedasticity associated with the model. The 
stability test employs the cumulative sum of recursive residuals (CUSUM) and the 
cumulative sum of squares of recursive residuals (CUSUMSQ), and examines the 
structural stability of the model. The statistics of the diagnostics test and stability test 
along with some key regression statistics (R2, Durbin-Watson and F) of the ARDL 
models employed in Section 6.2 through 6.9 are furnished in Appendix C.    
 The high value of R2 for all of the ARDL models show that the overall goodness 
of fit of these models is extremely high. The F-statistics measuring the joint significance 
of all regressors in the model are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level for all of 
the models. Similarly, the Durbin-Watson statistics for all of the models are more than 
or close to 2.    
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 The diagnostic test results (presented in Appendix C) show that most of the 
models pass the tests for functional form and normality. However, the results indicate 
that there exist serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in most of the models. The 
ARDL model has been shown to be robust against residual autocorrelation. Therefore, 
the presence of autocorrelation does not affect the estimates (Laurenceson and Chai 
2003, p.30). Since the time series analysed in this study are of mixed order of 
integration, i.e., I(0) and I(1), it is natural to detect heteroscedasticity.  
 The stability test results (CUSUM and CUSUMSQ) plotted against the critical 
bound of 5 per cent significance level show that all of the models in general are stable 
over time.   
 
6.2 Financial Sector Widening 
As discussed in Chapter 4.4, one of the expected outcomes of the financial 
liberalisation is a widening of the financial sector. The degree of the financial sector 
widening is reflected in the volume of bank transactions (VBT). Therefore, in order to 
analyse the impact of financial liberalisation on financial sector widening, a ARDL test 
is conducted on the following modified version of equation (4.5): 
ttLVBTttttt eDFLILPBBIRRLGDPRLVBT ++++++= 543210 αααααα     (6.3) 
The unit root test in Chapter 5 has shown that the log of the real total volume of 
bank transaction (LVBT), the log of the real gross domestic product (LGDPR), the log 
of the average population density per bank branch (LPBB) and the financial 
liberalisation index (FLI) are nonstationary series, while real interest rate (IRR) is a 
stationary series. Regressand LVBT goes through a structural break in 1982:03. The 
data shows that the real total volume of bank transactions grew from Rs.33,933 million 
in 1982:02 to Rs.34,584 million in 1982:03 recording an increase of 2 per cent. As the 
exclusion of structural break makes the testing power of the model low, a dummy 
)( LVBTD  for the structural break on LVBT has been included in the above equation, 
which takes a value of 0 until 1982:03 and value of 1 from 1982:04 onwards.2   
  Total number of regressions estimated in (6.3) is (4+1)5 = 3125. The dummy 
)( LVBTD is included in the regression for the completeness of the information but it is not 
                                                          
2 Harvey, Leybourne and Newbold (2001) show that more power is achieved by choosing the break date 
as Tb+1 rather than Tb. 
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included in the main model. The model selected by SBC and AIC are (3,0,0,0,0)3 and 
(3,1,3,3,1), respectively. The SBC model is found to have a better prediction power over 
the AIC model4. The SBC model results are presented in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 below. 
 
Table 6.1 ARDL (3,0,0,0,0) Model Long Run Results 
Dependent Variable: LVBT 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio 
α0 16.2975 16.2215 1.0047 
LGDPR   0.2376   1.5636 0.1519  
IRR   0.0007   0.0117 0.0557  
LPBB  -0.6749   0.3370    -2.0029** 
FLI   1.0433   0.7166 1.4558  
DLVBT  -0.8531   0.3259    -2.6179** 
**  Significant at 5% level 
 
The test statistics in Table 6.1 show that the coefficient of LGDPR, IRR and FLI 
are positive, but statistically not significant at the 5 per cent level. This implies that 
there is no significant long run impact of LGDPR, IRR and FLI on LVBT. The 
coefficient of LPBB is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level, and the sign of the 
coefficient is as expected. There is a negative association between LPBB and LVBT, 
suggesting that a decrease in average population density per bank branch leads to an 
increase in the total volume of bank transactions. The underlying rationale is that the 
average population density per bank decreases when the number of bank branches 
increases. Therefore, among various measures of financial liberalisation, the elimination 
of entry barriers has a significant impact on the total volume of bank transactions. The 
above result reveals that on average a 1 unit decrease in LPBB is associated with an 
increase of Rs. 674.9 thousand in LVBT.  
Table 6.2 shows that the error correction model (ECMt-1) associated with the 
ARDL (3,0,0,0,0) model is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. This 
significance also confirms the long run cointegrating relationship between variables. 
The coefficient of the ECMt-1 is -0.0363, which suggests a slow speed of adjustment 
back to the long run equilibrium after a short run shock. About 4 percent of the 
disequilibria in the previous quarter are corrected in the current quarter. ECMt-1 also 
                                                          
3  The numbers in the parentheses separated by commas denote the selected optimal number of lag for 
each variable in the equation, excluding the dummy variable. 
4 The prediction mean-error of the SBC model is - 0.0017 and that of the AIC model is -0.0052. 
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shows that a change in FLI (∆FLI) is associated with the change in LVBT (∆LVBT). 
This information suggests that although there is no statistically significant long run 
relationship between the two variables (Table 6.1), a change in the composite index of 
financial liberalisation has some positive effect on the change in the total volume of 
bank transactions in the short run.     
 
 
Table 6.2 ARDL (3,0,0,0,0) Model ECM Results 
Dependent Variable: ∆LVBT 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio 
∆α   0.5912 0.4456 1.3269 
∆LVBT1   1.0000 0.0717 1.3940 
∆LVBT2 -0.5352 0.0656      -8.1616*** 
∆LGDPR   0.0086 0.0600 0.1436 
∆IRR   0.0000 0.0004 0.0557 
∆LPBB -0.0245 0.0206       -1.1860 
∆FLI   0.0378 0.0150    2.5247** 
∆ DLVBT -0.0310 0.0143  -2.1599** 
ECMt-1 -0.0363 0.177  -2.0513** 
**  Significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
 
A change in the total volume of bank transactions is directly associated with the 
change in the level of saving and investment. The impact of financial liberalisation on 
saving and investment is studied in the following section.    
 
6.3 Interest Rate, Savings and Investment 
One of the main hypotheses of financial liberalisation is that the deregulation of 
the interest rate would lead to an increase in the real interest rate, which in turn would 
increase saving and investment. To test this hypothesis, an empirical test is conducted 
on equation (4.7) and (4.8), with some adjustment for structural break. By including a 
dummy DLTDR for the structural break in the log of the real time deposits, equation (4.7) 
can be rewritten as follows:  
ttLTDRttttt eDFLILPBBDRRLGDPRLTDR ++++++= 11109876 αααααα  
                                                                                                                                      (6.4) 
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In the above equation, the log of the total real time deposits (LTDR), the log of 
the real gross domestic product (LGDPR), the log of the average population density per 
bank branch (LPBB), and the financial liberalisation index (FLI) are non-stationary, 
while the real deposit rate (DRR) is stationary (see Chapter 5). The regressand LTDR 
undergoes a structural break in 1980:04. The data reveals that the total real time 
deposits at banks jumped to Rs.11,749 million in the fourth quarter of 1980 from 
Rs.11,221 millions in the previous quarter, registering an increase of 4.7 per cent. 
Therefore, the dummy DLTDR takes the value of 0 until 1980:04 and 1 from 1981:01 
onwards. The ARDL test results for (6.4) are given in Table 6.3 and 6.4. 
The long run statistics (Table 6.3) reveals that the real deposit interest rate is the 
key determinant of the time deposits held by banks. The coefficient of DRR is 0.1020, 
which is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. It suggests that in the long run, 
an increase of one per cent in the real interest rate is associated with an increase of 
Rs.1.1074 million in the real time deposits5. This result contradicts with the findings 
reported by Bandiera et al. (2000), Loayza et al. (2000), and Reinhart and Tokatlidis 
(2001). These studies find no evidence of positive effect of the real interest rate on 
saving and in most cases they find the effect to be negative.  
 
 
Table 6.3 ARDL (4,3,4,0,0) Model Long Run Results 
Dependent Variable: LTDR 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio 
α0 -10.5308 12.6147 -0.8348 
LGDPR    1.6860   1.1457 1.4716 
DRR    0.1020   0.0452     2.2534** 
LPBB    0.2571   0.5998 0.4287 
FLI    0.0328   0.4476 0.0733 
DLTDR    0.6141   0.3968 1.5473 
**  Significant at 5% level 
 
 
The coefficient of LGDPR is not statistically significant. However, the 
coefficient of ∆LGDPR (Table 6.4) is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. 
                                                          
5 LTDR is in the natural log form while DRR is in the level form. An anti-log of the coefficient of DRR, 
which is 0.1020, is 1.1074. 
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This implies that although there is no statistically significant long run impact of real 
income on real saving, a change in the real income is associated with a change in the 
real saving in the short run. Similarly, a change in the real deposit rate (∆DRR) has a 
statistically significant positive effect on the change in real saving (∆LTDR). However, 
the change in the lags of DRR, i.e., ∆DRR1, ∆DRR2, and ∆DRR3 has a negative impact 
on the change in real savings. 
 
 
Table 6.4 ARDL (4,3,4,0,0) Model ECM Results 
Dependent Variable: ∆LTDR 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio 
∆α -0.3948 0.4868 -0.8109 
∆LTDR1  0.2072 0.0905      2.2904** 
∆LTDR2 -0.2593 0.0916      -2.8304*** 
∆LTDR3  0.1204 0.0894 1.3466 
∆LGDPR  0.6193 0.3052     2.0292** 
∆LGDPR1 -0.1739 0.3299       -0.5271 
∆LGDPR2 -0.5260 0.2985 -1.7622* 
∆DRR  0.0020 0.0008     2.6322** 
∆DRR1 -0.0024 0.0008     -2.8545*** 
∆DRR2 -0.0023 0.0008     -2.8167*** 
∆DRR3 -0.0019 0.0008   -2.3136** 
∆LPBB  0.0096 0.0197 0.4905 
∆FLI  0.0012 0.0166 0.0739 
∆ DLTDR  0.0230 0.0134 1.7205 
ECMt-1 -0.0375 0.0155   -2.4131** 
*  Significant at 10% level 
**  Significant at 5% level 
***  Significant at 1% level 
 
The ECM is statistically significant. It demonstrates that there is a long run 
relationship between the variables and the adjustment process is slow. The coefficient of 
–0.0375 suggests that about 4 per cent of the disequilibria of the previous quarter’s 
shock is adjusted back to the long run equilibrium in the current quarter. 
Both the long run and ECM results show that population density per bank 
branch and the composite index of financial liberalisation are not associated with the 
real time deposits. The overall result demonstrates the positive role played by the real 
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deposit rate in increasing the real time deposits. This finding clearly supports the first 
part of the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis.    
The second part of the hypothesis is associated with the positive effect of real 
interest rate on investment. Investment can be proxied by the total bank credits. In order 
to analyse this relationship, equation (4.9) is empirically tested after modifying it to 
include the dummy for structural change in the regressand. The modified equation is as 
follows: 
ttttt BCBRRFRLRRLTDRLTBCR 1615141312 ααααα ++++=  
                  ttLTBCRt eDFLI +++ 1817 αα                                             (6.5) 
In the above equation, the log of the real total bank credits (LTBCR), the log of 
the real time deposits (LTDR), the real borrowing from central bank (BCBR), the 
average population density per bank branch (LPBB) and the financial liberalisation 
index (FLI) are non-stationary variables, while the real lending rate (LRR) and the real 
refinance rate (RFR) are stationary variables (see Chapter 5). The unit root test results 
show that the variable LTBCR undergoes a structural break in 1995:02. In this quarter 
the real total bank credit increased by 6.8 per cent and reached Rs.41,526 million. To 
include this structural break, a dummy DLTBCR has been included in the equation that 
takes a value of 0 until 1995:02 and a value of 1 from 1995:03 onwards.  
The SBC selects an ARDL model of (4,1,0,0,0,0) while the AIC selects a model 
of (4,1,3,2,0,0). The SBC based model is employed here, as the prediction power of this 
model is superior to that of the AIC based model6. The ARDL test results are given in 
Table 6.5 and Table 6.6. 
The long run results given in Table 6.5 shows that real savings is the key 
determinant of real bank loans. The coefficient of LTDR 0.5561 which is highly 
significant implies that an increase in the real time deposits by Rs. 1 million would lead 
to an increase in the real bank lending by Rs.556 thousand. Similarly, borrowing from 
central bank and the summary measure of financial liberalisation have highly significant 
positive impact on the real bank lending but the coefficient of the former is 
infinitesimal. Statistically insignificant coefficient of the real lending rate (LRR) 
suggests that the lending rate does not determine the volume of bank lending. This can 
                                                          
6 The mean prediction error of SBC based and AIC based ARDL models are 0.0014 and – 0.0089, 
respectively. 
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happen where there is an extremely high demand for bank loans and the loans are in 
short supply. Therefore, from the above result, it can be inferred that even after the 
implementation of financial liberalisation policies, the bank loans are still in short 
supply in the Nepalese market.  
 
Table 6.5 ARDL (4,1,0,0,0,0) Model Long Run Results 
Dependent Variable: LTBCR 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio 
α0  4.1879 0.8408       4.9811*** 
LTDR  0.5561 0.0843        6.6003*** 
LRR -0.0168 0.0218 -0.7699 
RFR  0.0149 0.0204  0.7312 
BCBR  0.0002 0.0000        3.6743*** 
FLI  0.3420 0.1117        3.0624*** 
DLTBCR  0.3676 0.0823        4.4640*** 
***  Significant at 1% level 
 
Table 6.6 ARDL (4,1,0,0,0,0) Model ECM Results 
Dependent Variable: ∆LTBCR 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio 
∆α  0.7029 0.1114    6.3111*** 
∆LTBCR1  0.2955 0.0854    3.4598*** 
∆LTBCR2 -0.5593 0.0549 -10.1937*** 
∆LTBCR3  0.1655 0.0761     2.1748** 
∆LTDR -0.3953 0.1321   -2.9922*** 
∆LRR -0.0028 0.0035   -0.8091 
∆RFR  0.0025 0.0033     0.7586 
∆BCBR    0.00003   0.00001     3.3566*** 
∆FLI  0.0574 0.0142     4.0302*** 
∆ DLTBCR  0.0617 0.0190     3.2505 
ECMt-1 -0.1678 0.0407   -4.1228*** 
** Significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
  In Table 6.6, the coefficient of ECMt-1 is –0.1678, which is highly statistically 
significant. It implies that the disequilibrium occurred due to a shock is totally corrected 
in six quarters time at a rate of 17 per cent a quater. The ECM result also shows that a 
change in borrowing by commercial banks from the central bank (∆BCBR) and a 
change in the composite index of financial liberalisation (∆FLI) are associated with a 
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positive change in the real bank lending (∆LTBCR) although such change associated 
with the former (∆BCBR) is infinitesimal. However, the coefficient of ∆LTDR shows 
that a change in the real time deposits seems to be associated negatively with the change 
in the real bank lending.  
 
6.4 Economic Growth and Industrial Development 
 The ultimate goal of financial liberalisation in Nepal is to achieve higher 
economic growth and industrial development. In order to examine the impact of 
financial liberalisation on economic growth and industrial development in Nepal, 
ARDL-based empirical tests are conducted modifying equation (4.11) and (4.13), as 
developed in Chapter 4. 
 The regressand of (4.11) is the log of per capita real GDP (LGDPP) that goes 
through a structural change in 1974:01. The data reveals that the real per capita GDP 
increased significantly in the fourth quarter of 1974 by registering a quarterly growth of 
3.3 per cent. To include this structural break in the form of a dummy (DLGDPP), equation 
(4.11) is modified as follows: 
ttLGDPPtttt eDFLIIRRLFDLGDPP +++++= 2322212019 ααααα                   (6.6) 
 Among the variables included in the above equation, the log of the per capita 
gross domestic product (LGDPP), the log of the financial depth (LFD), and the financial 
liberalisation index (FLI) are non-stationary, and the real interest rate (IRR) is 
stationary. DLGDPP takes a value of 0 until 1974:01 and a value of 1 afterwards. 
Both the SBC and the AIC select the same ARDL model, which is (2,0,0,1). The 
ARDL test results are presented in Table 6.7 and Table 6.8 below. 
  
 
Table 6.7 ARDL (2,0,0,1) Model Long Run Results 
Dependent Variable: LGDPP 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio 
α0  7.5655 0.1167      64.8550*** 
LFD  0.0632 0.0923  0.6850 
IRR -0.0027 0.0036 -0.7439 
FLI  0.1818 0.0417        4.3660*** 
DLGDPP -0.0007 0.0037 -0.1803 
***  Significant at 1% level 
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Table 6.8 ARDL (2,0,0,1) Model ECM Results 
Dependent Variable: ∆LGDPP 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio 
∆α  0.3115 0.1597  1.9512** 
∆LGDPP1  0.5284 0.0735  7.1922*** 
∆LFD  0.0026 0.0036  0.7162 
∆IRR -0.0001 0.0001  0.7881 
∆FLI  0.0345 0.0105  3.3002*** 
∆ DLGDPP -0.0007 0.0037 -0.1803 
ECMt-1 -0.0412 0.0212 -1.9405* 
*  Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
 The ARDL results presented in the above tables reveal that the composite index 
of the financial liberalisation (FLI) is positively associated with per capita real GDP. 
Both the coefficients of FLI in Table 6.7 and that of ∆FLI in Table 6.8 are statistically 
significant at the one per cent level. This implies that FLI is associated positively with 
LGDPP in the long run as well as in the short run. However, LFD and IRR are not 
associated with LGDPP. The coefficient of ECMt-1 is –0.0412, which narrowly misses 
the statistical significance of the 5 per cent level. This shows that the adjustment process 
back to the long run equilibrium after a shock is slow, i.e., 4 per cent a quarter.     
The regressand in equation (4.13) is the log of the real non-agricultural gross 
domestic product (LNGDPR), which has a structural break in 1999:01. In the first 
quarter of 1999, the real non-agricultural gross domestic product increased by 1.27 per 
cent and reached Rs. 38,033 million. Among the variables of the equation system, the 
log of the real non-agricultural gross domestic product (LNGDPR), the log of the real 
total bank credits (LTBCR) and the financial liberalisation index (FLI) are 
nonstationary while the real interest rate (IRR) is stationary (see Chapter 5). By 
including the dummy for the structural break in LNGDPR, equation (4.13) can be 
rewritten as follows: 
 ttLNGDPRtttt eDFLIIRRLTBCRLNGDPR +++++= 2827262524 ααααα         (6.7) 
For testing the above relationship, the SBC selects an ARDL model of (2,3,0,0) 
while the AIC selects a model of (2,4,2,0). The SBC-based model is employed here as it 
 134
has a smaller prediction error compared to that of the AIC based model7. The long run 
and the ECM results of the selected ARDL model are presented in Table 6.9 and Table 
6.10, respectively. 
 
 
Table 6.9 ARDL (2,3,0,0) Model Long Run Results 
Dependent Variable: LNGDPR 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio 
α0   6.9867 1.5825   4.4150*** 
LTBCR   0.2640 0.1722   1.5332 
IRR -0.0072 0.0115  -0.6223 
FLI   0.6828 0.1874   3.6432*** 
DLNGDPR -0.3718 0.2143  -1.7353* 
*   Significant at 10% level 
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
 
 
Table 6.10 ARDL (2,3,0,0) Model ECM Results 
Dependent Variable: ∆LNGDPR 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio 
∆α 0.3800 0.2067  1.8381* 
∆LNGDPR1  0.4197 0.0954  4.3983*** 
∆LTBCR -0.1584 0.0552 -2.8708*** 
∆LTBCR1 -0.0754 0.0486 -1.5534 
∆LTBCR2 -0.1344 0.0535 -2.5118** 
∆IRR -0.0004 0.0006 -0.6700 
∆FLI  0.0371 0.0224  1.6601* 
∆ DLNGDPR  -0.0202 0.0167 -1.2109 
ECMt-1 -0.0544 0.0264 -2.0639** 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 1% level 
  
The ARDL test results (Table 6.9) suggest that there is a long run relationship 
between the composite index of financial liberalisation (FLI) and the real non-
agricultural GDP (LNGDPR). This relationship is statistically highly significant. The 
coefficient of FLI, which is 0.6828 states that a unit increase in the composite index of 
                                                          
7 The prediction mean error of the SBC based ARDL model is –0.0137, while that of the AIC based 
ARDL model is –0.0139 
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the overall financial liberalisation, is associated with an increase of Rs. 1.98 million in 
real non-agricultural GDP in the long run8. In the short run also, a change in FLI is 
positively associated with a change in LNGDPR, but this relationship is not statistically 
significant at the 5 per cent level. 
The result also reveals that the total bank credit (LTBCR) does not have a long-
run relationship with the real non-agricultural gross domestic product (LNGDPR). The 
ECM results (Table 6.10) show that a change in LTBCR is associated negatively with 
the change in LNGDPR.  
 
6.5 Financial Deepening 
Financial deepening shows the level of financial development in an economy, 
which is viewed as the catalyst for higher economic growth. In order to examine the 
impact of financial liberalisation on financial deepening the following relationship is 
tested: 
ttttt LPBBIRRLVBTPLGDPPLFD 3332313029 ααααα ++++=    
 ttLFDt eDFLI +++ 3534 αα                                                                   (6.8) 
 The above equation is the modified version of (4.15), and includes a dummy 
(DLFD) for the structural break in the log of financial depth (LFD). The dummy takes a 
value of 0 until 1975:02, and a value of 1 from 1975:03 onwards. The log of the 
financial depth (LFD), the log of the real per capita gross domestic product (LGDPP), 
the log of the real per capita volume of bank transaction (LVBTP), the log of the 
average population density per bank branch (LPBB) and the financial liberalisation 
index (FLI) are nonstationary variables, while the interest rate (IRR) is a stationary 
variable.  
An ARDL model of (4,0,4,0,0,0) is selected by SBC and a model of (4,1,4,3,0,0) 
is selected by AIC for the above equation. The SBC based model is employed here, as 
this model has better prediction power over the AIC-based model9. The test results are 
presented in Table 6.11 and 6.12 below. 
 
 
                                                          
8  LNGDPR is in the natural log form, while FLI is in the level form. The antilog of 0.6828 is 1.9794. 
9 The prediction mean error of SBC and AIC based models are 0.0025 and 0.0046, respectively. 
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Table 6.11 ARDL (4,0,4,0,0,0) Model Long Run Results 
Dependent Variable: LFD 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio 
α0 -2.0156 0.7473 -2.6972*** 
LGDPP -0.3726 0.4225 -0.8818 
LVBTP  0.8212 0.0846  9.7091*** 
IRR  0.0013 0.0030  0.4149 
LPBB -0.0102 0.1157 -0.0885 
FLI -0.0509 0.0818 -0.6224 
DLFD  0.2379 0.1450  1.6407 
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
Table 6.11 exhibits that there is a long run relationship between LFD and 
LVBTP. This relationship is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. According to 
Table 6.12, the change in LVBTP and LVBTPt-2 also are positively associated with the 
change in the LFD. But the change in LVBTPt-1 and LVBTPt-3 are negatively associated 
with the change in LFD.    
 
Table 6.12 ARDL (4,0,4,0,0,0) Model ECM Results 
Dependent Variable: ∆LFD 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio 
∆α -0.3274 0.1287 -2.5430*** 
∆LFD1  0.2958 0.0803  3.6829*** 
∆LFD2 -0.1718 0.0869 -1.9776** 
∆LFD3  0.3449 0.0837  4.1214*** 
∆LGDPP -0.0605 0.0763 -0.7937 
∆LVBTP  0.8236 0.0971  8.4829*** 
∆LVBTP1 -0.5693 0.1121 -5.0791*** 
∆LVBTP2  0.5140 0.0959  5.3616*** 
∆LVBTP3 -0.3986 0.1020 -3.9113*** 
∆IRR  0.0002 0.0005   0.4220 
∆LPBB -0.0017 0.0191 -0.0871 
∆FLI  0.0083 0.0133 -0.6236 
∆ DLFD  0.0387 0.0183   2.1074** 
ECMt-1 -0.1624 0.0456 -3.5598*** 
** Significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
Regarding the relationship with other variables, LFD seems not to be statistically 
significantly associated with LGDPP, IRR, LPBB, and FLI. This finding does not 
support the hypothesis of financial liberalisation, which specifically states that the real 
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interest rate is positively associated with financial deepening. This result is consistent 
with the findings from Demetriades and Luintel (1996). They also do not find any 
evidence to support the view that the real interest rate is an important determinant of 
financial development. 
The coefficient of ECMt-1 is –0.1624, which is statistically significant at the 1 
per cent level (Table 6.12). This result shows that the disequilibria occurred due to a 
short run shock is corrected at a rate of 16 per cent each quarter following such shock. 
At this rate it takes more than 6 quarters to come back to the long run equilibrium.   
 
6.6 Resource Allocation 
 The impact of financial liberalisation can be analysed against the efficiency in 
resource allocation too. To examine this aspect, following equation has been empirically 
tested.  
ttttt FLILPBBIRRLSBCPLSNGDP 4140393837 ααααα ++++=   
   tLSNGDPt eD ++ 42α                    (6.9) 
 This equation is the extended version of equation (4.17). To include the effect of 
the structural break in LSNGDP, a dummy (DLSNGDP) has been included in (6.9). 
Among the variables in the equation, the log of the share of non-agricultural sector GDP 
in the total GDP (LSNGDP), the log of the share of bank credit to poor population 
(LSBCP), the log of the average population density per bank branch (LPBB) and the 
financial liberalisation index (FLI) are nonstationary variables, while the real interest 
rate (IRR) is a stationary variable. The dummy DLSNGDP takes in the structural break that 
occurred in 1997:03.   
 The SBC-based ARDL model (2,0,1,0,0) is selected for the above equation10. 
The ARDL test results are presented in Table 6.13 and Table 6.14 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 The mean prediction error of SBC and AIC based models are 0.0165 and 0.0172, respectively. 
 138
 
Table 6.13 ARDL (2,0,1,0,0) Model Long Run Results 
Dependent Variable: LSNGDP 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio 
α0  2.1470 0.6866  3.1272*** 
LSBCP  0.5661 0.4037  1.4024 
IRR  0.0038 0.0045  0.8498 
LPBB -0.7382 0.1571 -4.6988*** 
FLI  0.0866 0.0880  0.9843 
DLSNGDP  0.0657 0.0941  0.6978 
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
The ARDL result shows that there is a statistically significant long-run 
relationship between the average population density per bank branch and the share of 
non-agricultural GDP of the total GDP. This result implies that an increase in the 
number of bank branches leads to an increase in the share of non-agricultural GDP in 
the total GDP. 
 
Table 6.14 ARDL (2,0,1,0,0) Model ECM Results 
Dependent Variable: ∆LSNGDP 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio 
∆α 0.2595 0.0775  3.3469*** 
∆LSNGDP1 0.4890 0.0828  5.9037*** 
∆LSBCP 0.0684 0.0457  1.4990 
∆IRR  -0.0024 0.0006 -3.6251*** 
∆LPBB -0.0892 0.0249 -3.5836*** 
∆FLI  0.0105 0.0128  0.8203 
∆ DLSNGDP  0.0079 0.0108  0.7373 
ECMt-1 -0.1209 0.0383 -3.1604*** 
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
 The ECM result shows that also a change in LPBB is significantly associated 
with a change in LSNGDP. However, other variables, namely LSBCP, IRR and FLI are 
found not to be associated with LSNGDP in the long run. The coefficient of ECMt-1 
states that 12 per cent of the disequilibria of the previous quarter is corrected in the 
current quarter following a short-run shock.    
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6.7 Employment Opportunities 
 The level of employment depicts the economic status of a country. Most of the 
economically advanced countries are found to have low unemployment rate, whereas 
one of the common features of an economically poor country is a high unemployment 
rate. Government policies in the economically poor countries are directed toward 
increasing the employment opportunities. In this context, financial liberalisation also 
might have some implication on changing the level of employment in a country. To 
examine the financial liberalisation impact on employment opportunities, the following 
relationship is tested. 
 ttttt FLILPBBIRRLFDLPBCIA 4746454443 ααααα ++++=      
 ttLPBCIA eD ++ 48α                  (6.10) 
 The above equation is constructed by adding a dummy DLPBCIA in equation 
(4.19). The log of real per capita bank credit to industry and agriculture (LPBCIA), the 
log of the financial depth (LFD), the log of the average population per bank branch 
(LPBB), and the financial liberalisation index (FLI) are nonstationary series, whereas 
the real interest rate (IRR) is a stationary series. LPBCIA embraces a structural break in 
1982:04, and this break is represented by DLPBCIA in the equation.  
 To analyse the long run relationship between the variables in equation (6.10), the 
ARDL test is conducted. The AIC-based model (3,1,4,0,4) is employed, as this model is 
found to have a smaller prediction error than that of the SBC-based model (1,1,0,0,0). 
The results of the ARDL model are presented in Table 6.15 and Table 6.16. 
Table 6.15 results show that all the variables except IRR form a long run 
relationship with LPBCIA. The relationship is highly significant. A one unit increase in 
LFD is associated with an increase of Rs.1.56 in the per capita bank credit to industry 
and agriculture sector. Similarly, a one unit decrease in LPBB is associated with an 
increase of Rs.2.19 in the LPBCIA. On the other hand, a one unit increase in FLI is 
associated with an increase of Rs.1.84 in LPBCIA11. The coefficient of ECMt-1 implies 
that 41 per cent of the disequilibria that occurred in the previous quarter is corrected in 
the present quarter following a short-run shock.  
 
                                                          
11 LPBCIA is in the log form, while FLI is in the level form. Antilog of the coefficient of FLI is 1.8397. 
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Table 6.15 ARDL (3,1,4,0,4) Model Long Run Results 
Dependent Variable: LPBCIA 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio 
α0 29.6808 4.1980  7.0703*** 
LFD 1.5558 0.2574  6. 434*** 
IRR 0.0007 0.0060  0.1101 
LPBB -2.1856 0.3790 -5.7667*** 
FLI  0.6096 0.0780  7.8150*** 
DLPBCIA  0.6892 0.1632 -4.2238*** 
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
   
 
Table 6.16 ARDL (3,1,4,0,4) Model ECM Results 
Dependent Variable: ∆LPBCIA 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio 
∆α 12.2060 2.1825   5.5926*** 
∆LPBCIA1  0.1159 0.0913   1.2700 
∆LPBCIA2  0.2698 0.0965   2.7959*** 
∆LFD  0.0054 0.3998   0.0125 
∆IRR  0.0003 0.0025   0.1098 
∆LPBB -1.1359 0.5806  -1.9565** 
∆LPBB1 -0.1398 0.5536  -0.2525 
∆LPBB2  1.5185 0.6741   2.2527** 
∆LPBB3  1.2500 0.5910   2.1152** 
∆FLI  0.0758 0.1172   0.6468 
∆FLI1 -0.1751 0.1230  -1.4232 
∆FLI2 -0.3909 0.1210  -3.2304*** 
∆FLI3 -0.3721 0.1286  -2.8932*** 
∆ DLPBCIA -0.2834 0.0699  -4.0537*** 
ECMt-1 -0.4112 0.0556  -7.3987*** 
** Significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
 Since the above measurement is indirect, the result should be interpreted 
carefully. From the above results, the amount of additional employment generated as the 
effect of financial liberalisation cannot be ascertained. However, it can be inferred that 
financial liberalisation has a positive impact on creating employment opportunities in 
industrial and agricultural sectors. Such impact emerges through an increase in the level 
of financial deepening, an increase in the number of bank branches, also due to the 
overall policy measures. This finding is consistent with the general hypothesis that the 
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increased total investment is positively associated with the increase in the number of 
jobs. 
 
6.8 Redistribution of Income 
 One of the major concerns of a developing country is the redistribution of 
income. Economic growth that is not linked with a reasonable redistribution leads to an 
increased gap between rich and poor, and this may bring serious problems on other 
socio-economic fronts. In order to investigate the role of financial liberalisation in the 
redistribution of income, equation (4.21) is modified and empirically tested as follows: 
          ttLSBCPPttttt eDFLILPBBIRRLFDLSBCPP ++++++= 545352515049 αααααα
           (6.11) 
 A unit root test shows that the log of the share of bank credit to poor population 
(LSBCPP), the log of the financial depth (LFD), the log of the average population 
density per bank branch (LPBB) and the financial liberalisation index (FLI) are non-
stationary variables and the real interest rate (IRR) is a stationary variable (see Chapter 
5). Regressand LSBCPP has a structural break in 1991:03. Therefore, the dummy 
DLSBCPP takes a value of 0 until 1991:03 and a value of 1 from 1991:04 onwards.  
 For equation (6.11), the model selection criteria SBC and AIC select the model 
of (1,1,0,0,0) and (1,4,0,0,3), respectively. The AIC-based model is employed here as it 
has the superior prediction power compared to that of the SBC based model12. Table 
6.17 and Table 6.18 contain ARDL test results. 
The long run result table (Table 6.17) shows that the population density per bank 
branch (LPBB) and the composite index of financial liberalisation (FLI) are negatively 
associated with the share of bank credit for the poor population in the total credit 
(LSBCPP). This result indicates a mixed type of effect. A decrease in the population 
density per bank branch is associated with an increase in the share of bank credit to the 
poor population. This relationship states that an increase in the number of bank branches 
would lead to an increase in the share of the bank credit to the poor. Generally, the 
banks initially are established in big cities. As per the branch extension guidelines set by 
the NRB time to time, the banks must open new branches in rural areas in a given ratios. 
                                                          
12  The mean prediction error of the SBC-based model is 0.0041, while that of the AIC based model is –
0.0015. 
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Therefore, the extension of the bank branches also means going from an urban to a rural 
area as well. This results in increased credit to the rural population. 
 
Table 6.17 ARDL (1,4,0,0,3) Model Long Run Results 
Dependent Variable: LSBCPP 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio 
α0  3.6745 1.6894   2.1750** 
LFD -0.3298 0.3809 -0.8659 
IRR  0.0026 0.0100   0.2630 
LPBB -1.2357 0.4304 -2.8708*** 
FLI  -0.6205 0.2021 -3.0704*** 
DLSBCPP   0.3357 0.2103  1.5967 
**   Significant at 5% level 
***   Significant at 1% level 
 
 
Table 6.18 ARDL (1,4,0,0,3) Model ECM Results 
Dependent Variable: ∆LSBCPP 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio 
∆α   0.6939 0.3611    1.9214* 
∆LFD   0.9904 0.2708    3.6568*** 
∆LFD1   0.3162 0.2592    1.2196 
∆LFD2 -0.1261 0.2478   -0.5089 
∆LFD3 -0.5958 0.2423   -2.4596** 
∆IRR  0.0005 0.0019    0.2637 
∆LPBB -0.2334 0.1039   -2.2471** 
∆FLI -0.1655 0.0914   -1.8105* 
∆FLI1  0.1583 0.0905    1.7486* 
∆FLI2  0.2368 0.0908    2.6088** 
∆ DLSBCPP  0.0634 0.0401    1.5821 
ECMt-1 -0.1889 0.0581   -3.2502*** 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
On the other hand, an increase in the summary measures of financial 
liberalisation is associated with a significant decrease in the share of the bank credit to 
the poor population. It can be inferred from this result that financial liberalisation is not 
helpful in poverty reduction since the overall effect of the policy is rather negatively 
associated with it. This means that an increase in the level of financial liberalisation 
would help increase the incidence of poverty. 
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 The coefficient of ECMt-1 is at –0.1889, which suggests a moderate speed of 
adjustment back to the long run equilibrium. This result is statistically significant at the 
1 per cent level. The result specifically states that about 19 per cent of the 
disequilibrium exerted by a short run shock is corrected each quarter following the 
shock. 
   
6.9 Financial Stability 
Without the financial stability, the financial sector cannot become helpful in 
achieving higher economic growth. One of the hypotheses of financial liberalisation is 
that the financial sector remains vulnerable and instable in a repressed state, and that 
stability can be brought in with the implementation of liberalisation policies. In this 
context, the following relationship is tested in order to examine the impact of financial 
liberalisation on financial stability. 
ttLCDRtttt eDFLILPBBLRRLCDR +++++= 5958575655 ααααα                (6.12) 
The above equation is constructed by adding a dummy (DLCDR) in to equation 
(4.23). Among the variables included in the equation, the log of the credit-deposit ratio 
of banks (LCDR), the log of the average population density per bank branch (LPBB) 
and the financial liberalisation index (FLI) are nonstationary series, while the real 
lending rate (LRR) is a stationary series. LCDR goes though a structural break in 
1990:01 and it has been captured in DLCDR. 
To test the long run relationship between the variables in the equation, the 
ARDL model test is conducted. The AIC based ARDL model (1,1,3,4) is selected over 
the SBC based model (1,0,3,0) as the former has a smaller prediction error13. The 
ARDL test results are given in Table 6.19 and Table 6.20. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13  The SBC-based model has a mean prediction error of –0.0181, while such error of the AIC-based 
model is 0.0074. 
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Table 6.19 ARDL (1,1,3,4) Model Long Run Results 
Dependent Variable: LCDR 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio 
α0 -4.6540 2.8817 -1.6150 
LRR -0.0159 0.0082 -1.9294* 
LPBB   0.4251 0.2834   1.5002 
FLI   0.3006 0.1443   2.0824** 
DLCDR -0.2833 0.1235  -2.2929** 
*   Significant at 10% level 
**   Significant at 5% level 
 
 
Table 6.20 ARDL (1,1,3,4) Model ECM Results 
Dependent Variable: ∆LCDR 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio 
∆α -0.8081 0.4551 -1.7758* 
∆LRR  0.0010 0.0016   0.6397 
∆LPBB -0.1647 0.2559 -0.6434 
∆LPBB1  1.1641 0.2407  4.8359*** 
∆LPBB2  0.5799 0.2286  2.5362** 
∆FLI -0.0472 0.0573 -0.8235 
∆FLI1 -0.0904 0.0570 -1.5860 
∆FLI2 -0.0119 0.0594 -0.2007 
∆FLI3 -0.1813 0.0610 -2.9722*** 
∆ DLCDR -0.0492 0.0190 -2.5914** 
ECMt-1 -0.1736 0.0418 -4.1576*** 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
The ARDL test result shows that there is a long-run relationship between FLI 
and LCDR. This relationship is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. This result 
suggests that an increase in the composite index of financial liberalisation is associated 
with an increase in the credit-deposit ratio. As explained in Chapter 4, a higher credit-
deposit ratio might be associated with higher non-performing assets of banks, and this 
may adversely affect the stability of the financial sector. From this point of view, the 
above result suggests that the summary measures of financial liberalisation bring 
instability to the financial sector. This finding is consistent with the fact that the bad 
loans of the Nepalese banking sector increased even after the implementation of 
financial liberalisation policies. The total bad loans of the banking sector in 2004 stood 
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at 29 per cent of the loan portfolios, and the share of such loans of NBL and RBB 
exceeded 50 per cent of their total loans (Himal 2005).     
The coefficient of real lending rate (LRR), which is negative, indicates the 
inverse relationship between LRR and LCDR. But this coefficient misses the 
significance of the 5 per cent level. LPBB does not form a long-run relationship with 
LCDR. However, the change in LPBB seems to be associated with a change in LCDR.  
The coefficient of ECMt-1 is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. This 
states that there is a strong error correction mechanism, and 17 per cent of the deviation 
from the long-run equilibrium is corrected in the following quarter after a short-run 
shock.  
 
6.10 Causality Test on Finance-Growth Variables 
In order to examine whether one variable is causally related to another, Granger 
(1969) introduced a concept of causality which is commonly known as, ‘Granger 
causality’. The concept is based on the idea that the future cannot affect the present or 
the past. In a bivariate framework, if current and lagged values of X improve the 
prediction of the future value of Y, then it is said that X ‘Granger causes’ Y. 
As discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 1.3), there has been a long debate about the 
direction of the causality between financial development and economic growth. With a 
view to examine this issue in the Nepalese context, the Granger causality test is 
conducted. 
The unit root test in Chapter 5 shows that the proxy of economic growth 
(LGDPP) and the proxy of financial development (LFD) are nonstationary series. As 
variables have to be stationary for the Granger causality test, the first difference of 
LGDPP and LFD is used. The simple model of Granger causality is as follows: 
∑∑
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2δλ     (6.14)  
Equation (6.13) postulates that the current value of ∆LGDPP is related to the 
past values of itself and the past values of ∆LFD. Similarly, equation (6.14) postulates 
that ∆LFD is related to the past values of itself and that of ∆LGDPP.  
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The null hypothesis in (6.13) is 0=jβ , which means, ‘∆LFD does not Granger 
cause ∆LGDPP’. Similarly, the null hypothesis in (6.14) is 0=jδ , and states ‘∆LGDPP 
does not Granger cause ∆LFD.’ The rejection or non-rejection of the null hypothesis is 
based on the F-statistics. 
There are four possible cases related to the direction of the causality between 
LGDPP and LFD, which are: 
i)  unidirectional causality from LFD to LGDPP 
ii) unidirectional causality from LGDPP to LFD 
ii) bilateral causality or feedback from each other 
iv) independence from each other or no causality 
The data of the time series are in a quarterly frequency. A lag length of 4 has 
been chosen for the above models. The Granger causality test results are given in Table 
6.21 below.  
 
Table 6.21 Granger Causality Results 
   
   Sample: 1970:1 – 2003:4 
   Lags: 4 
Null Hypothesis Observations F-Statistics Probability
∆LFD does not Granger cause ∆LGDPP 132 1.2385 0.2981 
∆LGDPP does not Granger cause ∆LFD 132 1.5209 0.2002 
 
The above test results show that F-statistics for both cases are not significant. 
This implies that null hypothesis for both equations cannot be rejected at the 5 per cent 
level. From these results, it can be concluded that there is no causal relationship 
between financial development and economic growth. In other words, financial 
development and economic growth are independent of each other in the case of Nepal, 
between 1970-2003.  
This result is in line with the cointegration test results for equation (6.6) and 
(6.8). These equations, which examine the relationship between LGDPP and LFD 
together with other relevant variables, do not find these variables to be significantly 
related. The finding is also consistent with the findings of Demetriades and Hussein 
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(1996), and Ram (1999). They also do not find any causal relationship existing between 
financial development and economic growth. 
From the overall results of the cointegration test presented in this chapter, it can 
be inferred that the financial liberalisation in Nepal has brought some positive impact on 
financial development and economic growth, but some negative impact on the 
redistribution and financial stability aspects. This type of impact of financial 
liberalisation is represented by the Scenario VI of the integrated framework developed 
in Chapter 4, where the growth aspect is high but redistribution (or equality) and 
stability aspects are low.  
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Chapter 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
In the first section of this Chapter, major empirical findings of the study are 
summarised and their policy implications are discussed. The second section outlines the 
specific contributions made by this study. Finally, the third section presents some issues 
toward which further studies should be directed. 
  
7.1 Empirical Findings and Policy Implications 
 The empirical test results show that financial liberalisation in Nepal has brought 
a mixed impact. The major findings and their policy implications are discussed in the 
following sub-sections.    
 
7.1.1 Economic Growth and Industrial Development 
 The results suggest that the number of per capita bank branches is significantly 
associated with the widening of the financial sector, and that the financial widening 
affects financial development. The policy implication of this finding is that the 
government should encourage the branch extension of banks in order to speed up the 
financial development in the country.   
Another finding of this study is that the real deposit rate is the key determinant 
of the time deposits whereas income is not. This finding suggests that irrespective of the 
changes in their income, people tend to save more when the real deposit rate is high. But 
people tend to choose to consume more or save in other forms than the time deposits at 
banks when the real deposit rate is low. Therefore, the real deposit rate should be kept 
high to increase the time deposits at banks.    
This study finds that the savings in the form of the time deposits at banks affect 
the bank loans, but that the lending rate does not have a significant impact on the bank 
loan. The inelastic lending rate indicates toward the situation that the bank loans are in 
short supply. This fact implies that the savings in the form of time deposits at banks is to 
be increased in order to increase the volume of the bank loans.  
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The borrowing by commercial banks from the central bank and the overall 
financial liberalisation policies also help increase the volume of bank loans. However, 
the statistics show that commercial banks in Nepal are borrowing from the central bank 
in a very small amount. Therefore, the commercial banks can increase the borrowing 
from the central bank in order to increase their loan disbursement. Similarly, it can be 
argued that the continued implementation of the various financial liberalisation 
measures will help increase the bank lending.   
The change in the number of bank branches has a positive impact on resource 
allocation. This finding suggests that when a bank is concentrated in a certain 
geographical area, it cannot find projects in an unlimited number that have a high return. 
As a consequence, after certain time, the bank has to extend loans even for projects with 
low returns and high risks. On the other hand, if the bank opens a new branch, the door 
for new investment opportunities is opened and the bank can extend loans for high 
return projects. Therefore, the resources can be allocated efficiently by increasing the 
number of bank branches.  
The composite index of the financial liberalisation is positively associated with 
per capita income as well as with industrial development. It suggests that increased 
availability of financial resources has encouraged the opening of new investment 
projects in the agriculture as well as the non-agricultural sector. As a consequence, it 
has promoted the economic growth of the country. Increased investment in the non-
agricultural sector has facilitated industrial development, which can have a long-term 
effect on economic growth. Thus, it can be argued that the implementation of financial 
liberalisation policies in Nepal has helped decrease the dependency on the agricultural 
sector.  
 
7.1.2 Employment and Redistribution of Income 
The financial deepening, the number of bank branches and the financial 
liberalisation measures collectively affect positively the bank loan to the agriculture and 
industrial sector. As agriculture and industry are the main employment-generating 
sectors, increased investment in these sectors are viewed to be linked with new job 
creation. Therefore, it can be argued that financial liberalisation has increased the 
employment opportunities in Nepal.  
The population density per bank branch is positively associated with the volume 
of bank credit to the poor - but the overall measures of financial liberalisation is 
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negatively associated with such credit. The opening of a new bank branch generally 
means the extension of banking services out of the main cities. As this process 
continues, the bank services ultimately spread to the rural area where a majority of the 
poor population resides. The availability of loan facilities to the poor help the increase 
the income generating activities of the poor, and ultimately assists in the redistribution 
of income. In this way, the increased number of bank branches may also be helpful in 
poverty reduction.  
On the other hand, the overall measures of financial liberalisation are found to 
be negatively associated with credit facilities to the poor. As financial liberalisation is 
related to the abolition of subsidies in interest rates and freedom given to the banks to 
extend their credit to high returning projects, there is a decrease in the flow of financial 
resources to the poor, along with the implementation of financial liberalisation 
measures. Therefore, an additional mechanism should be put side by side with the 
implementation of financial liberalisation measures in order to stop the decrease in the 
flow of the financial resources to the poor section of the population. 
     
7.1.3 Financial Stability 
The results of this study suggest that the financial liberalisation is positively 
associated with the credit-deposit ratio of the commercial bank. The credit-deposit ratio 
of a bank shows how much of the deposits collected from the depositors are extended as 
loan to the entrepreneurs or the consumers. As the banks have to pay certain interests on 
time deposits, they must invest the deposit money in such a way that they receive some 
return in excess of the interest paid by them on deposits. Keeping the deposit money 
idle means paying the interest by them without using the money. Therefore, the banks 
normally try to achieve a higher credit-deposit ratio.  
However, a higher credit-deposit ratio is not only associated with a higher return 
but also with higher risk. If a large portion of the credit extended by a bank is not 
repaid, the financial health of the bank is seriously affected. If such situation is 
widespread in the banking system then there exists instability in the entire financial 
system. Therefore, a higher credit-deposit ratio makes the financial system vulnerable. 
Under the financially repressed state, a high reserve requirement is one of the key 
factors that forces the credit-deposit ratio of the banks to remain low. As the reserve 
requirement is drastically reduced under financial liberalisation, more funds are 
available to extend as loans resulting to a higher credit-deposit ratio and the financial 
 151
instability occurs in the form of higher credit-deposit ratio in the banking sector. 
Therefore, it can be argued that financial liberalisation brings financial instability. With 
a view to protect the financial system from becoming vulnerable, an appropriate 
mechanism should be devised and implemented simultaneously with the 
implementation of a financial liberalisation policy. 
 
7.1.4 Finance-Growth Causality 
There is a long debate about the cause and effect relationship between financial 
development and economic growth. However, the economists advocating the financial 
liberalisation policies believe that financial development can facilitate economic 
growth. Some of the past studies have supported this view, but the others have either 
presented inconclusive results or supported the opposite view point. This study does not 
find any causal relationship between financial development and economic growth in 
Nepal. It means that the financial development and economic growth move 
independently. 
The core objective of financial liberalisation is to develop the financial sector 
with a belief that a healthy and strong financial sector would act as a catalyst for 
economic growth. If this belief were true, the financial development should have 
affected economic growth positively as a result of the financial liberalisation. But the 
above finding does not support this assertion. Therefore, it can be argued that financial 
liberalisation has not been able to facilitate the financial development so as to make it a 
cause of economic growth of the country.  
 
7.2 Contribution of this Study 
 This study has made some significant contributions in the field. These 
contributions are discussed in the following subsections: 
 
7.2.1 An Aggregated Framework for the Impact Evaluation 
This study has put forward an aggregated framework for the impact evaluation. 
This framework is useful not only for the impact evaluation of the financial 
liberalisation, but also for the impact evaluation of each and every public policy.   
There are a large number of studies in the field of financial liberalisation. Most 
of these studies focus on one or two aspects of it and generalise the result for the overall 
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policy implementation. The most frequently studied aspects of financial liberalisation 
include real interest rate and stock market development. More specifically, the impact of 
financial liberalisation on economic growth has been analysed in a greater detail (See 
Chapter 2.3), but the impact on the redistribution aspect is almost neglected. Similarly, 
the impact of liberalisation on financial stability also had been ignored until the Asian 
financial crisis.  
The impact evaluation of a policy or program is done in order to assess the 
effectiveness of that policy or the program. The inference drawn based on only partial 
aspects excluding other important ones may provide wrong information to the policy 
makers. Further, policies based on such information cannot bring expected result. In 
some cases unexpected negative impact may occur instead. Such a situation can be 
blamed for most of the public policy failures. Therefore, this study emphasizes on the 
study of the overall impact of the policy in an aggregated framework that includes all 
the three aspects, viz-economic growth, redistribution of income and financial stability. 
 
7.2.2 Overall Index of the Policy Measures 
 A summary index of the financial liberalisation policy measures has been 
developed in this study, which also takes into account the partial policy measures. 
Previous studies failed to properly include this part. Most of the studies are found either 
to treat the partial financial liberalisation as the full liberalisation, or exclude the partial 
liberalisation period by taking only the full liberalisation date. This is misleading, 
especially during the impact evaluation.     
 
7.2.3 Methodological Contribution 
 Economists face method selection problems while conducting unit root tests on 
time series data. As a practical solution to this problem, a sequential procedure for the 
unit root test based on a general to specific approach has been developed and used in 
this study. This procedure helps determine the appropriated test method for each time 
series under consideration. By following this procedure, one can avoid the risk of 
misspecification and misleading results to a great extent. 
 
7.2.4 First Study in the Nepalese Context 
 Nepal has been implementing the financial liberalisation policy for the last two 
decades. Although a couple of studies dealt with some aspects of financial liberalisation 
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in Nepal, no significant study is found to be conducted in the past on this field. 
Therefore, this is the first comprehensive study on the impact of the financial 
liberalisation in Nepal. 
  
7.3 Direction for Future Research 
 There are some issues, which could not be covered in this study. These issues 
should be dealt with in future studies. The issues are presented in the following 
subsections.  
 
7.3.1 In-depth Study on Redistribution and Poverty 
Due to the unavailability of the data in a required frequency or the time length 
on poverty incidence, gini coefficient and unemployment rate, the study on the impact 
of financial liberalisation on employment, income redistribution and poverty reduction 
have been rather indirect. In-depth study should be conducted in this field by employing 
other possible methods and survey data. 
 
7.3.2 External Sector Liberalisation 
The external sector, which is partially liberalised in Nepal, has not been analysed 
in this study. The effect of international interest rate and exchange rate on domestic 
financial resources specifically may be a field of interest. Therefore, future studies can 
focus on this area.  
    
7.3.3 India Factor 
Due to the open border and other socio-economic ties, virtually every event in 
India comes to affect a respective sector in Nepal. For example, demand and supply 
situation in India significantly affects the demand and supply situation in Nepal. This 
effect is unidirectional coming from India due to the incomparable size of the country 
and its economy. In addition to that, financial liberalisation in Nepal and India started 
almost at the same time and continued at the same pace. In this context, it would be 
interesting to study the impact of Indian financial liberalisation on Nepal. 
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7.2.4 Measuring the Cost of Policy Implementation 
Not only the benefits, but also the costs should be taken into account while 
assessing the effects of any policy implementation. Besides the expected changes, each 
and every policy may bring certain unexpected changes also, positive or negative, as the 
side effect of its implementation. A zero or negative impact on the targeted field and 
negative impact on other non-targeted fields may become the cost of the policy 
implementation. Although such costs cannot be quantified, these should be taken into 
account while conducting the impact evaluation. Therefore, future studies should try to 
develop some measures to quantify such costs. 
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APPENDIX A 
Table A.1 Financial Liberalisation Policy Variables 
  Value assigned: 0 for none, 1 for full, and 0.33, 0.50 and 0.66 for partial-gradual deregulation 
Year IRD REB RRR ECC IPR SMR PSB EAL
1970 Q1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1971 Q1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1972 Q1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1973 Q1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1974 Q1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1975 Q1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1976 Q1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1977 Q1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1978 Q1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1979 Q1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1980 Q1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Year IRD REB RRR ECC IPR SMR PSB EAL
1981 Q1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1982 Q1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1983 Q1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1984 Q1 0.33 1.00 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q2 0.33 1.00 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q3 0.33 1.00 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q4 0.33 1.00 0 0 0 0 0 0
1985 Q1 0.33 1.00 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q2 0.33 1.00 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q3 0.33 1.00 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q4 0.33 1.00 0 0 0 0 0 0
1986 Q1 0.66 1.00 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q2 0.66 1.00 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q3 0.66 1.00 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q4 0.66 1.00 0 0 0 0 0 0
1987 Q1 0.66 1.00 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q2 0.66 1.00 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q3 0.66 1.00 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q4 0.66 1.00 0 0 0 0 0 0
1988 Q1 0.66 1.00 0 0 0.50 0 0 0
Q2 0.66 1.00 0 0 0.50 0 0 0
Q3 0.66 1.00 0 0 0.50 0 0 0
Q4 0.66 1.00 0 0 0.50 0 0 0
1989 Q1 1.00 1.00 0 0 0.50 0 0 0
Q2 1.00 1.00 0 0 0.50 0 0 0
Q3 1.00 1.00 0 0 0.50 0 0 0
Q4 1.00 1.00 0 0 0.50 0 0 0
1990 Q1 1.00 1.00 0 0 0.50 0 0 0
Q2 1.00 1.00 0 0 0.50 0 0 0
Q3 1.00 1.00 0 0 0.50 0 0 0
Q4 1.00 1.00 0 0 0.50 0 0 0
1991 Q1 1.00 1.00 0 0.50 0.50 0 0 0
Q2 1.00 1.00 0 0.50 0.50 0 0 0
Q3 1.00 1.00 0 0.50 0.50 0 0 0
Q4 1.00 1.00 0 0.50 0.50 0 0 0
1992 Q1 1.00 1.00 0 0.50 0.50 0 0 0
Q2 1.00 1.00 0 0.50 0.50 0 0 0
Q3 1.00 1.00 0 0.50 0.50 0 0 0
Q4 1.00 1.00 0 0.50 0.50 0 0 0
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Year IRD REB RRR ECC IPR SMR PSB EAL
1993 Q1 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0 0 0
Q2 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0 0 0
Q3 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0 0 0.50
Q4 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0 0 0.50
1994 Q1 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0 0.50
Q2 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0 0.50
Q3 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0 0.50
Q4 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0 0.50
1995 Q1 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0 0.50
Q2 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0 0.50
Q3 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0 0.50
Q4 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0 0.50
1996 Q1 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0 0.50
Q2 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0 0.50
Q3 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0 0.50
Q4 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0 0.50
1997 Q1 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0 0.50
Q2 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0 0.50
Q3 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0 0.50
Q4 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0 0.50
1998 Q1 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0 0.50
Q2 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0 0.50
Q3 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0 0.50
Q4 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0 0.50
1999 Q1 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0 0.50
Q2 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0 0.50
Q3 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0 0.50
Q4 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0 0.50
2000 Q1 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0 0.50
Q2 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0 0.50
Q3 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0 0.50
Q4 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0 0.50
2001 Q1 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 0 0.50
Q2 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 0 0.50
Q3 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 0 0.50
Q4 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 0 0.50
2002 Q1 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 0 0.50
Q2 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 0 0.50
Q3 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 0 0.50
Q4 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 0 0.50
2003 Q1 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50
Q2 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50
Q3 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50
Q4 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50
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Table A.2 Quarterly Financial Liberalisation Index for Nepal 
(Based on Principal Component Methods) 
Year IRD REB RRR ECC IPR SMR EAL FLI
1970 Q1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1971 Q1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1972 Q1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1973 Q1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1974 Q1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1975 Q1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1976 Q1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1977 Q1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1978 Q1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1979 Q1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1980 Q1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Year IRD REB RRR ECC IPR SMR EAL FLI
1981 Q1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1982 Q1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1983 Q1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1984 Q1 0.123 0.334 0 0 0 0 0 0.457
Q2 0.123 0.334 0 0 0 0 0 0.457
Q3 0.123 0.334 0 0 0 0 0 0.457
Q4 0.123 0.334 0 0 0 0 0 0.457
1985 Q1 0.123 0.334 0 0 0 0 0 0.457
Q2 0.123 0.334 0 0 0 0 0 0.457
Q3 0.123 0.334 0 0 0 0 0 0.457
Q4 0.123 0.334 0 0 0 0 0 0.457
1986 Q1 0.246 0.334 0 0 0 0 0 0.580
Q2 0.246 0.334 0 0 0 0 0 0.580
Q3 0.246 0.334 0 0 0 0 0 0.580
Q4 0.246 0.334 0 0 0 0 0 0.580
1987 Q1 0.246 0.334 0 0 0 0 0 0.580
Q2 0.246 0.334 0 0 0 0 0 0.580
Q3 0.246 0.334 0 0 0 0 0 0.580
Q4 0.246 0.334 0 0 0 0 0 0.580
1988 Q1 0.246 0.334 0 0 0.189 0 0 0.769
Q2 0.246 0.334 0 0 0.189 0 0 0.769
Q3 0.246 0.334 0 0 0.189 0 0 0.769
Q4 0.246 0.334 0 0 0.189 0 0 0.769
1989 Q1 0.373 0.334 0 0 0.189 0 0 0.896
Q2 0.373 0.334 0 0 0.189 0 0 0.896
Q3 0.373 0.334 0 0 0.189 0 0 0.896
Q4 0.373 0.334 0 0 0.189 0 0 0.896
1990 Q1 0.373 0.334 0 0 0.189 0 0 0.896
Q2 0.373 0.334 0 0 0.189 0 0 0.896
Q3 0.373 0.334 0 0 0.189 0 0 0.896
Q4 0.373 0.334 0 0 0.189 0 0 0.896
1991 Q1 0.373 0.334 0 0.197 0.189 0 0 1.092
Q2 0.373 0.334 0 0.197 0.189 0 0 1.092
Q3 0.373 0.334 0 0.197 0.189 0 0 1.092
Q4 0.373 0.334 0 0.197 0.189 0 0 1.092
1992 Q1 0.373 0.334 0 0.197 0.189 0 0 1.092
Q2 0.373 0.334 0 0.197 0.189 0 0 1.092
Q3 0.373 0.334 0 0.197 0.189 0 0 1.092
Q4 0.373 0.334 0 0.197 0.189 0 0 1.092
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Year IRD REB RRR ECC IPR SMR EAL FLI
1993 Q1 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0 0 1.486
Q2 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0 0 1.486
Q3 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0 0.195 1.681
Q4 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0 0.195 1.681
1994 Q1 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0.381 0.195 2.062
Q2 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0.381 0.195 2.062
Q3 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0.381 0.195 2.062
Q4 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0.381 0.195 2.062
1995 Q1 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0.381 0.195 2.062
Q2 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0.381 0.195 2.062
Q3 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0.381 0.195 2.062
Q4 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0.381 0.195 2.062
1996 Q1 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0.381 0.195 2.062
Q2 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0.381 0.195 2.062
Q3 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0.381 0.195 2.062
Q4 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0.381 0.195 2.062
1997 Q1 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0.381 0.195 2.062
Q2 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0.381 0.195 2.062
Q3 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0.381 0.195 2.062
Q4 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0.381 0.195 2.062
1998 Q1 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0.381 0.195 2.062
Q2 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0.381 0.195 2.062
Q3 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0.381 0.195 2.062
Q4 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0.381 0.195 2.062
1999 Q1 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0.381 0.195 2.062
Q2 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0.381 0.195 2.062
Q3 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0.381 0.195 2.062
Q4 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0.381 0.195 2.062
2000 Q1 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0.381 0.195 2.062
Q2 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0.381 0.195 2.062
Q3 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0.381 0.195 2.062
Q4 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.189 0.381 0.195 2.062
2001 Q1 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.377 0.381 0.195 2.251
Q2 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.377 0.381 0.195 2.251
Q3 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.377 0.381 0.195 2.251
Q4 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.377 0.381 0.195 2.251
2002 Q1 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.377 0.381 0.195 2.251
Q2 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.377 0.381 0.195 2.251
Q3 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.377 0.381 0.195 2.251
Q4 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.377 0.381 0.195 2.251
2003 Q1 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.377 0.381 0.195 2.251
Q2 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.377 0.381 0.195 2.251
Q3 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.377 0.381 0.195 2.251
Q4 0.373 0.334 0.394 0.197 0.377 0.381 0.195 2.251
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Graph of the Variables 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Statistics of the ARDL Models 
  
 
1. Financial Sector Widening (Equation 6.3) 
1.1 Key Regression Statistics 
R2 = 0.9993 
Durbin-Watson Statistic = 2.0486 
F(8, 119) = 22061.9 (0.000) 
1.2 Diagnostic Test Results 
a. Serial Correlation F(4, 115) = 4.4868 (0.002) 
b. Functional Form F(1, 118) = 1.4753 (0.227) 
c. Normality χ2 (2) = 0.6889 (0.709) 
d. Heteroscedasticity F(1, 126) = 4.7416 (0.031)  
 
 
 
1.3 Plot of CUSUM and CUSUMSQ (Stability Test) 
 
 Plot of Cumulative Sum of Recursive Residuals
 The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level
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 Plot of Cumulative Sum of Squares of Recursive Residuals
 The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level
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2. Interest Rate and Savings (Equation 6.4) 
2.1 Key Regression Statistics 
R2 = 0.9993 
Durbin-Watson Statistic = 2.1215 
F(16, 111) = 10920.2 (0.000) 
2.2 Diagnostic Test Results 
a. Serial Correlation F(4, 107) = 5.1425 (0.001) 
b. Functional Form F(1, 110) = 0.3951 (0.531) 
c. Normality χ2 (2) = 3.1082 (0.211) 
d. Heteroscedasticity F(1, 126) = 4.1105 (0.045)  
 
2.3 Plot of CUSUM and CUSUMSQ (Stability Test) 
 
 Plot of Cumulative Sum of Recursive Residuals
 The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level
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 Plot of Cumulative Sum of Squares of Recursive Residuals
 The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level
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3. Interest Rate and Investment (Equation 6.5) 
3.1 Key Regression Statistics 
R2 = 0.9985 
Durbin-Watson Statistic = 2.0510 
F(11, 116) = 6855.6 (0.000) 
3.2 Diagnostic Test Results 
a. Serial Correlation F(4, 112) = 4.6084 (0.002) 
b. Functional Form F(1, 115) = 0.0053 (0.942) 
c. Normality χ2 (2) = 0.1641 (0.921) 
d. Heteroscedasticity F(1, 126) = 5.4799 (0.021)  
 
3.3 Plot of CUSUM and CUSUMSQ (Stability Test) 
 
 Plot of Cumulative Sum of Recursive Residuals
 The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level
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 Plot of Cumulative Sum of Squares of Recursive Residuals
 The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level
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4. Economic Growth (Equation 6.6) 
4.1 Key Regression Statistics 
R2 = 0.9981 
Durbin-Watson Statistic = 2.0762 
F(7, 124) = 9230.9 (0.000) 
4.2 Diagnostic Test Results 
a. Serial Correlation F(4, 120) = 17.6708 (0.000) 
b. Functional Form F(1, 123) = 0.0653 (0.799) 
c. Normality χ2 (2) = 121.0787 (0.000) 
d. Heteroscedasticity F(1, 130) = 4.2973 (0.040)  
 
4.3 Plot of CUSUM and CUSUMSQ (Stability Test) 
 
 Plot of Cumulative Sum of Recursive Residuals
 The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level
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 Plot of Cumulative Sum of Squares of Recursive Residuals
 The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level
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5. Industrial Development (Equation 6.7) 
5.1 Key Regression Statistics 
R2 = 0.9987 
Durbin-Watson Statistic = 2.1935 
F(9, 86) = 7488.5 (0.000) 
5.2 Diagnostic Test Results 
a. Serial Correlation F(4, 82) = 10.8018 (0.000) 
b. Functional Form F(1, 85) = 1.2346 (0.270) 
c. Normality χ2 (2) = 413.8578 (0.000) 
d. Heteroscedasticity F(1, 94) = 5.6507 (0.019)  
 
5.3 Plot of CUSUM and CUSUMSQ (Stability Test) 
 
 Plot of Cumulative Sum of Recursive Residuals
 The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level
-5
-10
-15
-20
0
5
10
15
20
1977Q1 1980Q4 1984Q3 1988Q2 1992Q1 1995Q4 1999Q3 2000Q4
 
 
 171
 Plot of Cumulative Sum of Squares of Recursive Residuals
 The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level
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6. Financial Deepening (Equation 6.8) 
6.1 Key Regression Statistics 
R2 = 0.9986 
Durbin-Watson Statistic = 2.2892 
F(14, 113) = 5921.4 (0.000) 
6.2 Diagnostic Test Results 
a. Serial Correlation F(4, 109) = 5.0421 (0.001) 
b. Functional Form F(1, 112) = 0.1312 (0.909) 
c. Normality χ2 (2) = 12.9521 (0.002) 
d. Heteroscedasticity F(1, 126) = 16.5043 (0.000)  
 
6.3 Plot of CUSUM and CUSUMSQ (Stability Test) 
 
 Plot of Cumulative Sum of Recursive Residuals
 The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level
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 Plot of Cumulative Sum of Squares of Recursive Residuals
 The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level
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7. Resource Allocation (Equation 6.9) 
7.1 Key Regression Statistics 
R2 = 0.9954 
Durbin-Watson Statistic = 2.0921 
F(8, 95) = 2565.91 (0.000) 
7.2 Diagnostic Test Results 
a. Serial Correlation F(4, 91) = 8.9399 (0.000) 
b. Functional Form F(1, 94) = 0.1363 (0.907) 
c. Normality χ2 (2) = 812.9623 (0.000) 
d. Heteroscedasticity F(1, 102) = 4.7503 (0.032)  
 
7.3 Plot of CUSUM and CUSUMSQ (Stability Test) 
 
 
 Plot of Cumulative Sum of Recursive Residuals
 The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level
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 Plot of Cumulative Sum of Squares of Recursive Residuals
 The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level
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8. Employment Opportunities (Equation 6.10) 
8.1 Key Regression Statistics 
R2 = 0.9945 
Durbin-Watson Statistic = 1.9907 
F(17, 78) = 829.4422 (0.000) 
8.2 Diagnostic Test Results 
a. Serial Correlation F(4, 74) = 1.0616 (0.382) 
b. Functional Form F(1, 77) = 0.9127 (0.342) 
c. Normality χ2 (2) = 50.5784 (0.000) 
d. Heteroscedasticity F(1, 94) = 7.3808 (0.008)  
 
8.3 Plot of CUSUM and CUSUMSQ (Stability Test) 
 
 
 Plot of Cumulative Sum of Recursive Residuals
 The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level
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 Plot of Cumulative Sum of Squares of Recursive Residuals
 The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level
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9. Redistribution of Income (Equation 6.11) 
9.1 Key Regression Statistics 
R2 = 0.9985 
Durbin-Watson Statistic = 2.0510 
F(11, 116) = 6855.6 (0.000) 
9.2 Diagnostic Test Results 
a. Serial Correlation F(4, 112) = 4.6084 (0.002) 
b. Functional Form F(1, 115) = 0.0053 (0.942) 
c. Normality χ2 (2) = 0.1641 (0.921) 
d. Heteroscedasticity F(1, 126) = 5.4799 (0.211)  
 
9.3 Plot of CUSUM and CUSUMSQ (Stability Test) 
 
 Plot of Cumulative Sum of Recursive Residuals
 The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level
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 Plot of Cumulative Sum of Squares of Recursive Residuals
 The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level
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10. Financial Stability (Equation 6.12) 
10.1 Key Regression Statistics 
R2 = 0.9096 
Durbin-Watson Statistic = 1.7305 
F(13, 94) = 72.7267 (0.000) 
10.2 Diagnostic Test Results 
a. Serial Correlation F(4, 90) = 2.9458 (0.024) 
b. Functional Form F(1, 92) = 0.7625 (0.385) 
c. Normality χ2 (2) = 2.0898 (0.352) 
d. Heteroscedasticity F(1, 106) = 0.0861 (0.770)  
 
10.3 Plot of CUSUM and CUSUMSQ (Stability Test) 
 
 Plot of Cumulative Sum of Recursive Residuals
 The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level
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 Plot of Cumulative Sum of Squares of Recursive Residuals
 The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level
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